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In this thesis, two topics in portfolio management have been studied: utility-
risk portfolio selection and a paradox in time consistency in mean-variance prob-
lem.
The first topic is a comprehensive study on utility maximization subject to
deviation risk constraints. Under the complete Black-Scholes framework, by us-
ing the martingale approach and mean-field heuristic, a static problem includ-
ing a variational inequality and some constraints on nonlinear moments, called
Nonlinear Moment Problem, has been obtained to completely characterize the
optimal terminal payoff. By solving the Nonlinear Moment Problem, the various
well-posed mean-risk problems already known in the literature have been revis-
ited, and also the existence of the optimal solutions for both utility-downside-risk
and utility-strictly-convex-risk problems has been established under the assump-
tion that the underlying utility satisfies the Inada Condition. To the best of
our knowledge, the positive answers to the latter two problems have long been
absent in the literature. In particular, the existence of an optimal solution for
utility-semivariance problem, an example of the utility-downside-risk problem, is
in substantial contrast to the nonexistence of an optimal solution for the mean-
2semivariance problem. This existence result allows us to utilize semivariance as a
risk measure in portfolio management. Furthermore, it has been shown that the
continuity of the optimal terminal wealth in pricing kernel, thus the solutions in
the binomial tree models converge to the solution in the continuous-time Black-
Scholes model. The convergence can be applied to provide a numerical method
to compute the optimal solution for utility-deviation-risk problem by using the
optimal portfolios in the binomial tree models, which are easily computed; such
numerical algorithm for optimal solution to utility-risk problem has been absent
in the literature.
In the second part of this thesis, a paradox in time consistency in mean-
variance has been established. People often change their preference over time,
so the maximizer for current preference may not be optimal in the future. We
call this phenomenon time inconsistency or dynamic inconsistency. To manage
the issues of time inconsistency, a game-theoretic approach is widely utilized to
provide a time-consistent equilibrium solution for dynamic optimization problem.
It has been established that, if investors with mean-variance preference adopt the
equilibrium solutions, an investor facing short-selling prohibition can acquire a
greater objective value than his counterpart without the prohibition in a buoyant
market. It has been further shown that the pure strategy of solely investing in
bond can sometimes simultaneously dominate both constrained and unconstrained
equilibrium strategies. With numerical experiments, the constrained investor can
dominate the unconstrained one for more than 90% of the time horizon. The
source of paradox is rooted from the nature of game-theoretic approach on time
consistency, which purposely seeks for an equilibrium solution but not the ultimate
maximizer. Our obtained results actually advocate that, to properly implement
the concept of time consistency in various financial problems, all economic aspects
should be critically taken into account at a time.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Since the first introduction in Markowitz (1952), portfolio management has be-
come one of the key research topics in finance. In financial markets, investors
always have to make decisions on asset allocations and plan for the future. In-
vesting more proportion of wealth in a more risky asset can enhance the expected
portfolio payoff, meanwhile, it also increases the uncertainty on the portfolio pay-
off, called “portfolio risk”. Portfolio management is a study on striving for an
optimal portfolio which maintains an ideal balance between portfolio return and
portfolio risk. Hence, the research on portfolio management can provide more
effective portfolio management and monitor prevalent risks in financial markets.
Samuelson (1969) and Merton (1971) extended Markowitz’s portfolio selection
problem from single-period framework to multi-period and continuous time set-
tings respectively. Stochastic control theory is widely applied to dynamic decision
making by formulating a stochastic control problem. A portfolio adopted by the
investor is represented by a control function. An objective function, which is a
functional of the control function, is used for representing the investor’s prefer-
ence in the portfolio. Under this setting, the investor aims to choose the ideal
control function which maximizes the objective function. There are two common
approaches to solve the stochastic control problem and portfolio selection, namely,
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dynamic programming approach and martingale approach. The former approach
makes use of dynamic programming principle (DPP) to obtain the Hamilton-
Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation, which characterizes the optimal portfolio, by
invoking the inherent tower property. The optimal portfolio can be obtained by
solving the HJB equation using partial differential equation (PDE) methods; see
Merton (1971), Touzi (2002), and Fleming and Soner (2006) for details. Alterna-
tively, the martingale method can be applied to solve for this utility maximization
problem in a complete market, where the existence of the optimal solution can be
shown by using duality method, and then utilize the Clark-Ocone formula to seek
for the optimal weight; see Pliska (1982, 1986), Karatzas et al. (1987, 1991), Cox
and Huang (1989), and Deelstra et al. (2001) for details.
In this thesis, two topics in portfolio management have been investigated. The
first topic is a comprehensive study of the utility-deviation-risk portfolio selection
problem. In this framework, the investor aims to maximize the expected utility of
portfolio terminal payoff and to minimize the portfolio risk induced by the devi-
ation of the portfolio terminal payoff from the expected payoff at the same time.
We establish the existence and characterization results of optimal solutions to the
utility-risk problems. Furthermore, we provide a numerical algorithm to compute
the optimal solution. As the result, an optimal asset allocation which maximizes
investor’s satisfaction gained from portfolio payoff and manages the risk of the
underlying portfolio simultaneously can be obtained. The second topic concerns
the time consistency in portfolio management. People often change their prefer-
ence over time, thus, in dynamic decision making, a decision which is optimal for
the current preference however may not be optimal for the future preference. We
call this intertemporal conflict time inconsistency or dynamic inconsistency. The
continuous-time mean-variance problem is an example of time-inconsistent prob-
lems. A game-theoretic approach is commonly used to provide a time-consistent
solution, called equilibrium strategy. Our main contribution to the second topic
2
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is a paradoxical result in the equilibrium solution to mean-variance problem: an
investor facing more investment constraints can acquire a greater objective value
than his counterpart with less. An overview of these two topics and a summary
of our work in this thesis will be described in this chapter.
1.1 Utility-risk Portfolio Selection
Expected utility and mean-variance are two common criteria for evaluating portfo-
lio performance. For example, Samuelson (1969) and Merton (1971) investigated
utility maximization problems in multi-period and continuous time settings re-
spectively, while Markowitz (1956) and Merton (1972) aimed to minimize the
variance of the portfolio return subject to a constraint on the expected return of
the terminal wealth, and they also established the efficient frontier.
The advantage of the utility maximization formulation allows a direct applica-
tion of dynamic programming or via HJB by invoking the inherent tower property.
The advantage of using mean-variance criteria is due to its relative computational
simplicity and convenience in selling in bulk to accommodate market demand;
indeed, different consumers possess different utilities towards return, but due to
the limitation of resources available, it is more convenient to sell a uniform pack-
age which can cater for the needs of most people. Levy and Markowitz (1979)
showed that the optimal portfolio in utility maximization can be approximated by
the mean-variance efficient frontier over ranges of commonly used utilities, return
rates and volatilities. Hence, the mean-variance portfolio can basically entertain
the almost optimal satisfaction of common consumers. Further studies support
this approximation; for instances, see Markowitz (1959, 2010), Pulley (1981), and
Kroll et al. (1984).
Due to the nonlinear nature of the square function of the expectation of the
terminal wealth involved in the variance, an immediate application of dynamic
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programming principle is not viable, which results that the analytic research in
mean-variance portfolio optimization is used to mainly focused on single-period
models at the first stage. The embedding technique developed by Li and Zhou
(2000) broke the ice by converting the mean-variance problems under both contin-
uous time and multi-period settings into the canonical linear-quadratic stochastic
control problems. From that point on, more complicated mean-variance problems
have also been investigated, in work such as Lim and Zhou (2002), Bielecki et al.
(2005), Chen et al. (2008) and Chen and Yang (2011).
Variance is not the only risk measure commonly adopted in the portfolio se-
lection problem. Jin et al. (2005) consider a general convex risk function of the
deviation of the terminal payoff from its own mean, by following the Lagrangian
approach as proposed in Bielecki et al. (2005), to characterize the optimal terminal
payoff, and then they applied the Clark-Ocone formula to determine the optimal
portfolio weights. Besides, they also studied the mean-downside-risk problem and
established the non-existence of an optimal solution by showing that the opti-
mal value function is unattainable by any admissible control. The downside-risk
measure can remedy the common criticism on incurring penalty on the upside
return which happens in the use of variance. Markowitz (1990) also claims that
“semivariance (an example of downside risk measure) seems more plausible than
variance as a measure of risk since it is concerned only with adverse deviations”.
In contrast to continuous time models, Jin et al. (2006) solved for the single-
period mean-semivariance portfolio selection problem. After that, the study on
the optimization problem subject to downside risk measure has been absent until
the recent study by Cao et al. (2014), in which they showed that mean-lower-
partial-moments problem possesses a positive solution if we impose a uniform
upper bound on the terminal payoff. For the relevant literature in connection
with downside risk measure and semivariance, see also Hogan and Warren (1972),
Nantell and Price (1979), Nawrocki (1999), and Steinbach (2001). Apart from
4
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using deviation risk measure, He et al. (2015) studied continuous-time mean-risk
portfolio choice problems with general risk measures including VaR, CVaR, and
law-invariant coherent risk measures.
Turning back to reality, a number of financial crises have been observed fre-
quently over recent decades, so tighter government regulations have been enforced
in the financial market. On the other hand, the intensive competition in the
market pushes any old-fashioned profitable strategies to the edge; all of these
urge most companies to provide more tailor-made investment products in order
to maintain their profit margins. A uniform package such as the mean-variance
portfolio mentioned above can barely satisfy the demand of sophisticated investors
nowadays, and a definitive answer to utility maximization with minimal risk is
eagerly sought. Nevertheless, before our present work, the solution to this most
relevant optimization problem has still been long absent in the literature.
In Chapter 2, we first provide a comprehensive study of utility-risk portfolio
selection problems: we suggest that the objective function of portfolio selection
is not simply the expected value of a certain functional of the terminal payoff,
but it also deals with the deviation risk caused by the underlying portfolio. Note
that Jin et al. (2005) call their problem formulation mean-risk problem, though
they only consider deviation risk measure in their work, so to avoid ambiguity,
we use a single word “risk” to stand for the deviation risk measure throughout
this thesis. Our proposed problem follows the recent trend of embedding various
risk management criteria into the utility maximization framework. Such risk-
monitoring mechanisms reduce the drawback caused by the ambitious investment
strategy in pure utility maximization problems, which could lead to higher risk of
potential pecuniary loss (see Zheng, 2009). To name a few along this direction,
Basak and Shapiro (2001) first suggested implementing a Value-at-Risk (VaR)
constraint into the portfolio optimization due to the prevailing regulation on VaR
limitation. The research in Yiu (2004), Leippold et al. (2006), and Cuoco et al.
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(2008) further turn the VaR limitation from a static constraint to a dynamic
one in various utility-optimization problems. Besides, Zheng (2009) studied the
efficient frontier problem of both maximizing the expected utility of the terminal
wealth and minimizing the conditional VaR of any potential loss. To the best of
our knowledge, our present work is the first attempt to apply risk management to
utility maximization subject to the deviation risk measure.
More precisely, we model the objective function as the difference of deviation
risk (function of the deviation of the terminal payoff from its own mean) from
the utility (concave increasing function of the terminal payoff); see 2.1.2. We first
follow the same idea as in Bielecki et al. (2005) and Jin et al. (2005) to convert our
dynamic optimization problem into an equivalent static problem. By considering
the first-order condition for the objective function, we can obtain a primitive static
problem, called the Nonlinear Moment Problem, which characterizes the optimal
terminal wealth with respect to the respective necessity and sufficiency results
(Sections 2.2.1 and 2.3.1), which are fundamentally different, and not equivalent
to each other. For necessity, the optimal terminal wealth satisfying two mild reg-
ularity conditions (Conditions 2.2.1 (i) and (ii)) solves for the Nonlinear Moment
Problem; while for sufficiency, the solution of the Nonlinear Moment Problem
that satisfies Condition 2.3.1 serves as the optimal terminal wealth. Note that
this Nonlinear Moment Problem includes a variational inequality (2.2.4) with a
set of constraints (2.2.5)-(2.2.7) involving the expectation of some nonlinear func-
tions of the optimal terminal wealth and its own mean, or the “mean-field term”
in the context of mean-field type control theory. The formulation of the Nonlinear
Moment Problem is motivated by the mean-field approach developed in Bensous-
san et al. (2014), in which the authors studied the classical mean-variance problem
with the aid of a novel mean-field type HJB equation. Note that the same static
problem may be obtained via the formal Lagrangian multiplier approach as in
Bielecki et al. (2005) and Jin et al. (2005).
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With the aid of the Nonlinear Moment Problem, our necessity conditions war-
rant an alternative deduction of the non-existence result of the mean-semivariance
problem, first considered in Jin et al. (2005). On the other hand, for the applica-
tion of the sufficiency conditions together with the Nonlinear Moment Problem,
we replicate the explicit construction of the optimal solutions of various well-
posed mean-risk problems in the existing literature. Furthermore, the novelty
of our new approach allows us to establish new existence result for the optimal
solutions for a variety of utility-risk problems, especially the utility-downside-risk
(in Section 2.3.2) and the utility-strictly-convex-risk problems (in Section 2.3.3),
in which the underlying utility satisfies the common Inada Condition. To the
best of our knowledge, these problems have not been considered so far before our
work. Note that by the sufficiency result in Theorem 2.3.2, we can conclude that
there exists an optimal solution for the utility-downside-risk problem including
utility-semivariance problem, and this result is in contrast to Jin et al. (2005), in
which they find that the continuous-time mean-downside-risk problem possesses
no optimal solution at all. As a consequence, the possibility of using semivari-
ance as a natural risk measure in the portfolio selection can now be legitimately
implemented.
1.2 Numerical Valuation of Optimal Utility-risk
Portfolio Payoff
In Chapter 2, we characterize the optimal terminal wealth to utility-risk problem
using Nonlinear Moment Problem. In order to obtain explicit solutions for utility-
risk problems, we need to first obtain the explicit solution for the corresponding
system of nonlinear equations simplified from the Nonlinear Moment Problem.
Since the system consists of improper integrations of the implicit function of a
variable over the positive real line, an explicit numerical solution of the equation
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system is usually difficult to be obtained even in the simple cases such as power-
utility-variance problems (the details can be refer to Remark 3.3.15). To compute
integration numerically, a usual approach is to discretize the domain so that the
integral can be approximated by a finite sum. In Chapter 3, we make use of this
idea in a more intuitive way in the sense that the optimal terminal payoffs for
continuous-time utility-risk problem in Chapter 2 is approximated by the optimal
terminal payoffs in the binomial tree model.
A main objective of portfolio selection is to implement the optimal portfolio
in practice, while the theoretical existence result is an intermediate achievement.
The explicit form of optimal portfolio is eagerly sought as we can compute the
optimal portfolio weight and implement the optimal portfolio directly. However,
most problems in portfolio selection do not have an explicit form of optimal port-
folio, so we may seek for some numerical method to trace the optimal solution.
Through DPP approach, the optimal portfolio can be characterized by a HJB
equation. The discrete approximation of HJB equation such as finite difference
method can be applied to obtain the optimal portfolio and its corresponding
value function. For instance, perpetual utility maximization with the respective
convergence results was studied in Fitzpatrick and Fleming (1991). For the other
literature which uses discrete approximation of HJB equation in portfolio selection
paradigm, one can consult Brennan et al. (1997) and Forsyth and Wang (2010).
Alternative, Campbell and Viceira (1999) obtain approximate closed-form solu-
tions through log-linearizing the first-order condition characterization of optimal
solution. Under the martingale approach, the optimal terminal wealth for portfo-
lio selection can be obtained, but there is no information about the corresponding
optimal portfolio. To resolve this problem, Cvitanic´ et al. (2003) and Detemple
et al. (2003) utilize a Monte Carlo method to simulate the optimal solutions.
Apart from discretizing the analytic characterization of optimal solution di-
rectly, we can approximate the optimal solution under continuous-time setting
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by using the solution in discrete time model which is easier to compute. He
(1991) establish that the sequence of optimal solutions to utility maximization
under discrete-time lattice models to continuous-time diffusion model with multi
assets. The corresponding discrete-time solution is obtained by solving a partial
differential equation derived through DPP approach. The book by Prigent (2003)
provides a comprehensive study of the weak convergence of the optimal solution
obtained through the martingale method from discrete-time models to continuous
time model.
In Chapter 3, we first extend the utility-risk framework in Chapter 2 to a gen-
eralized model setting such that the dynamics of asset prices can be unspecified.
We make assumptions on the existence of pricing kernel and complete market
(see Section 3.1). In this case, the discrete binomial tree model, the continuous-
time Black-Scholes model (which is used in Chapter 2), and more complicated
stochastic interest rate model are covered (see examples in Section 3.1). In con-
trast with Chapter 2, we focus on the combinations between utility function which
satisfies the Inada conditions and strictly concavity and two types of deviation
risk measure, namely, downside risk and strictly convex risk. Under this problem
formulation, two problems will be studied in Chapter 3:
(i) The existence and uniqueness of the optimal solution.
(ii) The conditions for the convergence of the optimal solutions under different
model settings.
The numerical approximation of the optimal solution under the continuous-time
Black-Scholes model by the solutions in the binomial tree models can be justified
by verifying these models satisfy the conditions in Problem (ii).
Since the solution for Nonlinear Moment Problem in Chapter 2 depends on
market settings in terms of the pricing kernel only, the similar Nonlinear Moment
Problem with the corresponding necessity and sufficiency results can be obtained
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(See Section 3.2) by using the martingale approach, even though the dynamics
of asset prices are not specified. Following the similar arguments in Chapter
2, we establish the existence of optimal solutions for utility-downside-risk and
utility-strictly-convex-risk problems under our generalized framework. Because of
the strictly concavity assumption, any solution to our utility-risk problem is the
unique solution. Hence, Problem (i) is resolved.
As for Problem (ii), we first establish that the optimal terminal payoff to
utility risk problem is a continuous function of pricing kernel in the sense that,
if a sequence of the pricing kernels converges weakly, the corresponding optimal
terminal payoffs under the market with such pricing kernels converge weakly to
optimal terminal payoff under the market with the corresponding pricing kernel
being the limit of the sequence of pricing kernels (see Section 3.3). Larsen and
Zˇitkovic´ (2007) conduct similar convergence studies on how small perturbations of
the market coefficient processes changes the optimal solution for utility maximiza-
tion. The proof of this stability result made use of convex-duality techniques. In
contrast, since the optimal terminal wealth to our utility-risk problem is in terms
of a solution of a nonlinear equation system, we prove our convergence result
in Section 3.3 by establishing the limit of the sequence of the solutions of the
equation system is finite, followed by applications of the Dominated Convergence
Theorem.
Afterward, we shall verify that the conditions in Problem (ii) are satisfied
by the pricing kernels under the discrete binomial tree market models which are
constructed from the continuous-time model in Chapter 2 (see Section 3.3.3). The
proof of weak convergence of pricing kernel is motivated by Fo¨llmer and Schied
(2004) which establish the weak convergence of stock pricing from the binomial-
tree model to the continuous-time Black-Scholes model through an application of
the Central Limit Theorem. With the results in Section 3.3, we have a numerical
algorithm to approximate the optimal solution for the continuous-time utility-risk
10
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problem by the optimal terminal payoffs in the binomial tree model.
1.3 A Paradox in Time Consistency in Mean-
Variance Problem?
In the financial investment context, agents barely keep the same preference over
time; in contrast, they usually make an investment decision that may only be
optimal with respect to their contemporary utility while disregarding its distant
future prospect. This myopic decision may lead to some potential substantial
burden in the longer run as investors currently underestimate their future respon-
sibility. This phenomenon is described as time inconsistency in decision making.
There is a long history of the study on time consistency with intense popu-
larity. Strotz (1955) first raised the issues of time inconsistency, and considered
a continuous-time deterministic consumption problem with non-exponential dis-
count factor, which is not necessarily a constant. The Euler differential equation
obtained in his setting varies with the initial time, and so the corresponding opti-
mal path depends on the initial time (or evaluation time); however, this optimal
solution would no longer be optimal for agent’s future preference. Recall the
Bellman optimality principle (Bellman, 1957):
“An optimal policy has the property that whatever the initial state and initial
decision are, the remaining decisions must constitute an optimal policy with respect
to the state resulting from the first decision.”
The optimization problem under Strotz’s framework is time inconsistent in the
sense that it cannot satisfy the Bellman optimality principle. Loosely speaking,
a dynamic optimization is time-consistent if its maximizer is dependent solely on
the current states. With regard to this inconsistent matter, if the agent could have
a choice of reconsidering his strategy in the future and there is no commitment
11
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on his strategy, he should give up the original strategy which was only optimal at
an earlier time, and adopt another one which is contemporarily optimal at that
future time. Strotz described this agent as spendthrift1 since his behavior is
inconsistent with his original plans.
Furthermore, Strotz (1955) suggested two possible resolutions to deal with
time-inconsistency matter, namely: precommitment and consistent strategies.
Under the precommitment policy, an individual precommits his future activities
so that he will implement the optimal path even though it will then no longer be
optimal in the future. On the other hand, the consistent planning is one through
which the agent is supposed to look for “the best plan among those that he will
actually follow”. The main feature of Strotz’s consistent strategy is that the cur-
rent action is the one that makes the agent to achieve the best possible value
of his contemporary objective function under the assumption that all his future
actions shall be optimal. The Strotz’s idea was later interpreted in terms of game
theory by Peleg and Yaari (1973): we consider a time-inconsistent problem as a
non-cooperative game, in which the players of the game represent different time
points, and choose their strategy in order to maximize their own objective func-
tions; then the notion of Nash subgame perfect equilibrium of this game problem
is then used to define the “time-consistent” strategy for the original problem.
Therefore, the Strotz’s consistent planning and the corresponding time-consistent
strategy are named as game-theoretic approach and equilibrium strategy re-
spectively. Pollak (1968) supplemented Strotz’s notion by suggesting backward
recursive evaluation method, which can serve as an effective algorithm for find-
ing the time-consistent equilibrium solution. Besides, under logarithmic utility,
Pollak also showed that the equilibrium solution coincides with the spendthrift
1In economic literature such as Pollak (1968) and Mar´ın-Solano and Navas (2010), the notion
of spendthrift is sometimes referred as “naive”, since the agent may be too naive to even not
recognize the time inconsistency issue.
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solution for Strotz’s problem. Goldman (1980) provided some general conditions
under which the subgame perfect equilibrium, as described in Strotz-Pollak’s work,
exists.
In summary, there are three approaches of tackling time-inconsistent problems
as described above: 1) spendthrift; 2) precommitment; and 3) game theoretic
one. In Section 4.1.2, we shall provide the mathematical descriptions of time
inconsistency and the notion of these three approaches including the definition
of equilibrium solution. The comparison among these three approaches will be
discussed through a concrete example.
It is well known that the classical mean-variance portfolio selection problem
has time-inconsistency aspects. In particular, due to the non-linearity in the ex-
pectation of the second moment in the objective function (see Bjo¨rk and Murgoci,
2010), the usual Tower Property fails to hold, so the corresponding optimization
problem can never admit the Bellman optimality. For instance, the maximizer
for mean-variance problem depends on both the current and the initial states
(see Li and Zhou (2000) or Example 4.1.2 in Section 4.1.1 of the present the-
sis). Mean-variance problem under multi-period and continuous-time frameworks
were solved using precommitment approach in Li and Ng (2000) and Li and Zhou
(2000) respectively. The literature provided in Sections 1.1 and 1.2 regarding
the optimization problem which does not admit the Bellman optimality principle,
such as Bielecki et al. (2005), Jin et al. (2005), and Chen et al. (2008), and also
our work in Chapters 2 and 3 concern precommitment solution.
Apart from mean-variance problem, the consumption and saving problem sub-
ject to non-exponential discounting is a substantial topic in time consistency. The
game-theoretic approach can be utilized to solve the time inconsistency issues in
this time-inconsistent consumption and saving problem. Phelps and Pollak (1968)
first used quasi-hyperbolic discount to model intergenerational time preference in
discrete-time stationary Ramsey’s saving problem and obtained an explicit time-
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consistent equilibrium solution for isoelastic utility. This quasi-hyperbolic dis-
count is geometrically decaying across all dates except at the current date and it
has a sharp short-run drop at this time. This phenomenon reflects that people is
more impatient in the shorter term so that their discount behaves like a hyper-
bolic function; to name a few, the empirical supports on this observation can be
found in Thaler (1981), Ainslie (1992), and Loewenstein and Prelec (1992). The
study on time consistency in Ramsey’s problems under non-exponential discount
was then followed by Laibson (1997), Harris and Laibson (2001), and Krusell
and Smith (2003), over discrete-time settings; and Barro (1999), Karp (2007),
and Ekeland and Lazrak (2010) over continuous-time settings. Laibson (1997)
and Harris and Laibson (2001) characterized the equilibrium solutions by using
Euler-type equations. Karp (2007) derived the dynamic programming equation
as the necessary condition for equilibrium solutions. Ekeland and Lazrak (2010)
carried the computations in addition to that in Karp (2007), and obtained the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation with the corresponding verification the-
orem to characterize the equilibrium solution. The study on time consistency over
stochastic frameworks was initiated by Harris and Laibson (2001), and they stud-
ied the Ramsey’s problem with stochastic income subject to the quasi-hyperbolic
discount. Harris and Laibson (2013) later extended their previous work in Ram-
sey’s problem by introducing a randomness in the time duration of short-run
drop. Using HJB equation, Ekeland and Pirvu (2008) and Mar´ın-Solano and
Navas (2010) solved the stochastic Merton investment and consumption problem
under non-exponential discount, which includes quasi-hyperbolic discount as a
special case. In addition, Mar´ın-Solano and Navas (2010) compared the equilib-
rium strategy with precommitment and spendthrift strategies for specific utility
functions, namely, logarithmic, power, and exponential utilities.
The notion of equilibrium solution for continuous-time optimization problem
is more intricate than that under the discrete-time setting in which time units
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together can be interpreted as a finitely many player non-cooperative game. Eke-
land and Pirvu (2008) provided a precise mathematical definition of equilibrium
solution for the continuous-time problems among all Markovian controls by con-
sidering the limiting case when the decision-maker can commit only over each
infinitesimal unit of time. Bjo¨rk and Murgoci (2010) supplemented the former
work by extending to a general class of continuous-time time-inconsistent Marko-
vian control problems. With this definition, an extended HJB equation system
was derived to characterize the equilibrium solution. Those two works allow us to
investigate more subtle problems in connection with time consistency, for instance,
see further developments in Ekeland et al. (2012), Bensoussan et al. (2014), Bjo¨rk
et al. (2014), and Kronborg and Steffensen (2015).
Besides, Hu et al. (2012) extended the notion of the equilibrium control among
all open-loop controls. By using the stochastic maximum principle, they de-
rived a linear forward-backward stochastic differential equation to characterize
the equilibrium control for linear-quadratic time-inconsistent control problems.
They showed that the corresponding equilibrium strategy can sometimes, in a
broader sense, be different from that under the Bjo¨rk and Murgoci’s framework.
The time-consistent solution for the classical mean-variance paradigm was first
obtained in Basak and Chabakauri (2010) through the derivation of dynamic pro-
gramming principle. On the other hand, Bjo¨rk and Murgoci (2010) obtained the
same time-consistent solution through the studying of the extended HJB system.
Czichowsky (2013) later studied the mean-variance problem under a general semi-
martingale setting and obtained the time-consistent solution through taking limit
of the solutions for the corresponding discrete-time models, which can be deter-
mined by backward recursive argument. Furthermore, Basak and Chabakauri
(2012) solved the mean-variance problem on incomplete markets.
In contrast to the game theoretic approach, Pedersen and Peskir (2015) solved
the classical mean-variance problem using an alternative notion of time-consistent
15
1.3. A Paradox in Time Consistency in Mean-Variance Problem?
solution, which, in fact, aligns with the spendthrift approach, also see Example
4.1.4 in Section 4.1.2 for detail.
Since the common equilibrium solution of mean-variance problem with con-
stant risk aversion in Basak and Chabakauri (2010) and Bjo¨rk and Murgoci (2010)
is completely independent of the current state, Bjo¨rk et al. (2014) criticized that
this state-independent solution is not economically sounding as the investor puts
the same dollar amount in stock regardless of his current wealth. Therefore, Bjo¨rk
et al. (2014) and Bjo¨rk and Murgoci (2014) revisited the mean-variance problem
but with wealth-dependent risk aversion under continuous and discrete time set-
tings respectively. Under these new settings, they established that the equilibrium
controls are linear in the current wealth if the risk aversion varies inversely with
the current wealth. Apart from considering the state-dependent risk aversion, Wei
et al. (2013) obtained a state-dependent solution for mean-variance asset-liability
problem, in which the liability process is somehow exogenous so that the market
is incomplete.
It should be noted that the mean-variance problem with such a dependence
of risk aversion on the current wealth in Bjo¨rk et al. (2014) and Bjo¨rk and Mur-
goci (2014) critically relies on the positivity of the current wealth all the time.
In the absence of the confinement of short-selling prohibition, one can often find
an admissible control resulting in a negative wealth process, especially over the
discrete-time setting. The negative wealth will cause the investor’s risk aversion
to be negative which lead the investors to be risk seeking. In this case, the mean-
variance utility becomes unbounded, and the problem becomes ill-posed. Since
the obtained equilibrium portfolio in Bjo¨rk et al. (2014) is only linear in wealth, its
corresponding equilibrium wealth process is a geometric Brownian motion, and
thus the process keeps positive over the time horizon almost surely. However,
in the discrete time framework with the allowance of shortselling in Bjo¨rk and
Murgoci (2014), the positivity of the optimal wealth process is no longer guaran-
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teed even when the equilibrium strategy is linear (see Remark 2.6 in Bensoussan
et al., 2014). This ill-posed issue seems to expose the economic limitation of the
framework in Bjo¨rk and Murgoci (2014); to remedy this shortcoming yet with
more economic relevance under the trend of setting tightening regulation in favor
of shortselling prohibition after the recent financial crisis, forbidding shorting of
both bonds and stocks can ensure the positivity of the corresponding equilibrium
wealth process. Hence, with the enforcement of shortselling prohibition, Ben-
soussan et al. (2014) revisited the problems of Bjo¨rk et al. (2014) and Bjo¨rk and
Murgoci (2014), and obtained the constrained equilibrium solutions. For other
recently interesting works on the time consistent portfolio selection under mean-
variance setting and more general time-inconsistent framework, one can consult
with Yong (2012), Cui et al. (2015), and Gu et al. (2016).
Besides, Bensoussan et al. (2014) illuminated numerically an observation that
the investor facing a shortselling prohibition (said to be constrained investor) can
even acquire a better value function than another agent without the confinement
(said to be unconstrained investor) for time-consistent mean-variance optimiza-
tion with state-dependent risk aversion; also see Table 4.2 in Section 4.1.3 for
details. This is a unusual numerical observation in optimization problem: what-
ever the constrained investor can do, the unconstrained investor must be able
to do the same, so we should expect that the unconstrained investor always has
a better value function than that of the constrained one. The similar observa-
tion was discovered in Forsyth and Wang (2011), in which they first showed with
an interesting numerical evidence that the strategy of constrained investor could
be sometimes more efficient than that of the unconstrained one. Nevertheless,
the theoretical framework for the paradigm under which similar phenomena will
reappear is still absent in the literature.
In Chapter 4, as motivated by the counter-intuitive numerical examples in
Forsyth and Wang (2011) and Bensoussan et al. (2014), we aim at providing an
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analytic study on how the constrained investor can outperform the unconstrained
investor. We illuminate analytically that, under certain economically meaning-
ful conditions which usually hold in a buoyant market, an investor facing more
investment restrictions can outperform than an investor with less:
(i) An agent can start off his constrained time-consistent strategy at a certain
time in the past or in the future which can outperform the time-consistent
one adopted by his unconstrained rival.
(ii) If the commencement is allowed to be earlier, investing all the wealth in
riskless bond can beat both equilibrium strategies adopted by constrained
and unconstrained investors respectively.
(iii) To a certain extreme, with properly chosen parameters such that the “good-
ness index” of the stock, αt
σt
, studied in Shiryaev et al. (2008) and Du Toit
and Peskir (2009), is close to the index value computed from the market
data, there could even be more than 90% of positive commencement time
over the whole time horizon so that the constrained time-consistent strategy
outperforms the unconstrained one.
The source of these paradoxical results is rooted in the nature of a direct
application of game-theoretic approach on time consistency, which seeks for the
Nash subgame perfect equilibrium of the intertemporal games between different
time-players but not the ultimate maximizer. Therefore, it is not necessary that
the equilibrium solution among a larger admissible set to have a greater value of
objective function. However, the inconsistency and paradox raised in Chapter 4
do not mean that we should give up time-consistent solution. The equilibrium
strategy does resolve the intertemporal conflict which appears in precommitment
solution, thus the study on time consistency should focus on how to obtain a
time-consistent strategy in a proper manner. It is more important to have more
extensive study on the economic meaning behind time-consistent solution, so that
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we can construct a more sophisticated time-consistent strategy which takes ac-
count of immediate economic consideration.
1.4 Outline of this Thesis
Chapter 2 studies utility-deviation-risk portfolio selection problem under continuous-
time Black-Scholes framework. In our framework, the investor aims to maximize
the expected value of utility, which is a function of the portfolio terminal payoff
representing his satisfaction, and to minimize the convex-deviation-risk measure,
used in Jin et al. (2005), simultaneously. By an application of the Martingale
Representation Theorem, we first convert our dynamic optimization problem into
an equivalent static problem. By considering the first-order optimality condi-
tions and mean-field heuristic, we characterize the optimal terminal payoff by
Nonlinear Moment Problem, which includes a variational inequality and some
equality constraints on nonlinear moments, with corresponding necessity and suf-
ficiency results. The Nonlinear Moment Problem can be further simplified into
a system of nonlinear equations. By assuming that utility function satisfies the
Inada conditions, we establish the existence of optimal solutions for both utility-
downside-risk and utility-strictly-convex-risk problems through solving the system
of equations. Moreover, the necessity and sufficiency results regarding Nonlinear
Moment Problem can be applied to revisit several mean-risk problems studied
in Jin et al. (2005), including the non-existence of optimal solution to mean-
semivariance problem. Chapter 2 is based on Wong et al. (2015).
Chapter 3 provides a numerical method to compute the optimal solution to
utility -risk problem. We first extend the utility-risk framework in Chapter 2 from
continuous-time Black-Scholes framework to generalized market framework where
the dynamics of asset prices can be unspecified. Under our generalized market
framework, the continuous-time Black-Scholes model, the discrete binomial tree
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model and the stochastic interest rate model for asset prices can be covered.
Under the generalized framework, the similar existence results as in Chapter 2
for utility-downside-risk and utility-strictly-convex-risk problem are obtained. In
addition, we establish the continuity of optimal terminal wealth in terminal pricing
kernel. The continuity result can be applied to show the convergence of optimal
solution from the binomial tree model to the continuous-time Black-Scholes model.
This convergence result provides a numerical method to approximate the optimal
solution to the continuous-time utility-risk problem in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 is
based on Wong et al. (2016).
Chapter 4 presents a paradox in time consistency in mean-variance problem.
We first introduce the time consistency and revisit the literature about mean-
variance problems through game theoretic approach, including Bjo¨rk et al. (2014)
and Bensoussan et al. (2014). Motivated by the counter-intuitive numerical obser-
vations in Forsyth and Wang (2011) and Bensoussan et al. (2014) that an investor
with more investment constraints can acquire a greater objective value than an
investor with less, we establish analytically that the similar phenomenon will
reappear in a buoyant market. Moreover, we show that even the pure investment
strategy of solely investing in riskless asset can beat both equilibrium strategies
adopted by the constrained and unconstrained investors for a large enough time
horizon. With numerical experiments, we also illustrate that the constrained
investor can outperform the unconstrained one for more than 90% of the time
horizon. Finally, we shall discuss the meaning beneath our paradoxical results in
time consistency. Chapter 4 is based on Bensoussan et al. (2016).
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Chapter 2
Utility-Risk Portfolio Selection
In this chapter, we first introduce the problem formulation in Section 2.1 and
convert our continuous-time utility-risk problem into an equivalent static formu-
lation as stated in Theorem 2.1.5. In Section 2.2, we derive the necessary condi-
tion that the optimal terminal wealth satisfying two mild regularity conditions,
Conditions 2.2.1 (i) and (ii), solves for the Nonlinear Moment Problem in Theo-
rem 2.2.2. We then apply this necessity result to revisit the non-existence result
for the mean-semivariance problem (Section 2.2.2). In Section 2.3, we establish
the verification theorem (Theorem 2.3.2), serving as the sufficient condition that
the solution of the Nonlinear Moment Problem satisfying Condition 2.3.1 serves
as the optimal terminal wealth. We then apply the sufficiency result to estab-
lish the existence of the corresponding optimal solutions for utility-downside-risk
and utility-strictly-convex-risk problems in Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.3 respectively;
the technical proofs are deferred to the Appendix. Finally, we apply the Non-
linear Moment Problem to establish the sufficient condition for the existence of
an optimal solution of mean-risk problem in Section 2.3.4. Such sufficient con-
dition can be used to revisit the various well-known mean risk problems such
as mean-variance (Example 2.3.17), mean-weighted-power-risk (Example 2.3.18)
(which includes mean-weighted-variance and mean-variance as special cases, also
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see Remark 2.3.20) and mean-exponential-risk problems (Example 2.3.21).
2.1 Problem Setting
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a fixed complete probability space, over whichW (t) = (W1(t), . . . ,Wm(t))t
denotes m−dimensional standard Brownian motion; M t denotes the transpose of
a matrix M . We adopt the same market modeling setting as in Jin et al. (2005).
Define Ft := σ(W (s) : s ≤ t). Suppose that the market has one riskless money
account with price process B(t) and m risky assets with the joint price process,
S(t) := (S1(t), . . . , Sm(t))
t, such that the pair (B(t), S(t)) satisfies the following
equations:
dB(t) = r(t)B(t)dt, B(0) = b0 > 0,
dSk(t) = µk(t)Sk(t) dt+ Sk(t)
∑m
j=1 σkj(t)dWj(t), Sk(0) = sk > 0,
k = 1, . . . ,m,
where r(t) is the riskless interest-rate, µk(t) and σk(t) := (σk1(t), . . . , σkm(t))
are respectively the appreciation rate and volatility of the k-th risky asset, all
assumed to be uniformly bounded. We also assume that the volatility matrix of
assets σ(t) := (σkj(t))m×m is uniformly elliptic, so that σ(t)σ(t)
t ≥ δI for some
δ > 0, so the market is complete and (σ(t))−1 exists for all t.
Let pi(t) := (pi1(t), . . . , pim(t))
t, where pik(t) is the money amount invested in
the k-th risky asset of the portfolio at time t. The dynamics of controlled wealth
process is:
dXpi(t) = (r(t)Xpi(t) + pi(t)tα(t))dt+ pi(t)tσ(t)dW (t), Xpi(0) = x0 > 0,
(2.1.1)
where α(t) := (α1(t), . . . , αm(t))
t and αk(t) := µk(t)−r(t) for any k ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
The objective functional is:
J(pi) := E[U(Xpi(T ))]− γE[D (E[Xpi(T )]−Xpi(T ))], (2.1.2)
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where the terminal time T is finite and γ > 0 denotes the risk-aversion coefficient.
We denote by U a utility function such that U : Dom(U)→ R is strictly increas-
ing, concave and continuously differentiable in the interior; here the domain of U ,
D := Dom(U), is a convex set in R. Define the lower end point of the domain
D, K := inf(D) ∈ [−∞,∞). For completeness, we extend the definition of U
over R so that U(x) = −∞ for x ∈ R/D and U ′(K) := limx↓K U ′(x). Here the
function D : R → R+ stands for a risk function which measures the deviation of
the random return from its own expectation. We assume that D is non-negative,
convex and continuously differentiable.
For any given p ≥ 1, denote Lp :=
{
Z| ‖Z‖p := E[|Z|p]
1
p <∞
}
and L∞ :=
{Z| ‖Z‖∞ := supω∈Ω |Z(ω)| <∞}. Define H2 to be the class of all Ft-adapted
processes pi, equipped with a norm ‖pi‖2H2 := E
[∫ T
0
pi(t)tpi(t)dt
]
<∞.
Definition 2.1.1. We define the class of all admissible controls pi ∈ A as follows:
A := {pi ∈ H2∣∣Xpi(T ) ∈ X} ,
where X is the class of all admissible terminal wealths, such that
X := {X ∈ L2|X ∈ FT , X ∈ D a.s., U(X) ∈ L1, D(E[X]−X) ∈ L1}.
Note that, for every admissible terminal wealth, both its expected utility and
expected deviation risk are well-defined. Since U is increasing and D is convex,
we have
|U(θx+ (1− θ)y)| ≤ |U(x)|+ |U(y)| for all x, y ∈ D and θ ∈ [0, 1];
0 ≤ D(θx+ (1− θ)y) ≤ θD(x) + (1− θ)D(y) for all x, y ∈ R and θ ∈ [0, 1].
Hence, X is a convex subspace of L2. For any admissible control pi, we have
Xpi ∈ H2 and Xpi(t) ∈ L2 for any t ∈ [0, T ] by Theorems 1.2 and 2.1 in Touzi
(2013).
Under the above settings, our utility risk problem can be stated as follows:
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Problem 2.1.2.
Maximize J(pi),
subject to pi ∈ A and (Xpi(·), pi(·)) satisfies (2.1.1) with initial wealth x0.
We define ξ(t) as
ξ(t) := exp
(
−
∫ t
0
(
r(s)ds+
1
2
α(s)t
(
σ(s)σ(s)t
)−1
α(s)ds+ α(s)t
(
σ(s)t
)−1
dW (s)
))
.
By applying Itoˆ’s formula to ξ(t)Xpi(t), it is clear that ξ(t) is the pricing kernel.
Denote ξ := ξ(T ) ∈ Lp for any p ≥ 1. Hence, for a given initial condition
Xpi(0) = x0, E[ξXpi(T )] = x0 for any pi ∈ A. If x0 < E [ξ]K, A is empty1.
If x0 = E [ξ]K, even when A is non-empty, all such pi ∈ A will give the same
terminal wealth, Xpi(T ) = K a.s.2, so no actual optimization is required, thus the
corresponding problem becomes trivial. In the rest of this chapter, based on this
observation, we only consider our problem under this natural assumption:
Assumption 2.1.3. The initial wealth x0, the lower end point of D, K ∈
[−∞,∞), and pricing kernel ξ := ξ(T ) altogether satisfy:
x0 > E [ξ]K.
Note that if we choose U to be linear and D to be quadratic, i.e. U(x) = x and
D(x) = x2, then Problem 2.1.2 reduces to the classical mean-variance problem.
If we only choose U to be linear, then Problem 2.1.2 reduces to the mean-risk
problem as in Jin et al. (2005); in particular, if we alternatively choose D(x) =
ax+ +bx−, then Problem 2.1.2 reduces to the mean-weighted-variance problem. If
we just set D to be a convex function with D(x) = 0 for x ≤ 0, Problem 2.1.2 is to
maximize utility and minimize the downside risk of terminal wealth; its resolution
will be established in Subsection 2.3.2.
1If A is non-empty, we have x0 = E[ξXpi(T )] ≥ E [ξ]K since Xpi(T ) ∈ X for any pi ∈ A,
which implies Xpi(T ) ≥ K a.s.
2If there exists pi ∈ A such that P[Xpi(T ) > K] > 0, then x0 = E[ξXpi(T )] > E [ξ]K.
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Since our market is complete, all L2-integrable and FT -measurable terminal
wealth can be attained by an admissible control, in the light of Martingale Repre-
sentation Theorem. Our dynamic utility-risk optimization problem 2.1.2 can be
converted into the following static optimization problem:
Define Ψ : X → R such that Ψ(X) := E[U(X)]− E[D(E[X]−X)].
Problem 2.1.4.
Maximize Ψ(X), (2.1.3)
subject to X ∈ X and E[ξX] = x0.
Then, the optimal solution of Problem 2.1.4 is the optimal terminal wealth of
Problem 2.1.2:
Theorem 2.1.5 (Theorem 2.1 in Bielecki et al. (2005) and Theorem 2.1 in Jin
et al. (2005)). If pi(t) is optimal for Problem 2.1.2, then Xpi(T ) is optimal for
Problem 2.1.4. Conversely, if X ∈ X is optimal for Problem 2.1.4, there exists
pi ∈ A such that Xpi(T ) = X and pi is optimal for Problem 2.1.2.
Note that the maximization in Problem 2.1.4 is confined to the set X , so
that the solution obtained in Problem 2.1.4 is an admissible terminal wealth in
Problem 2.1.2. Our present chapter aims to establish an admissible terminal
wealth X ∈ X that maximizes Ψ(X) under rather general scenarios, including
those not yet covered in the existing literature.
2.2 Necessary Condition
2.2.1 Maximum Principle
To show the necessity for optimality, we assume that the optimal solution of
Problem 2.1.4, Xˆ ∈ X , satisfies the following two very mild technical conditions:
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Condition 2.2.1. (i) Both U ′(Z) ∈ L1 and D′ (E[Z]− Z) ∈ L1.
(ii) There exists δ > 0 such that D (E [Z]− Z − δ) ∈ L1 and D (E [Z]− Z + δ) ∈
L1.
Now, it is necessary for Xˆ to solve for the following auxiliary static problem,
we call it the Nonlinear Moment Problem:
Theorem 2.2.2 (Nonlinear Moment Problem). If Xˆ is the optimal solution of
Problem 2.1.4 satisfying Conditions 2.2.1 (i) and (ii), then it is necessary that
there exist constants Y,M,R ∈ R such that the quadruple
(
Xˆ, Y,M,R
)
solves for
the following variational inequality:Y ξ = U
′(Xˆ)− γR + γD′
(
M − Xˆ
)
, a.s. on {Xˆ > K},
Y ξ ≥ U ′(Xˆ)− γR + γD′
(
M − Xˆ
)
, a.s. on {Xˆ = K} (if P[Xˆ = K] > 0),
(2.2.4)
subject to the nonlinear moment constraints
E[ξXˆ] = x0, (2.2.5)
E[Xˆ] = M, (2.2.6)
E
[
D′
(
M − Xˆ
)]
= R. (2.2.7)
2.2.1.1 Proof of Theorem 2.2.2
Let Xˆ ∈ X be an optimal solution of Problem 2.1.4. We define Γ : L2 × D → R
by
Γ (X, x) := U ′(x)− γE [D′ (E[X]−X)] + γD′ (E[X]− x) . (2.2.8)
For simplicity of notation, in the rest of this chapter, we shall denote the random
variable Γ
(
Xˆ, Xˆ
)
by Γˆ.
To prove the necessity, we first apply the first-order conditions as stated in
Proposition 2.2.3. Next, we make use of Proposition 2.2.3 to give a preliminary
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result for characterizing the optimal solution of Problem 2.1.4, Xˆ, in Lemma
2.2.5: if we can find a random variable, Z, as described in Lemma 2.2.5, then it
is necessary that Xˆ has to satisfy the variational inequality (2.2.4). Finally, in
Proposition 2.2.10, we construct such a Z.
Proposition 2.2.3. If Xˆ is optimal for Problem 2.1.4 satisfying Condition 2.2.1
(i), then
E
[
X˜Γˆ
]
≤ 0,
for all X˜ ∈ Θ :=
{
Z ∈ L∞ |E[Zξ] = 0 and Xˆ + Z ∈ X
}
.
For any X˜ ∈ Θ, by the convexity of X , Xˆ + θX˜ ∈ X for all 0 < θ < 1. The
directional derivative of Ψ(X) is
d
dθ
Ψ(Xˆ + θX˜)
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
=
d
dθ
(
E
[
U(Xˆ + θX˜)
]
− γE
[
D
(
E[Xˆ + θX˜]− (Xˆ + θX˜)
)]) ∣∣∣∣
θ=0
.
Before we proceed on the proof of Proposition 2.2.3, we first justify the inter-
change of the order of differentiation and taking expectation of the above expres-
sion. To this end, we need the following lemma:
Lemma 2.2.4. Given two random variables Xˆ ∈ X and X˜ ∈ L2 such that Xˆ +
X˜ ∈ X ,
lim
θ↓0
E
U(Xˆ + θX˜)− γD
(
E
[
Xˆ + θX˜
]
− (Xˆ + θX˜)
)
−
(
U(Xˆ)− γD
(
E
[
Xˆ
]
− Xˆ
))
θ

= E
lim
θ↓0
U(Xˆ + θX˜)− γD
(
E
[
Xˆ + θX˜
]
− (Xˆ + θX˜)
)
−
(
U(Xˆ)− γD
(
E
[
Xˆ
]
− Xˆ
))
θ
 .
Proof. Since U is concave and D is convex function, so f(θ) := U(Xˆ + θX˜) −
γD(E[Xˆ+θX˜]− (Xˆ+θX˜)) is concave in θ > 0. Thus, for any δ > 0, by concavity
of f , f(θ) ≥ δ
θ+δ
f(0) + θ
θ+δ
f(θ + δ), so
f(θ)− f(0)
θ
≥ f(θ + δ)− f(0)
θ + δ
.
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Hence, 1
θ
(
U(Xˆ + θX˜)− γD
(
E
[
Xˆ + θX˜
]
− (Xˆ + θX˜)
)
−
(
U(Xˆ)− γD
(
E
[
Xˆ
]
− Xˆ
)))
is increasing as θ decreases to 0. Since Xˆ and Xˆ + X˜ are admissible terminal
wealth, thus U
(
Xˆ + X˜
)
−γD
(
E
[
Xˆ + X˜
]
− (Xˆ + X˜)
)
and U(Xˆ)−γD
(
E
[
Xˆ
]
− Xˆ
)
are both L1-integrable because Xˆ + X˜, Xˆ ∈ X . Hence, this lemma follows from
the Monotone Convergence Theorem.
Proof of Proposition 2.2.3. By Lemma 2.2.4, the chain rule and Condition 2.2.1
(i), we have
d
dθ
Ψ(Xˆ + θX˜)
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
= E
[
U ′(Xˆ)X˜
]
− γE
[
D′
(
E[Xˆ]− Xˆ
)(
E[X˜]− X˜
)]
= E
[
X˜Γˆ
]
. (2.2.9)
Our claim follows by the first-order necessary condition for optimality.
To characterize the optimal solution Xˆ, we first have the following lemma:
Lemma 2.2.5. Given that Xˆ is optimal for Problem 2.1.4 satisfying Condition
2.2.1 (i), if there exists a random variable, Z ∈ [0, 1], such that the following three
items hold: Z > 0 a.s. on
{
Xˆ > K
}
,
Z = 0 a.s. on
{
Xˆ = K
}
(if P[Xˆ = K] > 0), ,
(2.2.10)
ZξΓˆ ∈ L1, Z
(
Γˆ− Y ξ
)
∈ L∞, and (2.2.11)
Xˆ + Z
(
Γˆ− Y ξ
)
∈ X , (2.2.12)
where Y :=
E[ZξΓˆ]
E[Zξ2] , then it is necessary that Γˆ defined in (2.2.8) satisfies the
following algebraic structure:Γˆ = Y ξ a.s. on
{
Xˆ > K
}
,
Γˆ ≤ Y ξ a.s. on
{
Xˆ = K
}
(if P[Xˆ = K] > 0).
(2.2.13)
Proof. We split our proof into two parts: (i) Γˆ = Y ξ a.s. on
{
Xˆ > K
}
, and (ii)
Γˆ ≤ Y ξ a.s. on
{
Xˆ = K
}
(if P[Xˆ = K] > 0).
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(i) Take
X˜ = Z
(
Γˆ− Y ξ
)
, (2.2.14)
(2.2.11) and (2.2.12) warrants that X˜ ∈ L∞ with Xˆ + X˜ ∈ X and
E[X˜ξ] = E
[
ZξΓˆ
]
− Y E[Zξ2] = 0.
By Proposition 2.2.3 and the fact that Y = E
[
ZξΓˆ
]
/E[Zξ2],
0 ≥ E
[
X˜Γˆ
]
= E
[
Z
(
Γˆ− Y ξ
)
Γˆ
]
− Y E
[
ZξΓˆ
]
+ Y 2
[
Zξ2
]
= E
[
Z
(
Γˆ− Y ξ
)2]
.
(2.2.10) ensures that Z
(
Γˆ− Y ξ
)2
≥ 0, and therefore E
[
Z
(
Γˆ− Y ξ
)2]
= 0,
which implies that Z
(
Γˆ− Y ξ
)2
= 0 a.s. By (2.2.10), on
{
Xˆ > K
}
, Z > 0,
hence Γˆ = Y ξ a.s. on
{
Xˆ > K
}
.
(ii) If P[Xˆ = K] > 0, assume the contrary that P
[
I
{
Xˆ = K
}(
Γˆ− Y ξ
)
> 0
]
>
0. Consider
X˜ = kI
{
Xˆ = K
}
− min{Xˆ −K, 1}
2
where k := E
[(
min{Xˆ −K, 1}
)
ξ
]/(
2E
[
I
{
Xˆ = K
}
ξ
])
> 0 in light of
the required feasibility of X and our interest being only on non-trivial set-
ting. We have
Xˆ + X˜ =
max
{
Xˆ+K
2
, Xˆ − 1
2
}
, if Xˆ > K,
K + k, if Xˆ = K.
Obviously, X˜ ∈ L∞, K ≤ Xˆ + X˜ ∈ D a.s. and E
[
X˜ξ
]
= 0.
Since U is monotonic,
|U(Xˆ + X˜)| ≤ |U(K + k)|+
∣∣∣∣∣U
(
max
{
Xˆ +K
2
, Xˆ − 1
2
})∣∣∣∣∣
≤ |U(K + k)|+ |U(K)|+ |U(Xˆ)|.
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As P[Xˆ = K] > 0 and P[Xˆ = K] · |U(K)| ≤ E[|U(Xˆ)|] is finite, they prevent
U(K) from taking −∞. Clearly, K+k ∈ D, and so U(K+k) is finite. Since
Xˆ ∈ X , we also have U(Xˆ) ∈ L1. These three claims altogether imply that
U(Xˆ + X˜) ∈ L1.
Note that
E
[
Xˆ + X˜
]
= E
[
(K + k) I[Xˆ = K]
]
+ E
[
max
{
Xˆ +K
2
, Xˆ − 1
2
}(
1− I[Xˆ = K]
)]
= kP[Xˆ = K] + E
[
max
{
Xˆ +K
2
, Xˆ − 1
2
}]
,
we then establish the upper bound of D
(
E
[
Xˆ + X˜
]
−
(
Xˆ + X˜
))
into
three different cases: (1) Xˆ = K, (2) K < Xˆ < K + 1, and (3) Xˆ ≥ K + 1.
(1) D
(
E
[
Xˆ + X˜
]
−
(
Xˆ + X˜
))
= D
(
E
[
Xˆ + X˜
]
−K − k
)
is a finite
constant.
(2) Note that
E
[
Xˆ +K
2
]
− Xˆ +K
2
≤ E
[
max
{
Xˆ +K
2
, Xˆ − 1
2
}]
− Xˆ +K
2
≤ E
[
max
{
Xˆ +K
2
, Xˆ − 1
2
}]
−K.
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By convexity of D, we have
D
(
E
[
Xˆ + X˜
]
−
(
Xˆ + X˜
))
= D
(
kP
[
Xˆ = K
]
+ E
[
max
{
Xˆ +K
2
, Xˆ − 1
2
}]
− Xˆ +K
2
)
≤ D
(
kP
[
Xˆ = K
]
+ E
[
max
{
Xˆ +K
2
, Xˆ − 1
2
}]
−K
)
+D
(
kP
[
Xˆ = K
]
+ E
[
Xˆ +K
2
]
− Xˆ +K
2
)
≤ C +D
kP [Xˆ = K]+ E
[
Xˆ
]
− Xˆ
2

≤ C +D
kP [Xˆ = K]+ E
[
Xˆ
]
−K
2
+D
E
[
Xˆ
]
− Xˆ
2

≤ C +D(0) +D
(
E
[
Xˆ
]
− Xˆ
)
, where C is a constant.
(3) By the same arguments as that for case (ii), we have
D
(
E
[
Xˆ + X˜
]
−
(
Xˆ + X˜
))
≤ D
(
kP
[
Xˆ = K
]
+ E
[
max
{
Xˆ +K
2
, Xˆ − 1
2
}]
−K
)
+D
(
kP
[
Xˆ = K
]
+ E
[
Xˆ
]
−K
)
+D
(
E
[
Xˆ
]
− Xˆ
)
.
Since Xˆ ∈ X , we have D(E[Xˆ]− Xˆ) ∈ L1, so D(E[Xˆ+ X˜]− (Xˆ+ X˜)) ∈ L1.
Finally,
E
[
ΓˆX˜
]
= kE
[
I
{
Xˆ = K
}
Γˆ
]
−
E
[(
min
{
Xˆ −K, 1
})
Γˆ
]
2
= kE
[
I
{
Xˆ = K
}
Γˆ
]
−
E
[(
min
{
Xˆ −K, 1
})
Y ξ
]
2
= k
(
E
[
I
{
Xˆ = K
}
Γˆ
]
− E
[
I
{
Xˆ = K
}
Y ξ
])
> 0, (2.2.15)
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where the second equality follows because we have shown that Γˆ = Y ξ
when Xˆ > K and the third equality follows because k =
E[(min{Xˆ−K,1})ξ]
(2E[I{Xˆ=K}ξ]) .
(2.2.15) violates Proposition 2.2.3, this implies that if P[Xˆ = K] > 0,
P
[
I
{
Xˆ = K
}(
Γˆ− Y ξ
)
> 0
]
> 0 leads to a contradiction. We have
P
[
I
{
Xˆ = K
}(
Γˆ− Y ξ
)
≤ 0
]
= 1.
Therefore, the complete characterization as specified in (2.2.13) now follows.
The overall necessity claim will be accomplished if the explicit construction of
Z as described in the hypothesis in Lemma 2.2.5 can be obtained. Even the nature
of such Z appears to be complicated and uncommon in the literature, we shall
devote the remaining part of this subsection to the establishment of its existence.
In order to satisfy (2.2.12), X˜ expressed in terms of Z as in (2.2.14) needs to
be bounded so that the deviation of U(Xˆ + X˜) from U(Xˆ) and that of D(E[Xˆ +
X˜]− Xˆ − X˜) from D(E[Xˆ]− Xˆ) are less than some constant, say 1 for simplicity,
almost surely. To warrant this, we need the following lemma immediate from the
continuity of U :
Lemma 2.2.6. There exists δU : int(D)→ (0, 1] such that for any x0 ∈ int(D)3,
|U(x)− U(x0)| ≤ 1, ∀x ∈ D such that |x− x0| < δU(x0).
We shall make use of δU defined in Lemma 2.2.6 to construct Z so that U(Xˆ+
X˜) ∈ L1, where X˜ in terms of Z is given in (2.2.14). Beforehand, for any y ∈
3A possible choice of δU can be constructed as the following:
δU (x) := min
{
1
U∗(x)
,
x−K
2
, 1
}
,
where
U∗(x) :=
U
′(x− 1), if x− 2 ∈ D,
U ′(x+K2 ), if x− 2 /∈ D.
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(0,∞), define a random variable Zy ∈ [0, 1] by:
Zy :=

0, if Xˆ = K,
1, if Xˆ > K and Γˆ = yξ,
min
{
min{δU(Xˆ), 12(Xˆ−K), δ2}
|Γˆ−yξ| , 1
}
, otherwise.
(2.2.16)
First, we show that (2.2.11) is satisfied for any y ∈ (0,∞):
Lemma 2.2.7. For any y ∈ (0,∞), we have ZyξΓˆ ∈ L1 and Zy
(
Γˆ− yξ
)
∈ L∞.
Proof. By the definition of Zy in (2.2.16),
∣∣∣Zy (Γˆ− yξ) ∣∣∣ ≤ δ, so Zy (Γˆ− yξ) ∈
L∞. Since ∣∣ZyξΓˆ∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣Zyξ (Γˆ− yξ) ∣∣∣+ ∣∣yξ2Zy∣∣ ≤ δξ + yξ2,
we have ZyξΓˆ ∈ L1.
Next, we want to ensure one can find a y so that y =
E[ξΓˆZy]
E[ξ2Zy ] is satisfied.
Lemma 2.2.8. Define f : (0,∞)→ R by
f(y) := yE
[
ξ2Zy
]− E [ξΓˆZy] .
There is a root y∗ ∈ (0,∞) such that f(y∗) = 0.
Before we prove Lemma 2.2.8, we require to show the claim that Γˆ > 0:
Lemma 2.2.9. Given Xˆ is optimal for Problem 2.1.4 satisfying Conditions 2.2.1
(i) and (ii), it is necessary that Γˆ > 0 almost surely.
Proof. We consider two cases: (i) K > −∞ and (ii) K = −∞, respectively.
We consider case (i) K > −∞. With the optimal solution Xˆ of Problem 2.1.4,
we define h(x) := Γ
(
Xˆ, x
)
, which is a decreasing continuous function. Since
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U ′ > 0 on {Xˆ > K} and U ′ is decreasing because of concavity of U , we have
limx↓K U ′(x) > 0. Hence,
lim
x↓K
h (x) > −γE
[
D′
(
E
[
Xˆ
]
− Xˆ
)]
+ γD′
(
E
[
Xˆ
]
−K
)
.
By definition, Xˆ ≥ K uniformly, and D′ is increasing, thus D′
(
E
[
Xˆ
]
−K
)
≥
E
[
D′
(
E
[
Xˆ
]
− Xˆ
)]
. Consequently, one have limx↓K h (x) > 0. Then, there ex-
ists k0 := inf {x > K |h(x) ≤ 0} ∈ (K,∞], i.e., Γˆ ≤ 0 implies Xˆ ≥ k0. If k0 =∞,
it is immediate that Γˆ > 0 almost surely, so we consider the case that k0 < ∞.
Assume the contrary, that P
[
Γˆ ≤ 0
]
> 0. Consider
X˜ :=

−k0−K
2
, if Γˆ ≤ 0,
k0−K
2
E[I{Γˆ≤0}ξ]
E[I{Γˆ>0}ξ] , if Γˆ > 0.
(2.2.17)
We have Xˆ + X˜ > K and X˜ ∈ L∞. Since U is concave,
U(Xˆ) + X˜U ′(Xˆ + X˜) ≤ U(Xˆ + X˜) ≤ U(Xˆ) + X˜U ′(Xˆ).
Furthermore, when Γˆ ≤ 0, we have X˜ < 0 and Xˆ ≥ k0, then
X˜U ′
(
Xˆ + X˜
)
≥ X˜U ′
(
k0 − k0 −K
2
)
;
while Γˆ > 0, we have X˜ > 0 and Xˆ(T ) ≤ k0, then
X˜U ′
(
Xˆ + X˜
)
≥ X˜U ′
k0 + k0 −K
2
E
[
I
{
Γˆ ≤ 0
}
ξ
]
E
[
I
{
Γˆ > 0
}
ξ
]
 .
Thus, U(Xˆ + X˜) ∈ L1. On the other hand, since D is convex,
0 ≤ D
(
E
[
Xˆ + X˜
]
−
(
Xˆ + X˜
))
≤ D
(
E
[
Xˆ
]
− Xˆ
)
+
(
E
[
X˜
]
− X˜
)
D′
(
E
[
Xˆ + X˜
]
−
(
Xˆ + X˜
))
.
Similar to showing X˜U ′(Xˆ + X˜) being bounded from below, we can show that(
E
[
X˜
]
− X˜
)
D′
(
E
[
Xˆ + X˜
]
−
(
Xˆ + X˜
))
is bounded from above, thus
D
(
E
[
Xˆ + X˜
]
−
(
Xˆ + X˜
))
∈ L1.
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Hence, Xˆ+ X˜ ∈ X . Also, E
[
X˜ξ
]
= 0, but E
[
X˜Γˆ
]
> 0, which altogether violates
Proposition 2.2.3. As a result, P
[
Γˆ ≤ 0
]
= 0.
Now, consider the case (ii) D = R; the approach is similar as in the case (i).
Firstly, there exists k0 := inf {x > −∞|h(x) ≤ 0} ∈ (−∞,∞]. If k0 < ∞, we
assume the contrary, that P
[
Γˆ ≤ 0
]
> 0, and then as in case (i), we can show
that Proposition 2.2.3 is violated by setting X˜ as follows:
X˜ :=

−1, if Γˆ ≤ 0,
E[I{Γˆ≤0}ξ]
E[I{Γˆ>0}ξ] , if Γˆ > 0.
Proof of Lemma 2.2.8. For any y ∈ (0,∞), by (2.2.16), we have
∣∣yξ2Zy − ξΓˆZy∣∣ = ∣∣yξ − Γˆ∣∣ · |Zy|ξ ≤ δξ. (2.2.18)
By the Dominated Convergence Theorem, f is continuous on (0,∞). Since
Γˆ > 0 almost surely by Lemma 2.2.9,
lim
y↓0
Zy = min
min
{
δU
(
Xˆ
)
, 1
2
(
Xˆ −K
)
, δ
2
}
Γˆ
, 1
 > 0
almost surely on
{
Xˆ > K
}
. Since P
[
Xˆ > K
]
> 0, we have, by the Dominated
Convergence Theorem,
lim
y→0
f(y) = E
[
lim
y→0
(
yξ2Zy − ξΓˆZy
)]
= −E
[
ξΓˆ lim
y↓0
Zy
]
< 0.
Note that
lim
y→∞
yξ2Zy
= ξmin
{
δU
(
Xˆ
)
,
1
2
(
Xˆ −K
)
,
δ
2
}
> 0 a.s. on
{
Xˆ > K
}
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and
lim
y→∞
ξΓˆZy
= ξΓˆ lim
y→∞
min
min
{
δU
(
Xˆ
)
, 1
2
(
Xˆ −K
)
, δ
2
}
|Γˆ− yξ| , 1
 = 0.
By applying the Dominated Convergence Theorem and the fact that P
[
Xˆ > K
]
>
0 under Assumption 2.1.3, we have:
lim
y→∞
f(y) = E
[
lim
y→∞
(
yξ2Zy − ξΓˆZy
)]
= E
[
lim
y→∞
yξ2Zy
]
> 0,
Our claim follows by intermediate value theorem.
Proposition 2.2.10. Suppose the optimal solution of Problem 2.1.4, Xˆ, satisfies
Conditions 2.2.1 (i) and (ii). There exists a random variable Z ∈ [0, 1] satisfying
(2.2.10)-(2.2.12) in Lemma 2.2.5.
Proof. We shall verify that Z := Zy∗ with Zy as defined in (2.2.16) and y
∗ obtained
in Lemma 2.2.8 satisfies (2.2.10)-(2.2.12). Note that δU in Lemma 2.2.6 only take
positive values no matter what the corresponding arguments are; in particular,
according to (2.2.16), when Xˆ > K, Z > 0. Therefore, Z satisfies (2.2.10).
Note that y∗ = E
[
ZξΓˆ
] /
E[Zξ2] by Lemma 2.2.8. By Lemma 2.2.7, we have
ZξΓˆ ∈ L1 and Z
(
Γˆ− y∗ξ
)
∈ L∞, thus (2.2.11) is satisfied.
By a simple calculation under the third case in (2.2.16),
∣∣∣Z (Γˆ− y∗ξ) ∣∣∣ ≤
1
2
(
Xˆ −K
)
, thus we have
Xˆ + Z
Γˆ− E
[
ZξΓˆ
]
E[Zξ2]
ξ
 ≥ Xˆ − 1
2
(
Xˆ −K
)
=
1
2
(
Xˆ +K
)
∈ D, a.s..
Since
∣∣∣Z (Γˆ− y∗ξ) ∣∣∣ ≤ δU (Xˆ), by a direct application of Lemma 2.2.6 (a),
we have
∣∣∣U (Xˆ + Z (Γˆ− y∗ξ))− U(Xˆ)∣∣∣ ≤ 1, and thus∣∣∣∣∣U
Xˆ + Z
Γˆ− E
[
ZξΓˆ
]
E[Zξ2]
ξ
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣U(Xˆ)∣∣+ 1.
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Hence, U
(
Xˆ + Z
(
Γˆ− E[ZξΓˆ]E[Zξ2] ξ
))
∈ L1.
Similarly, since we also have
∣∣∣E [Z (Γˆ− y∗ξ)]− Z (Γˆ− y∗ξ) ∣∣∣ ≤ δ, we have
D
(
E
[
Xˆ + Z
(
Γˆ− y∗ξ
)]
−
(
Xˆ + Z
(
Γˆ− y∗ξ
)))
= D
(
E
[
Xˆ
]
− Xˆ − Z
(
Γˆ− y∗ξ
)
+ E
[
Z
(
Γˆ− y∗ξ
)])
≤ D
(
E
[
Xˆ
]
− Xˆ − δ
)
+D
(
E
[
Xˆ
]
− Xˆ + δ
)
.
Hence, by Condition 2.2.1 (ii), D
(
E
[
Xˆ + Z
(
Γˆ− y∗ξ
)]
−
(
Xˆ + Z
(
Γˆ− y∗ξ
)))
∈
L1.
We can now conclude Xˆ+Z
(
Γˆ− y∗ξ
)
satisfies all the admissibility conditions
of X , and hence Z satisfies (2.2.12).
In summary, by Proposition 2.2.10, we have Zy∗ satisfying (2.2.10)-(2.2.12) in
Lemma 2.2.5. By Lemma 2.2.5, it is necessary that Γˆ in terms of Xˆ as in (2.2.8)
satisfies the following algebraic structure:Γˆ = Y ξ a.s. on
{
Xˆ > K
}
,
Γˆ ≤ Y ξ a.s. on
{
Xˆ = K
}
(if P[Xˆ = K] > 0),
where Y = E
[
ZξΓˆ
] /
E [Zξ2] and Z is obtained in Proposition 2.2.10. Now,
by setting M := E[Xˆ] and R := E[D′(M − Xˆ)] together with the constraint
E[Xˆξ] = x0 given in Problem 2.1.4, the claim described in Theorem 2.2.2 follows.
Remark 2.2.11 (Comments on the Proof of Theorem 2.2.2). The Condition
2.2.1(i) has been utilized in order to make E[X˜Γˆ] in Proposition 2.2.3 well-defined.
After establishing Proposition 2.2.3, to show the Nonlinear Moment Problem, a
natural method is to construct another admissible terminal wealth Xˆ + X˜, where
X˜ is a perturbation, so that, if the NMP fails to hold, Proposition 2.2.3 will be
violated. However, in order to make Xˆ + X˜ admissible, we require the validity of
D′(E[Xˆ + X˜]− (Xˆ + X˜)) ∈ L1 which is not immediate in general even X˜ is small
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because D is convex. Hence, the establishment of Condition 2.2.1(ii) is crucial for
this purpose.
Condition 2.2.1(ii) is mild and is satisfied under the case of power utility
function.
2.2.2 Application to the Mean-Semivariance Problem
In this subsection, we take U(x) = x, D(x) = 1
2
x2+. Then D
′(x) = x+. We revisit
the non-existence result first obtained in Jin et al. (2005) via our Theorem 2.2.2.
Theorem 2.2.12. There is no optimal solution for the continuous-time mean-
semivariance problem.
Proof. Assume the contrary, that there exists an admissible optimal control pˆi;
then its corresponding optimal terminal wealth Xˆ ∈ L2 solves Problem 2.1.4 by
Theorem 2.1.5. Since D and D′ are bounded by quadratic and linear functions
respectively, it is clear that Xˆ satisfies Conditions 2.2.1 (i) and (ii). Hence, by
Theorem 2.2.2, it is necessary that there exist constants Y,M,R ∈ R such that
the quadruple (Xˆ, Y,M,R) solves for the following Nonlinear Moment Problem:
Y ξ + γR− 1 = γ
(
M − Xˆ
)
+
a.s., (2.2.19)
subject to the constraints: E
[
ξXˆ
]
= x0, E
[
Xˆ
]
= M and E
[(
M − Xˆ
)
+
]
= R.
Firstly, by taking expectation on the both sides of (2.2.19), we immediately
have Y = 1/E[ξ] > 0. If γR − 1 ≥ 0, then by (2.2.19), γ
(
M − Xˆ
)
+
> 0 a.s.,
and hence E[Xˆ] < M which is in conflict with the constraint E[Xˆ] = M . If
γR− 1 < 0, there exists some ξ0 > 0 such that γR− 1 +Y ξ < 0 for all ξ ∈ (0, ξ0),
which contradicts the positivity of the right hand side in (2.2.19). Thus, the
nonlinear moment problem has no solution. We conclude that mean-semivariance
problem does not admit an optimal solution.
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Remark 2.2.13. The mean-semivariance problem has been investigated in Jin
et al. (2005). The authors considered the semivariance minimization problem with
a fixed mean, and showed that this problem does not have an optimal solution
except for the trivial case in which the mean is equal to the terminal wealth, which
is the initial wealth accumulated at riskless interest rate. The nonexistence was
proven in their work by showing that the optimal value function is non-attainable.
The constrained optimization problem in Jin et al. (2005) and in Problem 2.1.2
are equivalent for suitable values of mean and risk aversion parameter. The trivial
riskless solution becomes optimal in Problem 2.1.2 only when γ =∞. For γ <∞,
the riskless strategy is dominated by another strategy attaining x0E[ξ] +θ
(
1− E[ξ]E[ξ2]ξ
)
as the corresponding terminal wealth for sufficiently small values of θ: Because
the mean of x0E[ξ] + θ
(
1− E[ξ]E[ξ2]ξ
)
is greater than x0E[ξ] in the order of O(θ) while
the semivariance of x0E[ξ] + θ
(
1− E[ξ]E[ξ2]ξ
)
is of the order O(θ2), therefore x0E[ξ] +
θ
(
1− E[ξ]E[ξ2]ξ
)
has a greater objective value for sufficiently small θ.
2.3 Sufficient Condition
2.3.1 Verification Theorem
We first introduce the following technical condition:
In this subsection, we aim to show that any admissible terminal wealth Xˆ ∈
X solving the Nonlinear Moment Problem satisfying the following condition is
optimal terminal wealth of Problem 2.1.2:
Condition 2.3.1. Both U ′(Z) ∈ L2 and D′ (E[Z]− Z) ∈ L2.
There is a fundamental difference between the necessary condition in Theorem
2.2.2 and the sufficient condition in the next theorem. Conditions 2.2.1 (i) and
(ii) are needed for the optimal terminal wealth satisfying the Nonlinear Moment
Problem in the necessity result, while Condition 2.3.1 is required for the sufficiency.
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Theorem 2.3.2. Suppose that there exists Xˆ ∈ X satisfying Condition 2.3.1 and
there exist constants Y,M,R ∈ R so that the quadruple
(
Xˆ, Y,M,R
)
solves for
the Nonlinear Moment Problem (2.2.4)-(2.2.7). Then, Xˆ is optimal for Problem
2.1.4, and it is also the optimal terminal wealth of Problem 2.1.2.
Remark 2.3.3. Theorem 2.3.2 boils the optimal control problem 2.1.2 down to
a static problem. Suppose that there exists an implicit function I(m, y) ∈ R
satisfying:
U ′(I(m, y)) + γD′(m− I(m, y)) = y, for any (m, y). (2.3.20)
Then the Nonlinear Moment Problem (2.2.4)-(2.2.7) will be solved by
(max{I (M,γR + Y ξ) , K}, Y,M,R), where the constants Y,M and R satisfy the
following system of nonlinear equations:
E[ξmax{I (M,γR + Y ξ) , K}] = x0, (2.3.21)
E[max{I (M,γR + Y ξ) , K}] = M, (2.3.22)
E [D′ (M −max{I (M,γR + Y ξ) , K})] = R. (2.3.23)
After we verify that max{I (M,γR + Y ξ) , K} belongs to X and also satisfies
Condition 2.3.1, max{I (M,γR + Y ξ) , K} is the optimal solution for Problem
2.1.4.
Proof of Theorem 2.3.2. Let (Xˆ, Y,M,R) be the solution of Nonlinear Moment
Problem (2.2.4)-(2.2.7) and X˜ ∈ L2 be an arbitrary random variable such that
Xˆ+ X˜ is admissible for Problem 2.1.4, i.e. Xˆ+ X˜ ∈ X and E
[
ξ
(
Xˆ + X˜
)]
= x0.
By (2.2.5), we have E
[
ξX˜
]
= 0. By Lemma 2.2.4, the chain rule and and under
our hypothesis that Xˆ satisfies (2.2.4) and Condition 2.3.1, we have
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d
dθ
Ψ(Xˆ + θX˜)
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
= E
[
U ′(Xˆ)X˜
]
− γE
[
D′
(
E[Xˆ]− Xˆ
)(
E[X˜]− X˜
)]
= E
[
X˜
(
U ′(Xˆ)− γE
[
D′
(
E[Xˆ]− Xˆ
)]
+ γD′
(
E[Xˆ]− Xˆ
))]
≤ E
[
X˜(Y ξ)
]
= 0. (2.3.24)
By the concavity of U and convexity of D, it is clear that Ψ(Xˆ + θX˜) ≥ (1 −
θ)Ψ(Xˆ) + θΨ(Xˆ + X˜) for any θ ∈ (0, 1]. Then
Ψ
(
Xˆ
)
≥ Ψ
(
Xˆ + X˜
)
−
Ψ
(
Xˆ + θX˜
)
−Ψ(Xˆ)
θ
. (2.3.25)
By (2.3.24), limθ↓0
Ψ(Xˆ+θX˜)−Ψ(Xˆ)
θ
= d
dθ
Ψ(Xˆ + θX˜)
∣∣
θ=0
≤ 0. After taking limits
on both sides of (2.3.25), Ψ
(
Xˆ
)
≥ Ψ
(
Xˆ + X˜
)
, hence Xˆ is optimal for Problem
2.1.4. By Theorem 2.1.5, We can now conclude that Xˆ is the optimal terminal
wealth of Problem 2.1.2.
In the next three subsections, we apply Theorem 2.3.2 to establish the existence
of optimal solutions for different utility-risk frameworks: (i) Utility-Downside-
Risk, (ii) Utility-Strictly-Convex-Risk, and (iii) Mean-Risk. In particular, we
remark that the positive answers to the first two problems have long been absent
in the literature.
2.3.2 Application to the Utility-Downside-Risk Problem
In this subsection, we take D = [0,∞). We assume that U : [0,∞) → [0,∞) is
strictly concave, and U and D : R → [0,∞) are continuously differentiable. We
consider D to be a downside risk function, so D is positive and strictly convex
on (0,∞) and D(x) = 0 for x ≤ 0. Thus, we have D′(x) > 0 when x > 0 and
D′(x) = 0 when x ≤ 0. In this proposed model, the payoff greater than its mean
will not be penalized, and only the downside risk would be taken into account.
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Moreover, we assume that U and D satisfy the following conditions:
U ′(0) =∞, U ′(∞) = 0 and D′(∞) =∞. (2.3.26)
Thus any utility functions satisfying the Inada conditions can be covered. Note
that this formulation can cover the utility-semivariance problem, its positive an-
swer has a substantial contrast to the nonexistence of an optimal solution to the
mean-semivariance problem. We further make the following assumption on the
utility function:
Assumption 2.3.4. There exists k0 > 0 so that the inverse of the first-order
derivative of U , (U ′)−1, satisfies (U ′)−1(k0ξ) ∈ L2.
Note that Assumption 2.3.4 can be satisfied if there exist β ∈ (0, 1) and γ > 1
such that U ′(βy) ≤ γU ′(y) for all y > 0, and this condition has been adopted in
Zheng (2009).
According to Remark 2.3.3, we first find an implicit function satisfying (2.3.20),
then the Nonlinear Moment Problem (2.2.4)-(2.2.7) can be reduced into a nonlin-
ear programming problem (2.3.21)-(2.3.23).
Proposition 2.3.5. There exists an implicit function I : R× (0,∞)→ (0,∞)
satisfying:
U ′(I(m, y))+γD′(m− I(m, y))−y = 0, for any (m, y) ∈ R× (0,∞). (2.3.27)
Moreover, this function I possesses the following regularities:
(a) (i) For each m ∈ R, I(m, y) is strictly decreasing in y on (0,∞).
(ii) For each y ∈ (0,∞), I(m, y) is strictly increasing in m on {m ∈
R| y ≥ U ′(m)}; I(m, y) = (U ′)−1(y) ∈ (0,∞) for all m ∈ {m ∈ R| y ≤
U ′(m)}.
(b) I(m, y) is jointly continuous in (m, y) ∈ R× (0,∞).
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Proof. Fix (m, y) ∈ R × (0,∞). Since U is strictly concave and D is convex,
U ′(z) + γD′ (m− z)− y is strictly decreasing in z. Since U ′ and D′ is continuous,
U ′(z) + γD′ (m− z)− y is continuous in z. Under Assumptions (2.3.26), we can
also easily show that U ′(z) + γD′ (m− z)− y is coercive in the sense that
lim
z→0
U ′(z) + γD′ (m− z)− y =∞, lim
z→∞
U ′(z) + γD′ (m− z)− y = −y < 0.
Thus, by the intermediate value theorem and strict monotonicity, for any (m, y) ∈
R× (0,∞), there exists a unique I(m, y) ∈ (0,∞) such that
U ′(I(m, y)) + γD′(m− I(m, y))− y = 0.
(a) (i) For fixed (m, y), U ′(z) + γD′ (m− z) − y is strictly decreasing in z.
When (z,m) is fixed, U ′(z) + γD′ (m− z)− y is strictly decreasing in
y, so I(m, y) is strictly decreasing in y.
(ii) We first claim that m ≥ I(m, y) when y ≥ U ′(m). Assume the con-
trary, that m < I(m, y). We have D′(m − I(m, y)) = 0, and then
y = U ′(I(m, y)) ≥ U ′(m), which contradicts to m < I(m, y) as U ′ is
decreasing. Next, we assume another contrary, that there exists m0, y0
with y0 ≤ U ′(m0) and δ > 0 such that I(m0 + δ, y0) ≤ I(m0, y0). Then
we have m0 + δ − I(m0 + δ, y0) > m0 − I(m0, y0) ≥ 0, thus
U ′(I(m0 + δ, y0)) + γD′(m0 + δ − I(m0 + δ, y0))
> U ′(I(m0, y0)) + γD′(m0 − I(m0, y0)),
which contradicts (2.3.27).
For the second assertion, y ≤ U ′(m) implies that m ≤ (U ′)−1(y), thus
I(m, y) = (U ′)−1(y) satisfies (2.3.27), and it is the unique solution by
the main result in this proposition.
(b) Fix (M0, Y0) ∈ R× (0,∞). By part (a), for any small enough  > 0,
I(M0 − , Y0 + ) ≤ I(m, y) ≤ I(M0 + , Y0 − ) (2.3.28)
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for any |(m, y)− (M0, Y0)| < .
It is straightforward to show that lim↓0 I(M0 + , Y0 − ) and I(M0, Y0)
satisfy the same equation in (2.3.27), so we have lim↓0 I(M0 + , Y0 − ) =
I(M0, Y0). Similarly, we have lim↓0 I(M0− , Y0 + ) = I(M0, Y0). Applying
the sandwich theorem to (2.3.28), we can conclude that
lim
(m,y)→(M0,Y0)
I(m, y) = I(M0, Y0).
Since the implicit function I never takes value in the boundary of D, so we
now look for numbers Y,M and R that solve the following system of equations as
described in Remark 2.3.3:
E[ξI (M,γR + Y ξ)] = x0; (2.3.29)
E[I (M,γR + Y ξ)] = M ; (2.3.30)
E [D′ (M − I (M,γR + Y ξ))] = R. (2.3.31)
Proposition 2.3.6. There exist numbers Y,M,R ∈ (0,∞) such that the system of
nonlinear equations of (2.3.29)-(2.3.31) is satisfied. Thus, (I (M,γR + Y ξ) , Y,M,R)
is a solution of the system of Equations (2.2.4)-(2.2.7), where I is given in Propo-
sition 2.3.5.
We shall solve for roots Y,M and R one by one via applying the intermediate
value theorem successively:
Lemma 2.3.7. Given Y,M ∈ (0,∞), there exists a unique R = RY,M ∈ (0, D′(M))
satisfying
E [D′ (M − I (M,γR + Y ξ))] = R; (2.3.32)
or equivalently by (2.3.27):
E [U ′ (I (M,γR + Y ξ))] = Y E[ξ]. (2.3.33)
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Furthermore, RY,M is strictly increasing in M for a fixed Y and is also strictly
increasing in Y for a fixed M .
Proof. We prove the followings in order:
(a) E[D′ (M − I (M,γR + Y ξ))−R] is strictly decreasing in R,
(b) E[D′ (M − I (M,γR + Y ξ))] is continuous in R,
(c1) limR→0 E[D′ (M − I (M,γR + Y ξ))−R] > 0,
(c2) limR→D′(M) E [D′ (M − I (M,γR + Y ξ))−R] < 0.
In light of (b), (c1) and (c2), then by the intermediate value theorem, there exists
R = RY,M satisfying (2.3.32) while the uniqueness of RY,M is guaranteed by (a).
Finally, we show that
(d1) RY,M is strictly increasing in M for fixed Y ,
(d2) RY,M is strictly increasing in Y for fixed M .
For each of the above items:
(a) By Proposition 2.3.5 (a)(i), U ′ (I (M,γR + Y ξ)) is strictly increasing in R al-
most surely. By (2.3.27), D′ (M − I (M,γR + Y ξ))−R = 1
γ
(Y ξ − U ′ (I (M,γR + Y ξ)))
is therefore strictly decreasing inR almost surely. Thus, E [D′ (M − I (M,γR + Y ξ))−R]
is strictly decreasing in R.
(b) Since D′ and I are both continuous, so D′ (M − I (M,γR + Y ξ)) is contin-
uous in R. Hence, the claim follows by an application of the Dominated
Convergence Theorem.
(c1) When Y ξ > U ′(M), we have M > I (M,Y ξ), thus
D′ (M − I (M,Y ξ)) > 0, a.s. on {Y ξ > U ′(M)} .
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Since U
′(M)
Y
∈ (0,∞), by the definition of ξ, we have
P[D′(M − I(M,Y ξ)) > 0] ≥ P
[
ξ >
U ′(M)
Y
]
> 0.
By the Dominated Convergence Theorem,
lim
R→0
E [D′ (M − I (M,γR + Y ξ))−R]
= E
[
lim
R→0
D′ (M − I (M,γR + Y ξ))
]
= E [D′ (M − I (M,Y ξ))] > 0.
(c2) By (2.3.27), we have limR→D′(M) I (M,γR + Y ξ) > 0 almost surely, so
lim
R→D′(M)
D′(M − I (M,γR + Y ξ)) < D′(M), a.s. .
By the Monotone Convergence Theorem,
lim
R→D′(M)
E [D′(M − I (M,γR + Y ξ))] < D′(M),
thus this part follows.
(d1) Assume the contrary, that there exists a M0 ∈ (0,∞) and a δ > 0 such that
RY,M0 ≥ RY,M0+δ.
By Proposition 2.3.5 (a)(ii), when γR + Y ξ ≥ U ′(M), I (M,γR + Y ξ) is
strictly increasing in M , thus D′(M − I (M,γR + Y ξ)) − R is strictly in-
creasing in M on {γR + Y ξ ≥ U ′(M)} by (2.3.27). When γR + Y ξ ≤
U ′(M), D′(M − I (M,γR + Y ξ)) − R = −R. So given Y and R, D′(M −
I (M,γR + Y ξ)) is increasing inM and is strictly increasing on {γR + Y ξ ≥ U ′(M)}.
Thus we have E [D′(M − I (M,γR + Y ξ))−R] is strictly increasing in M .
On the other hand, in (a), D′(M−I (M,γR + Y ξ))−R is strictly decreasing
in R almost surely. Now, we get
0 = E [D′ (M0 + δ − I (M0 + δ, γRY,M0+δ + Y ξ))−RY,M0+δ]
≥ E [D′ (M0 + δ − I (M0 + δ, γRY,M0 + Y ξ))−RY,M0 ]
> E [D′ (M0 − I (M0, γRY,M0 + Y ξ))−RY,M0 ] = 0,
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which is a contradiction.
(d2) In Proposition 2.3.5 (a)(i), we have I (M,γR + Y ξ) strictly decreasing in Y
given a fixed point of M and R, thus E [D′(M − I (M,γR + Y ξ))−R] is
also strictly increasing in Y almost surely given (M,R). Thus, this part can
be verified as in (d1).
Lemma 2.3.8. Given Y ∈ (0,∞) and RY,M as specified for each M ∈ (0,∞) in
Lemma 2.3.7, there exists a unique M = MY ∈ (0,∞) such that
E[I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ)] = M. (2.3.34)
Furthermore, MY is strictly decreasing in Y .
Proof. In this lemma, we prove the following in order:
(a) E[I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ)]−M is strictly decreasing in M ,
(b) E[I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ)] is continuous in M ,
(c1) limM→0 E[I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ)−M ] > 0,
(c2) limM→∞ E [M − I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ)] =∞.
By using (b), (c1) and (c2), in accordance with the intermediate value theorem
and part (a), there exists a unique M = MY satisfying (2.3.34). Finally, we show
that
(d) MY is strictly decreasing in Y .
For each of the above items:
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(a) By Proposition 2.3.5 (a)(ii) , D′ (M − I (M,γR + Y ξ))−R = 1
γ
(Y ξ − U ′ (I (M,γR + Y ξ)))
is strictly increasing in M when γR + Y ξ ≥ U ′(M). Thus, because D′ is
strictly increasing for positive M − I (M,γR + Y ξ), I (M,γR + Y ξ) −M
is strictly decreasing in M on {γR + Y ξ ≥ U ′(M)}. On the other hand,
on {γR + Y ξ ≤ U ′(M)}, I (M,γR + Y ξ) −M = (U ′)−1(γR + Y ξ) −M is
strictly decreasing in M .
By Proposition 2.3.5 (a)(i), I (M,γR + Y ξ)−M is strictly decreasing in R.
By Lemma 2.3.7, RY,M is strictly increasing in M . Thus, for any δ > 0, it
is almost surely that:
I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ)−M > I (M,γRY,M+δ + Y ξ)−M
> I (M + δ, γRY,M+δ + Y ξ)− (M + δ)
Thus, E [I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ)]−M is strictly decreasing in M .
(b) Fix M0 ∈ (0,∞). By the continuity of D′ and I, it is almost surely that:
lim
M↓M0
(D′ (M − I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ))−RY,M)
= D′
(
M0 − I
(
M0, γ lim
M↓M0
RY,M + Y ξ
))
− lim
M↓M0
RY,M (2.3.35)
By (2.3.32), (2.3.35) and the Dominated Convergence Theorem, we have
E
[
D′
(
M0 − I
(
M0, γ lim
M↓M0
RY,M + Y ξ
))]
− lim
M↓M0
RY,M
= lim
M↓M0
(E [D′ (M − I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ))]−RY,M) = 0.
By the uniqueness result in Lemma 2.3.7, we conclude that limM↓M0 RY,M =
RY,M0 . Similarly, we have limM↑M0 RY,M = RY,M0 . By continuity of I,
lim
M↓M0
I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ) = I (M0, γRY,M0 + Y ξ) .
Similarly, the equality of limits from the opposite side can also be deduced,
so
lim
M→M0
I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ) = I (M0, γRY,M0 + Y ξ) .
48
2.3. Sufficient Condition
Finally, our claim follows by the Dominated Convergence Theorem.
(c1) Since I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ)−M is decreasing in M by (a), thus
lim
M→0
I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ) = lim
M→0
(I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ)−M) .
We claim that limM→0 I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ) > 0 almost surely. Assume the
contrary, that there exists a sample value of ξ0 such that limM→0 I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ0) =
0. Then, we have
lim
M→0
D′ (M − I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ0)) = D′(0) and
lim
M→0
U ′ (I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ0)) = ∞.
But by (2.3.27), we again have:
lim
M→0
U ′ (I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ0))
= ξ0Y + γ lim
M→0
(RY,M −D′ (M − I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ0)))
≤ ξ0Y + γ lim
M→0
(D′(M)−D′ (M − I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ0)))
≤ ξ0Y + γ (D′(0)−D′ (0)) <∞,
which leads to a contradiction. Hence, limM→0 I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ) > 0 al-
most surely. Since I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ)−M is decreasing in M , by the Mono-
tone Convergence Theorem,
lim
M→0
E [I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ)−M ] > 0.
(c2) By (2.3.27), we either have limM→∞ I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ) =∞ almost surely
or limM→∞RY,M =∞.
Assume that limM→∞RY,M < ∞, thus limM→∞ I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ) = ∞
almost surely, then by continuity of U ′,
lim
M→∞
U ′ (I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ)) = 0 a.s. (2.3.36)
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Then, by the Dominated Convergence Theorem and (2.3.36),
lim
M→∞
E [U ′(I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ))] = E
[
lim
M→∞
U ′(I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ))
]
= 0.
Hence, we have limM→∞ E[U ′(I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ)) − ξY ] = −E[ξ]Y < 0.
This contradicts (2.3.33) in Lemma 2.3.7, so we must have limM→∞RY,M =
∞.
Given a sample ξ0, assume the contrary that limM→∞M−I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ0) <
∞, then limM→∞D′ (M − I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ0)) < ∞. By (2.3.27) and
limM→∞RY,M = ∞, we have limM→∞ U ′ (I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ0)) = ∞, thus
limM→∞ I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ0) = 0 and then it results in:
lim
M→∞
(M − I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ0)) =∞,
a contradiction.
Now, we have limM→∞M − I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ) =∞ almost surely. By the
Monotone Convergence Theorem,
lim
M→∞
E [M − I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ)] =∞ > 0.
(d) In part (a), we have shown that E [I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ)] −M is strictly de-
creasing in M for a fixed Y . On the other hand, in Proposition 2.3.5 (a)(i)
and Lemma 2.3.7 (d1), we can show that E [I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ)] − M is
strictly decreasing in Y for a fixedM . By (2.3.34), E [I (MY , γRY,MY + Y ξ)]−
MY = 0 for all values of Y , thus, MY is strictly decreasing in Y .
Lemma 2.3.9. Given RY,M and MY as specified in Lemmas 2.3.7 and 2.3.8 re-
spectively for each Y,M ∈ (0,∞), there exists a (not necessarily unique) Y ∗ ∈
(0,∞) such that
E[ξI (MY , γRY,MY + Y ξ)] = x0. (2.3.37)
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Proof. In this lemma, we prove the following in order:
(a) E [ξI (MY , γRY,MY + Y ξ)] is continuous in Y ,
(b1) limY→0 E [ξI (MY , γRY,MY + Y ξ)] =∞,
(b2) limY→∞ E [ξI (MY , γRY,MY + Y ξ)] = 0.
In turn, by the intermediate value theorem with (a), (b1) and (b2), there exists
Y satisfying (2.3.37).
For each of the above items:
(a) Fix Y0 ∈ (0,∞). For any  > 0, by Lemmas 2.3.7 and 2.3.8, we have
RY0−,MY0+ < RY,MY < RY0+,MY0− for any Y0 −  < Y < Y0 + ,(2.3.38)
and RY0+,MY0− is increasing in , we therefore have both the finite existence
of lim↓0RY0+,MY0− and lim↓0RY0−,MY0+ . By Proposition 2.3.5 (b), I is
jointly continuous,
lim
↓0
I
(
MY0−, (Y0 + ) ξ + γRY0+,MY0−
)
= I
(
lim
↓0
MY0−, Y0ξ + γ lim
↓0
RY0+,MY0−
)
.
Hence,
lim
↓0
(
D′
(
MY0− − I
(
MY0−, (Y0 + ) ξ + γRY0+,MY0−
))−RY0+,MY0−)
= D′
(
lim
↓0
MY0− − I
(
lim
↓0
MY0−, Y0ξ + γ lim
↓0
RY0+,MY0−
))
− lim
↓0
RY0+,MY0− .
By standard application of the Dominated Convergence Theorem,
E
[
D′
(
lim
↓0
MY0− − I
(
lim
↓0
MY0−, Y0ξ + γ lim
↓0
RY0+,MY0−
))
− lim
↓0
RY0+,MY0−
]
= lim
↓0
E
[
D′
(
MY0− − I
(
MY0−, (Y0 + ) ξ + γRY0+,MY0−
))−RY0+,MY0−] = 0.
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Since R in Lemma 2.3.7 is uniquely defined in (2.3.32), thus RY0,lim↓0MY0− =
lim↓0RY0+,MY0− . Similarly, we haveRY0,lim↓0MY0+ = lim↓0RY0−,MY0+ . By
the Dominated Convergence Theorem and (2.3.34),
E
[
I
(
lim
↓0
MY0−, Y0ξ + γRY0,lim↓0 MY0−
)
− lim
↓0
MY0−
]
= E
[
I
(
lim
↓0
MY0−, Y0ξ + γ lim
↓0
RY0+,MY0−
)
− lim
↓0
MY0−
]
= E
[
lim
↓0
(
I
(
MY0−, (Y0 + ) ξ + γRY0+,MY0−
)−MY0−)] = 0.
Since M in Lemma 2.3.8 is uniquely defined in (2.3.34), thus lim↓0MY0− =
MY0 . Similarly, we have lim↑0MY0− = MY0 and limY→Y0 MY = MY0 . Hence,
lim
↓0
RY0+,MY0− = RY0,lim↓0 MY0− = RY0,MY0
= RY0,lim↓0 MY0+ = lim↓0
RY0−,MY0+ .
By (2.3.38), we have limY→Y0 RY,MY = RY0,MY0 . Then we have
lim
Y→Y0
I (MY , Y ξ + γRY,MY ) = I
(
lim
Y→Y0
MY , Y0ξ + γ lim
Y→Y0
RY,MY
)
= I
(
MY0 , Y0ξ + γRY0,MY0
)
.
Finally, our claim follows from another application of the Dominated Con-
vergence Theorem.
(b1) For an arbitrary a sample value ξ0 ∈ (0,∞). Assume the contrary that
lim inf
Y→0
I (MY , Y ξ0 + γRY,MY ) <∞,
then there exists a sequence {yn} with yn → 0 such that
lim inf
Y→0
I (MY , Y ξ0 + γRY,MY ) = lim
n→∞
I
(
Myn , ynξ0 + γRyn,Myn
)
<∞.
Clearly, limn→∞ U ′
(
I
(
Myn , ynξ0 + γRyn,Myn
))
> 0. Furthermore, since U ′(I(m, ·))
is increasing, thus for any ξ > ξ0,
lim inf
n→∞
U ′
(
I
(
Myn , ynξ + γRyn,Myn
))
≥ lim
n→∞
U ′
(
I
(
Myn , ynξ0 + γRyn,Myn
))
> 0.
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By Fatou’s Lemma and (2.3.33),
lim inf
n→∞
ynE[ξ] = lim inf
n→∞
E
[
U ′
(
I
(
Myn , ynξ + γRyn,Myn
))]
≥ E
[
lim inf
n→∞
U ′
(
I
(
Myn , ynξ + γRyn,Myn
))]
≥ lim
n→∞
U ′
(
I
(
Myn , ynξ0 + γRyn,Myn
))
P [ξ > ξ0] > 0,
which contradict lim infn→∞ ynE[ξ] = 0.
Therefore, lim infY→0 I (MY , Y ξ0 + γRY,MY ) = ∞, for any ξ0 ∈ (0,∞).
Hence, lim infY→0 ξI (MY , Y ξ + γRY,MY ) = ∞ almost surely. By Fatou’s
Lemma,
lim inf
Y→0
E [ξI (MY , γRY,MY + Y ξ)] ≥ E
[
lim inf
Y→0
ξI (MY , γRY,MY + Y ξ)
]
=∞.
(b2) Since MY is decreasing in Y as shown in Lemma 2.3.8, thus limY→∞MY
exists and is finite.
For any N ∈ (0,∞), it is clear from its definition that limY→∞RN,MY ≥ 0.
Therefore, limY→∞ I (MY , Nξ + γRN,MY ) = I (limY→∞MY , Nξ + γ limY→∞RN,MY )
is finite almost surely for anyN ∈ (0,∞). Since I (limY→∞MY , Nξ + γ limY→∞RN,MY )
is decreasing in N , then limN→∞ I (limY→∞MY , Nξ + γ limY→∞RN,MY ) ex-
ists and is finite since I is always non-negative.
For if there exists a sample ξ0 ∈ (0,∞) such that
lim
N→∞
I
(
lim
Y→∞
MY , Nξ0 + γ lim
Y→∞
RN,MY
)
> 0, (2.3.39)
then limN→∞D′ (limY→∞MY − I (limY→∞MY , Nξ0 + γ limY→∞RN,MY )) <
∞ and limN→∞ U ′ (I (limY→∞MY , Nξ0 + γ limY→∞RN,MY )) <∞ if (2.3.39)
holds. By (2.3.27),
Nξ0 + γ lim
Y→∞
RN,MY
= U ′
(
I
(
lim
Y→∞
MY , Nξ0 + γ lim
Y→∞
RN,MY
))
+D′
(
lim
Y→∞
MY − I
(
lim
Y→∞
MY , Nξ0 + γ lim
Y→∞
RN,MY
))
.
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Then taking N → ∞ into the both sides, the limit in the left hand side
tends to infinity as limY→∞RN,MY ≥ 0 > −∞ for any finite fixed N , while
the limit in the right hand side is finite, a contradiction. So
lim
N→∞
I
(
lim
Y→∞
MY , Nξ + γ lim
Y→∞
RN,MY
)
= 0, a.s. (2.3.40)
On the other hand, since I (MY , Y ξ + γRY,MY ) ≤ I (MY , Nξ + γRN,MY ) for
all N ≤ Y < ∞ and limY→∞ I (MY , Nξ + γRN,MY ) exists, we have almost
surely, for any N ,
lim sup
Y→∞
I (MY , Y ξ + γRY,MY ) ≤ lim
Y→∞
I (MY , Nξ + γRN,MY )
= I
(
lim
Y→∞
MY , Nξ + γ lim
Y→∞
RN,MY
)
.
By (2.3.40), lim supY→∞ I (MY , Y ξ + γRY,MY ) = 0 almost surely. Finally,
by reverse Fatou’s lemma, since I (MY , Y ξ + γRY,MY ) ≤ I (Mk0 , k0ξ) ≤
I (Mk0 , U
′(Mk0)) + (U
′)−1(k0ξ) ∈ L2 for Y ≥ k0, where k0 is given in As-
sumption 2.3.4, we have
lim sup
Y→∞
E [ξI (MY , Y ξ + γRY,MY )]
≤ E
[
lim sup
Y→∞
ξI (MY , Y ξ + γRY,MY )
]
= 0. (2.3.41)
Proof of Proposition 2.3.6. According to Lemmas 2.3.7, 2.3.8 and 2.3.9, the triple
(Y ∗,MY ∗ , RY ∗,MY ∗ ) solves the system of nonlinear equations in (2.3.29)-(2.3.31).
Next, we shall verify that Xˆ = I (M,γR + Y ξ), where I is given in Proposition
2.3.5 and the numbers Y,M and R are warranted in Proposition 2.3.6, belongs to
X and satisfies Condition 2.3.1. Then, the optimal terminal wealth can be found
by Theorem 2.3.2:
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Theorem 2.3.10. Xˆ = I (M,γR + Y ξ) is an optimal terminal wealth to the
utility-downside-risk problem, where I is given in Proposition 2.3.5 and the num-
bers Y,M and R are warranted in Proposition 2.3.6.
Proof. According to Proposition 2.3.5, I(m, y) is finite on R×(0,∞) and is strictly
decreasing in y for a fixed m. We have 0 ≤ I (M,Y ξ + γR) ≤ I (M,γR) <
∞, thus U (I (M,Y ξ + γR)) and D (M − I (M,Y ξ + γR)) are both uniformly
bounded. Hence, X = I (M,Y ξ + γR) ∈ X . Since D′ is increasing, D′(M −
I (M,γR)) ≤ D′ (M − I (M,Y ξ + γR)) ≤ D′(M), and henceD′ (M − I (M,Y ξ + γR))
is uniformly bounded and in L2. Furthermore, by (2.3.27), U ′ (I (M,Y ξ + γR)) =
Y ξ+γR−γD′ (M − I (M,Y ξ + γR)), which is in L2, hence Xˆ = I (M,Y ξ + γR)
satisfies Condition 2.3.1.
With (Y,M,R) as warranted in Proposition 2.3.6, (I (M,Y ξ + γR) , Y,M,R)
solves the Nonlinear Moment Problem (2.2.4)-(2.2.7). Then, by Theorem 2.3.2,
Xˆ = I (M,Y ξ + γR) is an optimal solution to Problem 2.1.4 with downside risk
function D. Finally, by Theorem 2.1.5, Xˆ = I (M,Y ξ + γR) is an optimal termi-
nal wealth of utility-downside-risk problem.
In the proof of Theorem 2.3.10, it seems not immediate that the optimal
terminal wealth is uniformly bounded even if the risk measure is a downside one.
By Theorems 2.1.5 and 2.2.2, there exist numbers Y,M and R so that any optimal
terminal wealth Xˆ (satisfying Conditions 2.2.1 (i) and (ii)) satisfies:Y ξ = fM,R(Xˆ), a.s. on {Xˆ > 0},Y ξ ≤ fM,R(Xˆ), a.s. on {Xˆ = 0}, (2.3.42)
where fM,R(x) := U
′(x) − γR + γD′ (M − x). By taking expectation on both
sides of (2.3.42) with some terms being eliminated in accordance with (2.2.7),
we have Y ≥ E[U ′(Xˆ)]/E[ξ] > 0. By the definition of I in Proposition 2.3.5
and the fact that fM,R is decreasing, fM,R(x) ≤ 0 whenever x ≥ I (M,γR) > 0,
together with the facts that Y ξ > 0 and Xˆ has to satisfy (2.3.42) a.s., there is
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no possibility that Xˆ takes value greater than I (M,γR). In other words, Xˆ has
to be bounded above by the finite deterministic number I (M,γR). Note that
the optimal terminal wealth is bounded when the risk function is strictly convex.
In particular, the optimal terminal payoff in our utility-risk problem in Theorem
2.3.10 is counter-monotonic with the pricing kernel, which is a commonly found
property in the portfolio selection literature.
To motivate the claim of the boundedness of the optimal payoff from a financial
perspective, we consider a simple single period example. Based on the previous
observation, it is justifiable to simply take the optimal terminal payoff under this
example to be also counter-monotonic with the pricing kernel.
We suppose that the payoff is a random variable Z with two possible outcomes,
0 and a number z > 1, and their respective probabilities are p0 := 1− pz and pz.
For simplicity, we assume the riskless rate is zero. Our objective function is
J(Z) := E[U(Z)]− E[D(E[Z]− Z)] := E[Zθ]− E[(E[Z]− Z)ρ+], (2.3.43)
where θ < 1 and ρ > 1. There is a budget constraint on the payoff, namely
E[ξZ] = qzz = 1, (2.3.44)
where qz is the risk neutral probability of Z = z. We look for the optimal z so that
the corresponding payoff Z maximizes (2.3.43). Since we assume that the payoff
Z and the pricing kernel ξ are counter-monotonic, there exist a ξ0(z) ∈ (0,∞)
such that {Z = z} = {ξ < ξ0(z)}, thus qz =
∫ ξ0(z)
0
ξP[dξ]. Then, in order to
maintain the budget constraint at the same level, increasing z has to be balanced
off with a smaller risk neutral probability qz, thus ξ0(z) decreases in z. Therefore,
pz =
∫ ξ0(z)
0
P[dξ] decreases in z. Define h(z) := qz
pz
=
∫ ξ0(z)
0 ξP[dξ]∫ ξ0(z)
0 P[dξ]
, simple calculus
concludes that h′(z) < 0, and therefore h(z) decreases in z. By (2.3.44), pz =
h(z)−1
z
and E[Z] = h(z)−1. Then, we have
(i) E[U(Z)] = E[Zθ] =
h(z)−1
z1−θ
and
(ii) E[D(E[Z]− Z)] = E[(E[Z]− Z)ρ+] = (E[Z])ρ(1− pz) ≥ δ0(h(z)−1)ρ,
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for some δ0 > 0. Next, we consider two cases: (i) limz→∞ h(z)−1 < ∞ or (ii)
limz→∞ h(z)−1 =∞.
(i) We have limz→∞ E[U(Z)] = limz→∞ h(z)
−1
z1−θ = 0, i.e. a bounded Z is optimal
even in the ordinary utility maximization.
(ii) We have
lim
z→∞
E[D(E[Z]− Z)]
E[U(Z)]
≥ lim
z→∞
δ0(h(z)
−1)ρ
h(z)−1
z1−θ
≥ lim
z→∞
δ0(h(z)
−1)ρ−1 =∞,
which means that E[D(E[Z] − Z)] grows with z faster than E[U(Z)] due
to the diminishing marginal value of utility U and the increasing marginal
value of deviation risk D(E[Z] − Z). As a result, taking an arbitrary large
value in z actually causes a negative effect on the objective value. It is
noted that even the downside risk does not penalize on the upside payoff,
the deviation risk of Z still increases in z because E[Z] increases in z.
2.3.3 Application to the Utility-Strictly-Convex-Risk Prob-
lem
In this subsection, we take D = [0,∞). We assume that U : [0,∞) → [0,∞) is
strictly concave and continuously differentiable, while D : R → [0,∞) is strictly
convex and continuously differentiable. Moreover, we assume that U and D satisfy
(2.3.26) and D′(−∞) = −∞. Thus any utility functions satisfying the Inada
conditions can be covered.
We can establish the existence of the solution of the nonlinear moment prob-
lem in (2.2.4) by using the same approach as in Subsection 2.3.2. Since most
derivations are similar, we only indicate here the major differences from the last
subsection.
Proposition 2.3.11.
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There exists an implicit function I : R2 → (0,∞) satisfying:
U ′(I(m, y)) + γD′(m− I(m, y))− y = 0, for any (m, y) ∈ R2. (2.3.45)
Moreover, this function I possesses the following regularities:
(a) (i) For each y ∈ R, I(m, y) is strictly increasing in m.
(ii) For each m ∈ R, I(m, y) is strictly decreasing in y.
(b) I(m, y) is jointly continuous in (m, y) ∈ R2.
Proof. The proof is essentially the same as the proof of Proposition 2.3.5 except
that limZ→∞ U ′(Z) + γD′ (m− Z)− y = −∞ for any (m, y) ∈ R2.
Proposition 2.3.12. There exist constants Y,M ∈ (0,∞) and R ∈ R satisfying a
system of nonlinear equations in (2.3.29)-(2.3.31). Thus, (I (M,γR + Y ξ) , Y,M,R)
is the solution of system of Equations (2.2.4)-(2.2.7), where I is given in Propo-
sition 2.3.11.
Proof. The approach is again the same as that of Proposition 2.3.6 with the
following major changes:
(i) Since R can take values in (−∞, D′(M)) instead. We have to prove the
following in place of that in (c1) in Lemma 2.3.7:
lim
R→−∞
E[D′ (M − I (M,γR + Y ξ))−R] > 0.
By (2.3.45), we have limR→−∞ I (M,γR + Y ξ) =∞ almost surely. Since U ′
is continuous, so we have limR→−∞ Y ξ − U ′(I (M,γR + Y ξ)) = Y ξ almost
surely by the Inada condition. Since Y ξ − U ′ (I (M,γR + Y ξ)) is strictly
increasing as R→ −∞ and Y ξ − U ′ (I (M,γR + Y ξ)) ≥ D′ (M − I (M, 0))
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for R < 0 by (2.3.45), then by the Monotone Convergence Theorem,
lim
R→−∞
E [D′ (M − I (M,γR + Y ξ))−R]
= lim
R→−∞
E
[
1
γ
(Y ξ − U ′(I (M,γR + Y ξ)))
]
=
1
γ
Y E [ξ] > 0.
(ii) In part (d1) in Lemma 2.3.7 , by Proposition 2.3.11 (a), I (M,γR + Y ξ) is
strictly increasing in M , so D′(M−I (M,γR + Y ξ))−R is strictly increasing
in M .
(iii) In part (a) in Lemma 2.3.8, by (2.3.27), D′(M − I (M,γR + Y ξ)) − R
is strictly increasing in M almost surely. Since D′ is strictly increasing,
I (M,γR + Y ξ)−M is strictly decreasing in M for fixed Y,R.
(iv) In part (b2) in Lemma 2.3.9, since R can be negative, we no longer have
limY→∞RN,MY ≥ 0. Instead, we claim that for anyN ∈ (0,∞), limY→∞RN,MY >
−∞. Assume the contrary, that there exists N such that limY→∞RN,MY =
−∞. Then
lim
Y→∞
(ξN + γRN,MY ) = −∞ for all ξ ∈ (0,∞). (2.3.46)
Fix a sample ξ0 ∈ (0,∞). Let {yn} be a sequence with yn →∞ such that
lim
n→∞
I
(
Myn , Nξ0 + γRN,Myn
)
= lim inf
Y→∞
I (MY , Nξ0 + γRN,MY ) .
If limn→∞ I
(
Myn , Nξ0 + γRN,Myn
)
<∞, then
lim
n→∞
U ′
(
I
(
Myn , Nξ0 + γRN,Myn
))
> 0 and
lim
n→∞
D′
(
Myn − I
(
Myn , Nξ0 + γRN,Myn
))
> −∞.
With (2.3.45), they contradict to (2.3.46). So
lim inf
Y→∞
I (MY , Nξ0 + γRN,MY ) = lim
n→∞
I
(
Myn , Nξ0 + γRN,Myn
)
=∞.
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Thus, we have lim infY→∞ I (MY , Nξ + γRN,MY ) =∞ almost surely. Then,
lim
Y→∞
U ′ (I (MY , Nξ + γRN,MY )) = U
′
(
lim
Y→∞
I (MY , Nξ + γRN,MY )
)
= 0.
Since U ′ (I (MY , Nξ + γRN,MY )) ≤ Nξ + γRN,MN −D′(−I(0, γRN,MN )) for
Y > N , then by the reverse Fatou lemma, we have
0 = E
[
lim sup
Y→∞
U ′ (I (MY , Nξ + γRN,MY ))
]
≥ lim sup
Y→∞
E [U ′ (I (MY , Nξ + γRN,MY ))]
= NE [ξ] > 0,
which is a contradiction; thus for any N ∈ (0,∞), limY→∞RN,MY > −∞.
From here on the rest of the proof is the same as that for part (b2) in Proof
for Lemma 2.3.9 until the last line,
I (MY , Y ξ + γRY,MY ) ≤ I
(
M1, γ lim
Y→∞
R1,MY
)
<∞,
which is independent of ξ. Hence, the reverse Fatou Lemma still works in
(2.3.41).
Using the same argument as in Section 2.3.2, we can draw the same existence
conclusion:
Theorem 2.3.13. Xˆ = I (M,γR + Y ξ) is an optimal terminal wealth of the
utility-strictly-convex-risk problem, where I is specified in Proposition 2.3.11 and
the numbers Y,M and R are warranted in Proposition 2.3.12.
Furthermore, if we specify risk function D to be the square function, i.e.
D(x) = x2, and hence variance of the terminal payoff is the risk measure con-
cerned, then the solution of the Nonlinear Moment Problem in Theorem 2.3.2 is
unique:
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Proposition 2.3.14. There exists a unique set of numbers Y,M ∈ (0,∞) and
R ∈ R such that a system of nonlinear equations in (2.3.29)-(2.3.31) is satisfied.
Thus, X = I (M,γR + Y ξ), where I is a function defined in Proposition 2.3.11,
is the unique optimal terminal wealth of the utility-variance problem.
Proof. Now, D′(x) = 2x, then RY,MY = 0 for all Y by (2.3.30) and (2.3.31). Since
MY is strictly decreasing in Y , by Proposition 2.3.11 (b), I (MY , γRY,MY + Y ξ) =
I (MY , Y ξ) is strictly decreasing in Y . Because ξ is absolute continuous with
no point mass and its support is R, hence E [ξI (MY , γRY,MY + Y ξ)] is strictly
decreasing in Y . Therefore, Y ∗ obtained in Proposition 2.3.12 is unique. Thus,
(2.3.29)-(2.3.31) is uniquely solved by (Y ∗,MY ∗ , 0).
By remark 2.3.3, (I (MY ∗ , Y
∗ξ) , Y ∗,MY ∗ , 0) solve the Nonlinear Moment Prob-
lem. By Theorems 2.1.5 and 2.3.2, the second assertion follows.
2.3.4 Application to the Mean-Risk Problem
In this subsection, we assume the utility function to be linear, i.e. U(x) = x, and
we set D = R. Our Problem 2.1.2 reduces to a mean-risk optimization problem:
max
pi∈A
E[Xpi(T )]− γE[D (E[Xpi(T )]−Xpi(T ))]. (2.3.47)
As the Inada conditions in (2.3.26) do not hold in this case, the method de-
veloped in the previous subsection cannot be directly translated here. Suppose
that there is an inverse function for the first-order derivative of risk function,
I2 := (D
′)−1. The Nonlinear Moment Problem (2.2.4) corresponding to (2.3.47)
can be simplified as follows:
Y ξ = 1− γR + γD′
(
M − Xˆ
)
, (2.3.48)
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where the numbers Y,M,R ∈ R satisfy
E[ξXˆ] = x0, (2.3.49)
E[Xˆ] = M, (2.3.50)
E
[
D′
(
M − Xˆ
)]
= R. (2.3.51)
In accordance with Theorem 2.3.2, we are going to show that the reduced
Nonlinear Moment Problem (2.3.48) admits a solution, so that the corresponding
Xˆ will be an optimal terminal wealth for the mean-risk problem (2.3.47).
Theorem 2.3.15. If there exists a unique R ∈ R so that:
I2
(
R +
ξ
γE[ξ]
− 1
γ
)
∈ L2 and (2.3.52)
E
[
I2
(
R +
ξ
γE[ξ]
− 1
γ
)]
= 0, (2.3.53)
then by setting
Xˆ := M − I2
(
R +
ξY
γ
− 1
γ
)
, (2.3.54)
M :=
x0
E[ξ]
+
E
[
ξI2
(
R + ξY
γ
− 1
γ
)]
E[ξ]
, (2.3.55)
Y :=
1
E[ξ]
, (2.3.56)
together with R, they will solve the reduced Nonlinear Moment Problem (2.3.48)-
(2.3.51).
Proof. Condition (2.3.52) guarantees that X defined in (2.3.54) is in L2 and
E
[
ξI2
(
R + ξY
γ
− 1
γ
)]
is finite, by the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality. It is clear that
Condition 2.3.1 is satisfied. Since D is convex,
D
(
I2
(
R +
ξY
γ
− 1
γ
))
≤ D(0) +
(
R +
ξY
γ
− 1
γ
)
I2
(
R +
ξY
γ
− 1
γ
)
,
hence I2
(
R + ξY
γ
− 1
γ
)
∈ X . (2.3.48)–(2.3.51) can be verified easily by direct
substitution of (2.3.54)–(2.3.56).
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In Theorem 2.3.15, we solve the mean-risk optimization problem for any risk
function satisfying (2.3.52) and (2.3.53). (2.3.53) can be obviously satisfied when
I2 is both continuous and coercive. Note that the uniqueness of R can be war-
ranted by the strict convexity of D and (2.3.52) can be satisfied when I2 is of
polynomial growth.
Remark 2.3.16. In Jin et al. (2005), they studied the same mean-risk optimiza-
tion problem by using the Lagrangian approach, and they also formulated the
problem as follows:
minD(E[X(T )]−X(T )), subject to E[X(T )] = z.
This problem is equivalent to (2.3.47) for appropriate relationship between γ and
z. The work Jin et al. (2005) shows that if the mean-risk problem has a solution,
the optimal terminal wealth X = z − I2(µξ − λ), where λ and µ satisfy the
equations
E[I2(µξ − λ)] = 0,
E[ξI2(µξ − λ)] = zE[ξ]− x0.
For any z such that there exists γ > 0 satisfying
z =
x0
E[ξ]
+
E
[
ξI2
(
R + ξ
γE[ξ] − 1γ
)]
E[ξ]
,
if we set
µ =
1
γE[ξ]
, λ =
1
γ
−R,
where R is as obtained in (2.3.53), the solution in Jin et al. (2005) can then be
recovered.
Example 2.3.17 (Mean-Variance Case). We further set D(x) = 1
2
x2, the general
utility risk problem (2.1.2) boils down to the classical mean-variance problem.
Clearly, we have D′(x) = I2(x) = x. By setting ρ = 1 in (2.3.62), we have R = 0,
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and also in light of (2.3.55), M = x0E[ξ] +
1
γ
(
E[ξ2]
(E[ξ])2 − 1
)
, one can derive the optimal
terminal wealth from (2.3.61),
X =
x0
E[ξ]
+
1
γ
(
E[ξ2]
(E[ξ])2
− ξ
E[ξ]
)
. (2.3.57)
Then the optimal trading strategy can be obtained with an application of Mar-
tingale Representation Theorem since the market is complete. Now, we aim to
show that if all market coefficients are deterministic, we can obtain the explicit
form of optimal control. With deterministic market parameters, we have:
E[ξ] = exp
[
−
∫ T
0
r(s)ds
]
E[ξ2] = exp
[∫ T
0
(−2r(s) + α(s)t (σ(s)σ(s)t)−1 α(s))ds] .
Using (2.3.57), we have
X = C − 1
γ
exp
[∫ T
0
r(s)ds
]
ξ,
where C := exp
[∫ T
0
r(s)ds
]
x0+
1
γ
exp
[∫ T
0
α(s)t (σ(s)σ(s)t)
−1
α(s)ds
]
. Since {Xˆ(t)ξ(t)}
is a martingale, and we have
Xˆ(t)ξ(t) = E
[
Xˆ(T )ξ(T )|Ft
]
= CE[ξ|Ft]− 1
γ
e
∫ T
0 r(s)dsE[ξ2|Ft]
= Cξ(t)e−
∫ T
t r(s)ds − 1
γ
e
∫ T
0 r(s)ds (ξ(t))2 e
∫ T
t (−2r(s)+α(s)t(σ(s)σ(s)t)
−1
α(s))ds.
(2.3.58)
Thus, through an application of Itoˆ’s formula to (2.3.58), we have
d
(
Xˆ(t)ξ(t)
)
= −Cξ(t)e
∫ T
t −r(s)dsα(t)t
(
σ(t)t
)−1
dW (t)
+
1
γ
e
∫ T
0 r(s)ds (ξ(t))2 e
∫ T
t (−2r(s)+α(s)t(σ(s)σ(s)t)
−1
α(s))dsα(t)t
(
σ(t)t
)−1
dW (t)
= Cξ(t)e
∫ T
t −r(s)dsα(t)t
(
σ(t)t
)−1 − 2Xˆ(t)ξ(t)α(t)t (σ(t)t)−1 dW (t). (2.3.59)
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On the other hand, by applying Itoˆ’s formula to Xˆ(t)ξ(t) directly, we have
d
(
Xˆ(t)ξ(t)
)
= ξ(t)
(
−α(t)t (σ(t)t)−1 Xˆ(t) + pi(t)tσ(t)) dW (t),(2.3.60)
By comparing the coefficients of (2.3.59) and (2.3.60) and knowing ξ(t) > 0,
we can obtain the optimal control which coincides the result as obtained in Li and
Zhou (2000) and Bensoussan et al. (2014):
pˆi(t) =
(
σ(t)σ(t)t
)−1
α(t)
(
−Xˆ(t) +Ke
∫ T
t −r(s)ds
)
.
Example 2.3.18 (Mean-Weighted-Power-Risk Function case). Consider
D(x) =
a
2
xρ+1+
ρ+ 1
− b
2
xρ+1−
ρ+ 1
for ρ > 0 and a ≥ b > 0. a ≥ b means that the risk incurred when the return
is less than the expectation will be greater than that when the return is greater
than the expectation. Now, D′(x) = axρ+−bxρ−, and I2(x) = 1ax
1
ρ
+− 1bx
1
ρ
−. To verify
(2.3.52), we consider two cases: (i) ρ ≤ 2 and (ii) ρ > 2 respectively.
(i) If ρ ≤ 2, by Minkowski’s inequality, for any R ∈ R,
E
[(
I2
(
1
γE[ξ]
ξ +R− 1
γ
))2]
≤ E
[
1
b2
∣∣∣∣ 1γE[ξ]ξ +R− 1γ
∣∣∣∣ 2ρ
]
≤ 1
b2
E[∣∣∣∣ ξγE[ξ]
∣∣∣∣ 2ρ
] ρ
2
+
∣∣∣∣R− 1γ
∣∣∣∣
 2ρ .
We next show that ξ(t)k is bounded for all k ∈ R and t ∈ [0, T ]:
Lemma 2.3.19. For any k ∈ R, t ∈ [0, T ], ξ(t)k is integrable.
Proof.
E
[
ξ(t)k
]
= E
[
e
− ∫ t0(kr(s)ds+ k2α(s)t(σ(s)σ(s)t)−1α(s)ds+kα(s)t(σ(s)t)−1dW (s))]
= E
[
e
− ∫ t0(kr(s)ds+ k−k22 α(s)t(σ(s)σ(s)t)−1α(s)ds)
×e−
∫ t
0
(
k2
2
α(s)t(σ(s)σ(s)t)
−1
α(s)ds+kα(s)t(σ(s)t)
−1
dW (s)
)]
.
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Due to the uniform boundedness of the underlying market parameters, there
are some r and K such that |r(s)| ≤ r and |α(s)t (σ(s)σ(s)t)−1 α(s)| ≤ K
for any s ∈ [0, T ], we thus have
e
− ∫ t0(kr(s)ds+ k−k22 α(s)t(σ(s)σ(s)t)−1α(s)ds) ≤ eT (|k|r+|k−k2|K)
Because
{
e
− ∫ t0( k22 α(s)t(σ(s)σ(s)t)−1α(s)ds+kα(s)t(σ(s)t)−1dW (s))} is a martingale,
we can show that for any k ∈ R, t ∈ [0, T ], E [ξ(t)k] is bounded; indeed,
E
[
ξ(t)k
]
= E
[
e
− ∫ t0(kr(s)ds+ k−k22 α(s)t(σ(s)σ(s)t)−1α(s)ds)
×e−
∫ t
0
(
k2
2
α(s)t(σ(s)σ(s)t)
−1
α(s)ds+kα(s)t(σ(s)t)
−1
dW (s)
)]
≤ eT (|k|r+|k−k2|K)E
[
e
− ∫ t0( k22 α(s)t(σ(s)σ(s)t)−1α(s)ds+kα(s)t(σ(s)t)−1dW (s))]
= eT (|k|r+|k−k
2|K).
Since E
[
ξk
]
is bounded for any k ∈ R, I2
(
ξ
γE[ξ] +R− 1γ
)
∈ L2, i.e. (2.3.52)
is satisfied.
(ii) If ρ > 2, for any R ∈ R,
E
[(
I2
(
1
γE[ξ]
ξ +R− 1
γ
))2]
≤ 1
b2
(
2
1
ρ
γ
2
ρ (E[ξ])
2
ρ
E
[
ξ
2
ρ
]
+
2
p
(
2
γ2 (E[ξ])2
) 1
ρ
−1(
R− 1
γ
)2
E
[
ξ2(
1
ρ
−1)
])
,
by concavity of x
1
ρ . By the fact that E
[
ξk
]
is bounded for any k ∈ R,
(2.3.52) is satisfied.
Note that the expression
I2
(
ξ
γE[ξ]
+R− 1
γ
)
=
1
a
(
ξ
γE[ξ]
+R− 1
γ
) 1
ρ
+
− 1
b
(
ξ
γE[ξ]
+R− 1
γ
) 1
ρ
−
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is increasing in R and L1-integrable by Jensen’s inequality, for all R ∈ R. Thus,
E
[
I2
(
R + ξ
γE[ξ] − 1γ
)]
is continuous in R by the Dominated Convergence Theo-
rem. It is not difficult to use the Monotone Convergence Theorem to show that
E
[
I2
(
R + ξ
γE[ξ] − 1γ
)]
is coercive in the sense that
lim
R→−∞
E
[
I2
(
R +
ξ
γE[ξ]
− 1
γ
)]
= −∞, lim
R→∞
E
[
I2
(
R +
ξ
γE[ξ]
− 1
γ
)]
=∞.
By the intermediate value theorem, there exists a unique R ∈ R so that (2.3.53)
and (2.3.52) are satisfied. The solution of the mean-weighted-power-risk problem
is:
Xˆ =
1
E[ξ]
(
x0 + E
[
ξ
a
(
ξ
γE[ξ]
+R− 1
γ
) 1
ρ
+
− ξ
b
(
ξ
γE[ξ]
+R− 1
γ
) 1
ρ
−
])
−1
a
(
ξ
γE[ξ]
+R− 1
γ
) 1
ρ
+
+
1
b
(
ξ
γE[ξ]
+R− 1
γ
) 1
ρ
−
, (2.3.61)
where R is the unique root of the equation
E
[
1
a
(
ξ
γE[ξ]
+R− 1
γ
) 1
ρ
+
− 1
b
(
ξ
γE[ξ]
+R− 1
γ
) 1
ρ
−
]
= 0. (2.3.62)
Remark 2.3.20. If ρ = 1, this mean-weighted-power-risk model becomes the
mean-weighted-variance one, studied in Jin et al. (2005). The results in Jin et al.
(2005) can be recovered by choosing µ = 1
γE[ξ] , λ =
1
γ
−R where 1
γ
is selected such
that
z =
1
E[ξ]
(
x0 + E
[
ξ
a
(
R +
ξ
γE[ξ]
− 1
γ
)
+
− ξ
b
(
R +
ξ
γE[ξ]
− 1
γ
)
−
])
.
If a = b = 1, this mean-weighted-variance model further becomes the classical
mean-variance setting. We can easily get that R = 0 from (2.3.62). Then we can
recover the following solution:
Xˆ =
x0
E[ξ]
+
1
γ
(
E[ξ2]
(E[ξ])2
− ξ
E[ξ]
)
.
This result can coincide with the solution on P.226–227 in Bielecki et al. (2005)
by choosing
µ =
1
γE[ξ]
, λ =
x0
E[ξ]
+
E[ξ2]
γ (E[ξ])2
, where
1
γ
=
E[ξ] (zE[ξ]− x0)
V ar[ξ]
.
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Example 2.3.21 (Mean-Exponential-Risk Function Case). We further revisit
another example found in Jin et al. (2005). Consider the exponential risk function
D(x) = ex. Then D′(x) = ex and I2(x) = ln x for x > 0.
Proposition 2.3.22. Mean-Exponential-Risk Problem possesses an optimal solu-
tion if and only if γ ≥ exp
(
E
[
ln
(
ξ
E[ξ]
)])
4. Furthermore, if the problem possesses
an optimal solution, the optimal terminal wealth is
Xˆ =
1
E[ξ]
(
x0 + E
[
ξ ln
(
ξ
γE[ξ]
+R− 1
γ
)])
− ln
(
ξ
γE[ξ]
+R− 1
γ
)
,
(2.3.63)
where R ∈ [ 1
γ
,∞) is the unique root of the equation:
E
[
ln
(
ξ
γE[ξ]
+R− 1
γ
)]
= 0.
Proof. Firstly, we know that given x, y > 0, if 0 < x + y ≤ 1, then | ln(x + y)| ≤
| lnx|; on the other hand, if x+ y > 1, then 0 < ln(x+ y) < lnx+ y
x
. Combining,
| ln(x+ y)| ≤ | ln(x)|+ ∣∣ y
x
∣∣. For fixed R ∈ [ 1
γ
,∞
)
,
E
[∣∣∣∣ ln( ξγE[ξ] +R− 1γ
) ∣∣∣∣2
]
≤ E
[(∣∣∣∣ ln( ξγE[ξ]
) ∣∣∣∣+ ∣∣∣∣E[ξ]γR− 1ξ
∣∣∣∣)2
]
≤ E
[(| ln ξ|+ | ln(γE[ξ])|+ (γR− 1)E[ξ]ξ−1)2]
≤ 3 (E [| ln ξ|2]+ ln(γE[ξ])2 + (γR− 1)2E[ξ]2E [ξ−2]) . (2.3.64)
4E
[
ln
(
E[ξ]
ξ
)]
is known to be the Kullback-Leibler Divergence (relative entropy) from P to
Q, the risk neutral measure.
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Clearly, by a simple calculation,
E
[| ln ξ|2]
≤ E
[
2T
∫ T
0
∣∣∣∣r(s) + 12α(s)t (σ(s)σ(s)t)−1 α(s)
∣∣∣∣2ds
+2
∫ T
0
α(s)t
(
σ(s)σ(s)t
)−1
α(s)ds
]
≤ 2T 2
(
r +
C
2
)2
+ 2CT,
where C is a constant. With this last result and the boundedness of E[ξ−2], we
can show that (2.3.64) is bounded, and hence ln
(
ξ
γE[ξ] +R− 1γ
)
∈ L2 for any
R ∈ [ 1
γ
,∞).
Now, we consider three different cases: (i) γ > exp
(
E
[
ln
(
ξ
E[ξ]
)])
, (ii) γ =
exp
(
E
[
ln
(
ξ
E[ξ]
)])
, and (iii) γ < exp
(
E
[
ln
(
ξ
E[ξ]
)])
.
(i) Obviously, E
[
ln
(
ξ
γE[ξ] +R− 1γ
)]
is strictly increasing and continuous in
R ∈
(
1
γ
,∞
)
. By the Monotone Convergence Theorem,
lim
R→∞
E
[
ln
(
ξ
γE[ξ]
+R− 1
γ
)]
=∞.
On the other hand, limR→ 1
γ
E
[
ln
(
ξ
γE[ξ] +R− 1γ
)]
= E
[
ln
(
ξ
γE[ξ]
)]
< 0.
Hence, by intermediate value theorem, there exist an unique R satisfying
(2.3.52) and (2.3.53).
(ii) R = 1
γ
is the unique solution satisfying (2.3.52) and (2.3.53).
(iii) Assume the contrary that there exists an admissible solution Xˆ being an
optimal terminal wealth for this mean-exponential-risk problem. Since D =
D′, so Xˆ satisfies Condition 2.2.1 (i). It is clear that Xˆ satisfies Condition
2.2.1 (ii). Hence, by Theorem 2.2.2, it is necessary that there exist num-
bers Y,M,R such that (Xˆ, Y,M,R) solves the Nonlinear Moment Problem
69
2.4. Conclusion
(2.3.48)-(2.3.51). By (2.3.48) and (2.3.51), we first have
Xˆ = M − ln
(
R +
ξY
γ
− 1
γ
)
, Y =
1
E[ξ]
. (2.3.65)
Given that γ < exp
(
E
[
ln
(
ξ
E[ξ]
)])
, we have ln
(
ξ
γE[ξ]
)
> ln[ξ] − E[ln[ξ]].
Taking expectation on both sides of Xˆ in (2.3.65), for any R ∈
[
1
γ
,∞
)
, we
have
E
[
Xˆ
]
= M − E
[
ln
(
R +
ξY
γ
− 1
γ
)]
≥M − E
[
ln
(
ξY
γ
)]
> M − E [ln [ξ]− E [ln [ξ]]] = M,
which contradicts with (2.3.50). Therefore, there is no solution for the Non-
linear Moment Problem, and hence, this mean-exponential risk problem has
no optimal solution.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we studied the utility risk portfolio selection problem. We derived
the Nonlinear Moment Problem in (2.2.4)-(2.2.7), whose solution can completely
characterize the optimal terminal wealth by the necessity and sufficiency results
in Theorems 2.2.2 and 2.3.2 respectively. The nonexistence of optimal solution
for the mean-semivariance problem can be revisited by the application of The-
orem 2.2.2. Furthermore, we applied Theorem 2.3.2 to establish the existence
of optimal solutions for the utility-downside-risk and utility-strictly-convex-risk
problems. Their resolutions have long been missing in the literature, and the
positive answer in utility-downside-risk problem is in big contrast to the negative
answer in mean-downside-risk problem; with our present result, we can now use
semivariance as a proper risk measure in portfolio selection. Finally, we estab-
lished the sufficient condition for the Nonlinear Moment Problem through which
the existence of optimal solution of mean-risk problem can be ensured.
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In this chapter, the derivation of the Nonlinear Moment Problem with necessity
and sufficiency theorem and the existence results of optimal solution to various
specific utility-risk problems rely on the market completeness and existence of
pricing kernel, thus these results can be extended from the present continuous-
time Black-Scholes model to a more general framework. In the next chapter, I
shall investigate this extension.
Also, we have shown that some specific utility-risk problems possess an optimal
solution, however, how to numerically compute the optimal solution for the present
utility-risk problem has not been studied. In the next chapter, I shall develop an
numerical method to compute the optimal terminal wealth.
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Chapter 3
Numerical Valuation of Optimal
Utility-risk Portfolio Payoff
In this chapter, we first introduce the problem formulation and some assumptions
on market model in Section 3.1 and convert our dynamic utility-risk problem into
an equivalent static formulation as stated in Theorem 3.1.9. We will verify that
the aforementioned assumptions can be satisfied by various asset price models. In
Section 3.2, we revisit the results in Chapter 2 including the theory about Non-
linear Moment Problem and the unique existence of optimal solution for utility-
downside-risk problems (Theorem 3.2.8) and utility-strictly-convex-risk problems
(Theorem 3.2.14) under the generalized setting. In Section 3.3, we show that
the sequence of the optimal terminal payoffs in different model settings converges
under some conditions on the pricing kernel for the market model. Such condi-
tions are satisfied by discrete binomial tree model in Section 3.3.3 so that we can
conclude that the optimal solution for utility-risk problem under continuous-time
Black-Scholes model can be approximated by the solutions in discrete binomial
tree models. Since there is fundamental difference between downside risk and
strictly convex risk, all the aforementioned results are essentially presented in a
separate way. In Section 3.4, the convergence results in Section 3.3 are realized to
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compute the numerical solution for utility-risk problem under discrete binomial
tree model in Example 3.1.11.
3.1 Problem Setting
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a fixed complete probability space. Suppose that the market has
m+1 assets with the joint price process S(t) := (S0(t), . . . , Sm(t))
t; M t denotes the
transpose of a matrix M . Define the information filtration Ft := σ(S(s) : s ≤ t).
Let pi(t) , (pi1(t), . . . , pim(t))t, where pik(t) be the money amount invested in
the k-th risky asset of the portfolio at time t. The dynamics of controlled wealth
process is:
dXpi(t) = (Xpi(t)− pi(t)t1m)dS0(t)
S0(t)
+
m∑
k=1
pik(t)
dSk(t)
S(t)
, (3.1.1)
Xpi(0) = x0 > 0,
where 1m is m-dimension vector.
The objective functional is:
J(pi) := E[U(Xpi(T ))]− γE[D (E[Xpi(T )]−Xpi(T ))], (3.1.2)
where the terminal time T is finite and γ > 0 denotes the risk aversion coefficient.
The utility function U is defined as follows:
Definition 3.1.1. We define a utility function U such that U : (0,∞) → R is
strictly increasing, strictly concave and continuously differentiable in the interior.
Furthermore, we assume that U ′(0) =∞, U ′(∞) = 0.
Note that any utility functions satisfying Inada conditions can be covered. For
the completeness, we extend the definition of U over R so that U(0) := limx↓0 U(x)
and U(x) := −∞ for x < 0.
The deviation risk function D is used to measure the investor’s dissatisfaction
on the deviation of the random return from its own expectation. We consider
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two different types of deviation risk functions: downside risk function and strictly
convex risk function. They are to be defined in Definitions 3.1.2 and 3.1.3 respec-
tively:
Definition 3.1.2. We define a downside risk function D such that D : R → R+
is positive, strictly convex and continuously differentiable on (0,∞) and D(x) = 0
for x ≤ 0. Furthermore, we assume that D′(∞) =∞ and D′(0) = 0.
Definition 3.1.3. We define a strictly convex risk function D such that D : R→
R+ is non-negative, strictly convex and continuously differentiable. Furthermore,
we assume that D′(∞) =∞ and D′(−∞) = −∞.
Under Definition 3.1.2, the payoff greater than its mean will not be penalized,
and only the downside deviation risk would be taken into account. We also have
D′(x) > 0 when x > 0 and D′(x) = 0 when x ≤ 0 in this case.
For any given, p ≥ 1, Lp :=
{
Z| ‖Z‖p := E[|Z|p]
1
p <∞
}
. Define H2 to
be the class of all Ft-adapted processes pi, equipped with a norm ‖pi‖2H2 :=
E
[∫ T
0
pi(t)tpi(t)dt
]
<∞.
Definition 3.1.4. We define the class of all admissible controls pi ∈ A as follows:
A := {pi ∈ H2∣∣Xpi(T ) ∈ X} ,
here X is the class of all admissible terminal wealths, such that
X := {X ∈ L2|X ∈ FT , X ≥ 0 a.s., U(X) ∈ L1, D(E[X]−X) ∈ L1}.
Note that, for every admissible terminal wealth, both its expected utility and
expected deviation risk are well-defined. It is clear that X is a convex subspace
of L2.
Under the above settings, our utility risk problem can be stated as follows:
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Problem 3.1.5.
Maximize J(pi),
subject to pi ∈ A and (Xpi(·), pi(·)) satisfies (3.1.1) with initial wealth x0.
We have following assumptions on the market:
Assumption 3.1.6 (Pricing Kernel). Assume there exists a pricing kernel ξ(·) ∈
H2 such that ξ := ξ(T ) ∈ L2 and ξ(t)Xpi(t) is martingale for all pi ∈ A. We also
assume that ξ(0) = 1 and for each t ∈ [0, T ], ξ(t) ∈ (0,∞) a.s. In addition, we
define ξ := essinf ξ and ξ := esssup ξ.
Assumption 3.1.7 (Complete Market). For every X ∈ L2 and measurable by
FT , there exists a pi ∈ H2 such that Xpi(T ) = X.
Since our market is complete by Assumption 3.1.7, all L2-integrable and FT -
measurable terminal wealth can be attained by an admissible control. Our dy-
namic utility-risk optimization problem 3.1.5 can be converted into the following
static optimization problem:
Define Ψ : X → R such that Ψ(X) := E[U(X)]− E[D(E[X]−X)].
Problem 3.1.8.
Maximize Ψ(X), (3.1.3)
subject to X ∈ X and E[ξX] = x0,
Under the complete market assumption in Assumption 3.1.7, same as Theorem
2.1.5, the optimal solution of Problem 3.1.8 is the optimal terminal wealth of
Problem 3.1.5:
Theorem 3.1.9. If pi(t) is optimal for Problem 3.1.5, then Xpi(T ) is optimal for
Problem 3.1.8. Conversely, if X ∈ X is optimal for Problem 3.1.8, there exists
pi ∈ A such that Xpi(T ) = X and pi is optimal for Problem 3.1.5.
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Note that the maximization in Problem 3.1.8 is confined to the set X , so that
the solution obtained in Problem 3.1.8 is an admissible terminal wealth in Problem
3.1.5. Since Theorem 3.1.9 provide the equivalence between Problems 3.1.5 and
3.1.8, our present chapter now aims to establish an admissible terminal wealth
X ∈ X that maximizes Ψ(X).
Example 3.1.10 (Continuous time Black-Scholes Model). Assume that the mar-
ket has one bond and one stock. We consider the bond price and stock price
satisfy the following SDE:dB(t) = rB(t)dt, B(0) = b0 > 0,dS(t) = µ(t)S(t) dt+ σS(t)dW (t), S(0) = s0 > 0,
where W (t) is a standard Brownian motion. Let pi(t) be the money amount of
risky investment, thus the dynamic of wealth process becomes:
dXpi(t) = (rXpi(t) + αpi(t))dt+ σpi(t)dW (t), Xpi(0) = x0 > 0.
The continuous time pricing kernel ξ(·) becomes the following:
ξ(t) := exp
[
−rt− α
2
2σ2
t− α
σ
Wt
]
, (3.1.4)
Clearly, ξ(t) satisfies Assumption 3.1.6. Assumption 3.1.7 can be satisfied by the
application of Martingale Representation Theorem. Note that all assumptions are
satisfied even when the market parameters are Ft-adapted processes.
Example 3.1.11 (Binomial Tree Model). Assume that the market has one bond
and one stock, we consider a N -period discrete time framework with time interval
∆t := T
N
. The price processes of bond B(N)(t) and stock S
(N)
n are given by
B(N)(t) := B
(N)
bt∆tc and S
(N)(t) := S
(N)
bt∆tc respectively, where B
(N)
n and S
(N)
n have
following dynamics:
B
(N)
n+1 = e
r∆tB(N)n , B
(N)
0 = b0
S
(N)
n+1 = e
(
µ−σ2
2
)
∆t+σ
√
∆tZ
(N)
n+1S(N)n , S
(N)
0 = b0
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where Z
(N)
n is an iid Bernoulli random variable measurable by Fn∆t with probabil-
ity: P
[
Z
(N)
n = 1
]
= P
[
Z
(N)
n = −1
]
= 1
2
. Let pi
(N)
n be the money amount of risky
investment in n-th period, the corresponding wealth process X(N),pi(t) := X
(N),pi
bt∆tc
has the following the dynamics:
X
(N),pi
n+1 = e
r∆tX(N),pin +
(
e
(
µ−σ2
2
)
∆t+σ
√
∆tZ
(N)
n+1 − er∆t
)
pi(N)n , (3.1.5)
X
(N),pi
0 = x0
In this binomial tree model, the pricing kernel is given by ξ(N)(t) := ξ
(N)
bt∆tc,
where:
ξ(N)n :=
n∏
k=1
2
er∆t
(
e−(α−
1
2
σ2)∆t+σ
√
∆tZ
(N)
k − 1
e2σ
√
∆tZ
(N)
k − 1
)
, (3.1.6)
where α = µ− r. Hence, assumption 3.1.6 is obviously satisfied.
For Assumption 3.1.7, given X ∈ L2 and measurable by FT , the attaining
wealth process can be obtained by
X(N),pin = E
[
ξ
(N)
N
ξ
(N)
n
X
∣∣∣∣ξ(N)n
]
= E
[
N∏
k=n+1
2
er∆t
(
e−(α−
1
2
σ2)∆t+σ
√
∆tZ
(N)
k − 1
e2σ
√
∆tZ
(N)
k − 1
)
X
]
,
and the attaining trading strategy can be obtained from (3.1.5).
Example 3.1.12 (Stochastic Interest Rate Model). We follow the market setting
in Bajeux-Besnainou et al. (2003). Assume that the market has one riskless money
account (cash), one stock, and one zero coupon bond fund and their prices at t
are denote by S0(t), S1(t), and S2(t) respectively. The asset prices satisfy the
following SDE:
dS0(t) = r(t)S0(t)dt, S0(t) = s0 > 0,
dS1(t) = (r(t) + α1)S1(t) dt+ σ11S1(t)dW1(t) + σ12S1(t)dW2(t),
S1(0) = s1 > 0,
dS2(t) = (r(t) + α2)S2(t) dt+ σ21S2(t)dW1(t), S2(0) = s2 > 0,
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where W1(t) and W2(t) are independent standard Brownian motions and the in-
terest rate r(t) follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process with constant parameters
given by
dr(t) = ar (br − r(t)) dt− σrdW1(t), r(0) = r0
Let pi := (pi1, pi2) and pi1(t) and pi2(t) be the money amount of the investment
in stock and bond fund respectively, thus the dynamic of wealth process becomes:
dXpi(t) = (Xpi(t)− pi1(t)− pi2(t)) dS0(t)
S0(t)
+ pi1(t)
dS1(t)
S1(t)
+ pi2(t)
dS2(t)
S2(t)
= (r(t)Xpi(t) + α1pi1(t) + α2pi2(t)) dt
+ (σ11pi1(t) + σ21pi2(t)) dW1(t) + σ12pi1(t)dW2(t),
Xpi(0) = x0 > 0
The pricing kernel ξ(·) for the market setting becomes the following:
ξ(t) := exp
−∫ t
0
r(s)ds− 1
2

(
α1 − α2 σ12σ21
)2
σ211
+
α22
σ221
 t
− α2
σ21
W1(t)−
α1 − α2 σ11σ21
σ12
W2(t)
]
,
By applying Itoˆ’s formula to ξtX
pi(t), it is martingale, so Assumption 3.1.6 follows.
The Brownian motions W1(t) and W2(t) can be hedged perfectly through trad-
ing the stock and the zero-coupon bond continuously and freely, so the market is
complete and Assumption 3.1.7 is satisfied.
3.2 Nonlinear Moment Problem (NMP)
In this section, we shall establish the Nonlinear Moment Problem for our general-
ized market framework where the dynamics asset price processes are unspecified.
They can be proven by using the same argument as in Chapter 2, the essential
changes and key steps needed will be provided.
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3.2.1 Necessary and Sufficient Optimality Conditions
First, we shall derive a static problem, called Nonlinear Moment Problem to char-
acterize the optimal solution for Problem 3.1.8.
To show the necessity for optimality, we assume that the optimal solution of
Problem 3.1.8, Xˆ ∈ X , satisfies the following two very mild technical conditions:
Condition 3.2.1. Both U ′(Z) ∈ L1 and D′ (E[Z]− Z) ∈ L1.
Condition 3.2.2. There exists δ > 0 such that D (E [Z]− Z − δ) ∈ L1 and
D (E [Z]− Z + δ) ∈ L1.
Now, it is necessary for Xˆ to solve the Nonlinear Moment Problem:
Theorem 3.2.3 (Nonlinear Moment Problem). If Xˆ is the optimal solution of
Problem 3.1.8 satisfying Conditions 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, then it is necessary that there
exist constants Y,M,R ∈ R such that the quadruple
(
Xˆ, Y,M,R
)
solves the fol-
lowing equality:
Y ξ = U ′(Xˆ)− γR + γD′
(
M − Xˆ
)
a.s., (3.2.7)
subject to the nonlinear moment constraints
E[ξXˆ] = x0, (3.2.8)
E[Xˆ] = M, (3.2.9)
E
[
D′
(
M − Xˆ
)]
= R. (3.2.10)
Proof. The proof is exactly the same as Theorem 2.2.2. Note that Condition 3.2.1
confines Xˆ > 0 a.s.
We denote the static problem (3.2.7)-(3.2.10) as NMP(ξ) as its solution de-
pends on the choice of the terminal random variable of the pricing kernel, ξ. Next,
we establish the sufficiency result regarding to the Nonlinear Moment Problem.
In this subsection, we aim to show that any admissible terminal wealth Xˆ ∈
X solving the Nonlinear Moment Problem satisfying the following condition is
optimal terminal wealth of Problem 3.1.5:
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Condition 3.2.4. Both U ′(Z) ∈ L2 and D′ (E[Z]− Z) ∈ L2.
There is a fundamental difference between the necessary condition in Theo-
rem 3.2.3 and the sufficient condition in the next theorem. Conditions 3.2.1 and
3.2.2 are needed for the optimal terminal wealth satisfying the Nonlinear Mo-
ment Problem in the necessity result, while Condition 3.2.4 is required for the
sufficiency.
Theorem 3.2.5. Suppose that there exists Xˆ ∈ X satisfying Condition 3.2.4 and
there exist constants Y,M,R ∈ R so that the quadruple
(
Xˆ, Y,M,R
)
solves for
the Nonlinear Moment Problem (3.2.7)-(3.2.10). Then, Xˆ is the unique optimal
solution for Problem 3.1.8, and it is also the unique optimal terminal wealth of
Problem 3.1.5.
Proof. Let (Xˆ, Y,M,R) be the solution of Nonlinear Moment Problem (3.2.7)-
(3.2.10) and X˜ ∈ L2 be an arbitrary nontrivial random variable such that Xˆ+X˜ is
admissible for Problem 3.1.8, i.e. P[X˜ 6= 0] > 0, Xˆ+X˜ ∈ X and E
[
ξ
(
Xˆ + X˜
)]
=
x0. By (3.2.8), we have E
[
ξX˜
]
= 0.
By the strict concavity of U and convexity of D, it is clear that Ψ is strictly
concave, i.e.
Ψ(Xˆ + θX˜) > (1− θ)Ψ(Xˆ) + θΨ(Xˆ + X˜) for any θ ∈ (0, 1). (3.2.11)
By the concavity of Ψ, the chain rule, and under our hypothesis that Xˆ satisfies
(3.2.7) and Condition 3.2.4, we have
d
dθ
Ψ(Xˆ + θX˜)
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
= E
[
lim
θ↓0
Ψ(Xˆ + θX˜)−Ψ(Xˆ)
θ
]
= E
[
U ′(Xˆ)X˜
]
− γE
[
D′
(
E[Xˆ]− Xˆ
)(
E[X˜]− X˜
)]
= E
[
X˜
(
U ′(Xˆ)− γE
[
D′
(
E[Xˆ]− Xˆ
)]
+ γD′
(
E[Xˆ]− Xˆ
))]
= E
[
X˜(Y ξ)
]
= 0. (3.2.12)
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The first equality follows by Lemma 2.2.4. Since Ψ is strictly concave, we have
Ψ
(
Xˆ + θX˜
)
−Ψ(Xˆ)
θ
≤ d
dθ
Ψ(Xˆ + θX˜)
∣∣∣∣
θ=0
= 0.
By (3.2.11), we have
Ψ
(
Xˆ
)
> Ψ
(
Xˆ + X˜
)
−
Ψ
(
Xˆ + θX˜
)
−Ψ(Xˆ)
θ
≥ Ψ
(
Xˆ + X˜
)
.
Hence Xˆ is the unique solution for Problem 3.1.8. By Theorem 3.1.9, we can now
conclude that Xˆ is the unique optimal terminal wealth of Problem 3.1.5.
Remark 3.2.6. Theorem 3.2.5 boils the optimal control problem 3.1.5 down to
a static problem. Suppose that there exists an implicit function I(m, y) ∈ R
satisfying:
U ′(I(m, y)) + γD′(m− I(m, y)) = y, for any (m, y). (3.2.13)
Then the Nonlinear Moment Problem (3.2.7)-(3.2.10) will be solved by (I (M,γR + Y ξ) , Y,M,R),
where the constants Y,M and R satisfy the following system of nonlinear equa-
tions:
E[ξI (M,γR + Y ξ)] = x0, (3.2.14)
E[I (M,γR + Y ξ)] = M, (3.2.15)
E [D′ (M − I (M,γR + Y ξ))] = R. (3.2.16)
After we verify that I (M,γR + Y ξ) belongs to X and also satisfies Condition
3.2.4, I (M,γR + Y ξ) is the unique optimal solution for Problem 3.1.8.
Note that the optimal solution for the utility risk problem in Problem 3.1.8
depends on the choice of the terminal random variable of pricing kernel, ξ ∈ L2.
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3.2.2 Existence of the Solution of NMP: Case of Downside
Risk
After we obtained the sufficiency result in Theorem 3.2.5, we shall show the exis-
tence of the optimal solution of the utility-risk portfolio selection problems.
According to Remark 3.2.6, we first find an implicit function satisfying (3.2.13),
then the Nonlinear Moment Problem (3.2.7)-(3.2.10) can be reduced into a non-
linear programming problem (3.2.14)-(3.2.16). The desired implicit function can
be warranted by the same argument in Proposition 2.3.5:
Proposition 3.2.7. Let U and D are given by Definitions 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 respec-
tively. There exists an implicit function I : R× (0,∞)→ (0,∞) satisfying:
U ′(I(m, y))+γD′(m− I(m, y))−y = 0, for any (m, y) ∈ R× (0,∞). (3.2.17)
Moreover, this function I possesses the following regularities:
(a) (i) For each m ∈ R, I(m, y) is strictly decreasing in y on (0,∞).
(ii) For each y ∈ (0,∞), I(m, y) is strictly increasing in m on {m ∈
R| y ≥ U ′(m)}; I(m, y) = (U ′)−1(y) ∈ (0,∞) for all m ∈ {m ∈ R| y ≤
U ′(m)}.
(b) I(m, y) is jointly continuous in (m, y) ∈ R× (0,∞).
Then, the overall existence claim will be accomplished if we can solve the
nonlinear programming problem (3.2.14)-(3.2.16):
Theorem 3.2.8. Given that Assumption 2.3.4 holds and U and D are given by
Definitions 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 respectively, there exists the unique set of numbers
Y,M,R ∈ (0,∞) such that the system of nonlinear equations of (3.2.14)-(3.2.16)
is satisfied. Thus, (I (M,γR + Y ξ) , Y,M,R) is the unique solution for the Non-
linear Moment Problem (3.2.7)-(3.2.10), NMP(ξ), where I is given in Proposi-
tion 3.2.7. Hence, Xˆ = I (M,γR + Y ξ) is the unique optimal terminal wealth of
Utility-Downside-Risk problem.
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Proof. We will solve for roots Y,M and R for (3.2.14)-(3.2.16) one by one via
applying the intermediate value theorem successively as in Proposition 2.3.6. We
shall indicate the key steps and necessary changes in our proof.
Lemma 3.2.9. Given Y ∈ (0,∞), we consider two cases: (i) M ∈ ((U ′)−1(Y ξ),∞)
and (ii) M ∈ (0, (U ′)−1(Y ξ)).
(i) there exists a unique R = RY,M ∈ (0, D′(M)) satisfying
E [D′ (M − I (M,γR + Y ξ))] = R; (3.2.18)
or equivalently by (3.2.17):
E [U ′ (I (M,γR + Y ξ))] = Y E[ξ]. (3.2.19)
Furthermore, RY,M is strictly increasing in M for a fixed Y and is also
strictly increasing in Y for a fixed M .
(ii) R = RY,M = 0 uniquely solve (3.2.18).
Proof. The proof of case (i) is the same as Lemma 2.3.7.
For case (ii), Y ξ ≤ U ′(M), thus for all ξ, we have I (M,Y ξ) = (U ′)−1(Y ξ) ≥
(U ′)−1(Y ξ) ≥ M , so D′ (M − I (M,Y ξ)) = 0 almost surely. Thus RY,M = 0
satisfy (3.2.18). Since R − D′ (M − I (M,γR + Y ξ)) is strictly increasing, thus
R = RY,M = 0 uniquely solve (3.2.18).
Lemma 3.2.10. Given Y ∈ (0,∞) and RY,M as specified for each M ∈ (0,∞) in
Lemma 3.2.9, there exists a unique M = MY ∈ (
(
(U ′)−1(Y ξ),∞) such that
E[I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ)] = M. (3.2.20)
Furthermore, MY is strictly decreasing in Y .
Proof. DenoteM := (U ′)−1(Y ξ). We only verify limM↓M (E[I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ)]−M) >
0, the rest are the same as the proof of Lemma 2.3.8.
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By the continuity of D′ and I, it is almost surely that:
lim
M↓M
(D′ (M − I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ))−RY,M)
= D′
(
M − I
(
M,γ lim
M↓M
RY,M + Y ξ
))
− lim
M↓M
RY,M (3.2.21)
By (3.2.18), (3.2.21) and the Dominated Convergence Theorem, we have
E
[
D′
(
M − I
(
M,γ lim
M↓M
RY,M + Y ξ
))]
− lim
M↓M
RY,M
= lim
M↓M
(E [D′ (M − I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ))]−RY,M) = 0.
By the uniqueness result in Lemma 3.2.9, we conclude that limM↓M RY,M =
0. Because I is continuous, for ξ < ξ, we have limM↓M I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ) =
I (M,Y ξ) = (U ′)−1(Y ξ) > (U ′)−1(Y ξ) = M . Using the same approach as in
part (a) in the proof of Lemma 2.3.8, we have I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ)−M is strictly
decreasing in M . Finally, by Monotone Convergence Theorem,
lim
M↓M
(E[I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ)]−M) > 0.
Lemma 3.2.11. Given RY,M and MY as specified in Lemmas 3.2.9 and 3.2.10
respectively for each Y,M ∈ (0,∞), there exists a Y ∗ ∈ (0,∞) such that
E[ξI (MY , γRY,MY + Y ξ)] = x0. (3.2.22)
Proof. The proof is the same as that of Lemma 2.3.7 except a small change is
needed in part (b1):
The arbitrary sample value in the proof, ξ0, should only be considered in the
range (ξ, ξ). In this case, P[ξ > ξ0] > 0. Then we can follow the same arguments
to verify that lim infY→0 I (MY , Y ξ0 + γRY,MY ) = ∞, for any ξ0 ∈ (ξ, ξ), and
hence we conclude that lim infY→0 ξI (MY , Y ξ + γRY,MY ) =∞ for any ξ ∈ (ξ, ξ).
Finally, by Fatou’s Lemma,
lim inf
Y→0
E [ξI (MY , γRY,MY + Y ξ)] ≥ E
[
lim inf
Y→0
ξI (MY , γRY,MY + Y ξ)
]
=∞.
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Proof of Theorem 3.2.8. According to Lemmas 3.2.9, 3.2.10 and 3.2.11, the triple
(Y ∗,MY ∗ , RY ∗,MY ∗ ) solves the system of nonlinear equations in (3.2.14)-(3.2.16).
Next, we can verify that Xˆ = I (MY ∗ , γRY ∗,MY ∗ + Y
∗ξ) belongs to X and
satisfies Condition 3.2.4 using the same argument as in Theorem 2.3.10. Then,
by Theorem 3.2.5, Xˆ = I (MY ∗ , Y
∗ξ + γRY ∗,MY ∗ ) is the unique optimal solution
for Problem 3.1.8 with downside risk function D.
Since Xˆ is the unique solution and Y = E
[
U ′
(
Xˆ
)]
/E[ξ] by (3.2.19), Y
obtained in Lemma 3.2.11 is unique. Hence, only a unique set of triple (Y,M,R)
solves (3.2.14)-(3.2.16). Finally, by Theorem 3.1.9, Xˆ = I (M,Y ξ + γR) is the
unique optimal terminal wealth of utility-downside-risk problem.
Remark 3.2.12. Proposition 3.2.7 and Theorem 3.2.8 can be reduced to Propo-
sition 2.3.5 and Theorem 2.3.10 respectively by setting ξ = 0 and ξ = ∞, which
are warranted under the Black-Scholes setting.
Our formulation can cover the utility-semivariance problem. The existence
result in this section has a substantial contrast to the nonexistence of an optimal
solution to the mean-semivariance problem.
3.2.3 Existence of the Solution of NMP: Case of Strictly-
Convex Risk
We can establish the similar existence result by using the same approach as in the
case of downside risk.
Proposition 3.2.13. Let U and D are given by Definitions 3.1.1 and 3.1.3 re-
spectively. There exists an implicit function I : R2 → (0,∞) satisfying:
U ′(I(m, y)) + γD′(m− I(m, y))− y = 0, for any (m, y) ∈ R2. (3.2.23)
Moreover, this function I possesses the following regularities:
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(a) (i) For each y ∈ R, I(m, y) is strictly increasing in m.
(ii) For each m ∈ R, I(m, y) is strictly decreasing in y.
(b) I(m, y) is jointly continuous in (m, y) ∈ R2.
Proof. Same as Proposition 2.3.11.
Using the same argument as in the case of downside risk, we can draw the
same existence conclusion:
Theorem 3.2.14. Given that U and D are given by Definitions 3.1.1 and 3.1.3
respectively, there exists the unique set of numbers Y,M ∈ (0,∞) and R ∈
R such that the system of nonlinear equations of (3.2.14)-(3.2.16) is satisfied.
Thus, (I (M,γR + Y ξ) , Y,M,R) is the unique solution for the Nonlinear Mo-
ment Problem (3.2.7)-(3.2.10), where I is given in Proposition 3.2.13. Hence,
Xˆ = I (M,γR + Y ξ) is the unique optimal terminal wealth of Utility-Strictly-
Convex-Risk problem.
Proof. The proof of existence of (Y,M,R) solving the system of equations (3.2.14)-
(3.2.16) is similar in Proposition 2.3.12. Following the similar arguments, we can
prove the following lemmas:
Lemma 3.2.15. Given Y,M ∈ (0,∞), there exists a unique R = RY,M ∈
(−∞, D′(M)) satisfying
E [D′ (M − I (M,γR + Y ξ))] = R; (3.2.24)
or equivalently by (3.2.23):
E [U ′ (I (M,γR + Y ξ))] = Y E[ξ]. (3.2.25)
Furthermore, RY,M is strictly increasing in M for a fixed Y and is also strictly
increasing in Y for a fixed M .
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Lemma 3.2.16. Given Y ∈ (0,∞) and RY,M as specified for each M ∈ (0,∞) in
Lemma 3.2.15, there exists a unique M = MY ∈ (0,∞) such that
E[I (M,γRY,M + Y ξ)] = M. (3.2.26)
Furthermore, MY is strictly decreasing in Y .
Lemma 3.2.17. Given RY,M and MY as specified in Lemmas 3.2.15 and 3.2.16
respectively for each Y,M ∈ (0,∞), there exists a Y ∗ ∈ (0,∞) such that
E[ξI (MY , γRY,MY + Y ξ)] = x0. (3.2.27)
Now, we have a set of constants Y,M ∈ (0,∞) and R ∈ R satisfying a sys-
tem of nonlinear equations in (3.2.14)-(3.2.16). The remaining assertions can be
proven using the same arguments in Theorem 3.2.8, and we can conclude that
Xˆ = I (M,Y ξ + γR) is an optimal terminal wealth of utility-strictly-convex-risk
problem.
3.3 Main Results
In this section, we first shall establish the continuity of optimal terminal wealth
for utility risk problem: the sequence of optimal terminal payoffs converges weakly
with their corresponding terminal random variables of pricing kernel (or simply
call them terminal pricing kernels for convenience). Then, we show that the
sequence of terminal pricing kernels for binomial tree models converges weakly to
the terminal pricing kernels of the continuous-time Black-Scholes model. Hence,
we can apply these results to compute the optimal solution of utility-risk problem
under the Black-Scholes model using the solutions under the binomial tree models,
which are easily computed.
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3.3.1 Convergence of Optimal Solution: Case of Downside
Risk
We consider a sequence of markets which satisfy Conditions 3.1.6 and 3.1.7, de-
noted by {Π(N)}, thus each market ΠN has its unique pricing kernel ξ(N)(·), and
we have a sequence of the terminal random variables of pricing kernel {ξ(N)},
where ξ(N) := ξ(N)(T ). By Theorem 3.2.8, we know that each market possesses
the unique optimal terminal wealth for the utility risk problem Xˆ(N), and we have
a sequence of optimal terminal payoffs {Xˆ(N)}. We aim to show that if this se-
quence of terminal pricing kernels converges weakly to a terminal pricing kernel
{Xˆ∗} corresponding to a market Π∗, then the weak limit of the sequence of op-
timal terminal payoffs solves the utility-downside-risk problem under the market
Π∗.
Theorem 3.3.1. Given that U and D satisfy Definitions 3.1.1 and 3.1.2 respec-
tively, Assumption 2.3.4 holds, and all markets Π(N) and Π∗ satisfying Conditions
3.1.6 and 3.1.7 with corresponding unique terminal pricing kernels ξN and ξ
∗ and
optimal terminal payoffs Xˆ(N) and Xˆ∗, as described in Theorem 3.2.8. Suppose
that a sequence of their terminal pricing kernels ξ(N) satisfy the following condi-
tions:
(i) ξ(N) ∈ L2 converges weakly to ξ∗ ∈ L2 as N →∞.
(ii) For any K > 0,
{
ξ(N)
(
(U ′)−1
(
ξ(N)
)
+K
)}
N∈N is uniformly integrable.
Then the sequence {Xˆ(N)} converges weakly to Xˆ∗. Hence, Ψ
(
Xˆ(N)
)
→
Ψ
(
Xˆ∗
)
, i.e., the sequence of the optimal value functions of utility-risk problem
under Π(N) converges to the optimal value functions under Π∗.
Proof. By Theorem 3.2.8, the unique optimal terminal wealth for utility-downside-
risk problem under ΠN is given by
Xˆ(N) = I
(
M (N), γR(N) + Y (N)ξ(N)
)
,
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where the function I is given in Proposition 3.2.7 and the triple (Y (N),M (N), R(N))
satisfies the system of equations in (3.2.14)-(3.2.16) under ξ = ξ(N). Similarly, the
unique optimal terminal wealth under Π∗ is given by
Xˆ∗ = I (M∗, γR∗ + Y ∗ξ∗) .
Note that the choice of I in Proposition 3.2.7 is independent of the pricing kernel
ξ.
By Skorokhod’s representation theorem and condition (i), there exists a se-
quence of random variable ζ(N) which has the same distribution as ξ(N) and
ζ(N) → ξ∗ almost surely.
The following proposition shows that the sequence of
(
Y (N),M (N), R(N)
)
con-
verges to (Y ∗,M∗, R∗); its technical proof will be postponed to Section 3.3.1.1.
Proposition 3.3.2. limN→∞
(
Y (N),M (N), R(N)
)
= (Y ∗,M∗, R∗).
By Proposition 3.3.2, I
(
M (N), γR(N) + Y (N)ζ(N)
) → I (M∗, γR∗ + Y ∗ξ∗) al-
most surely. Together with the fact that I
(
M (N), γR(N) + Y (N)ζ(N)
)
and
I
(
M (N), γR(N) + Y (N)ξ(N)
)
have the same distribution,
Xˆ(N) = I
(
M (N), γR(N) + Y (N)ξ(N)
)→ I (M∗, γR∗ + Y ∗ξ∗) = Xˆ∗ weakly.
Since I(m, y) is decreasing in y for fixed m, for each N ,
I
(
M (N), γR(N) + Y (N)ζ(N)
) ≤ I (M (N), γR(N))
By Proposition 3.3.2, I
(
M (N), γR(N)
)→ I (M∗, γR∗) <∞, so we have
I
(
M (N), γR(N) + Y (N)ζ(N)
) ≤ I (M∗, γR∗) + 1 a.s., for all large enough N.
By the application of the Dominated Convergence Theorem,
Ψ
(
I
(
M (N), Y (N)ζ(N) + γR(N)
))→ Ψ(Xˆ∗) .
Together with the fact that I
(
M (N), Y (N)ζ(N) + γR(N)
)
and Xˆ(N) have the same
distribution, the convergence of value functions follows.
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3.3.1.1 Proof of Proposition 3.3.2
Since, for each N , ζ(N) has the same distribution as ξ(N), then the systems of
nonlinear equations in (3.2.14)-(3.2.16) with ξ = ζ(N) and ξ = ξ(N) share the
same set of solution
(
Y (N),M (N), R(N)
)
, i.e.
(
Y (N),M (N), R(N)
)
satisfy:
E
[
D′
(
M (N) − I (M (N), γR(N) + Y (N)ζ(N)))] = R(N), (3.3.28)
E
[
I
(
M (N), γR(N) + Y (N)ζ(N)
)]
= M (N), (3.3.29)
E
[
ζ(N)I
(
M (N), γR(N) + Y (N)ζ(N)
)]
= x0. (3.3.30)
Given the terminal pricing kernel ξ = ξ∗, we can define R∗Y,M and M
∗
Y from
Lemmas 3.2.9 and 3.2.10. We know that
(
Y ∗,M∗Y ∗ , R
∗
Y ∗,M∗
Y ∗
)
solves the system
of nonlinear equations of (3.2.14)-(3.2.16) with ξ = ξ∗. Since the solution of the
system is unique, we have (Y ∗,M∗, R∗) =
(
Y ∗,M∗Y ∗ , R
∗
Y ∗,M∗
Y ∗
)
Similarly, for the case of ξ = ζ(N), we can define R
(N)
Y,M and M
(N)
Y in the same
way and we have
(
Y (N),M (N), R(N)
)
=
(
Y (N),M
(N)
Y (N)
, R
(N)
Y (N),M
(N)
Y (N)
)
.
We first consider the next three lemmas which show R(N),M (N), Y (N) conver-
gent.
Lemma 3.3.3. Given a sequence {(MN , YN)} ∈ (0,∞)2, assume there exists a
subsequence {Nk} and M0, Y0 ∈ (0,∞) such that M0 = limk→∞MNk and Y0 =
limk→∞ YNk , then limk→∞R
(Nk)
YNk ,MNk
= R∗Y0,M0 where R
∗
Y,M and R
(N)
Y,M are defined in
Lemma 3.2.9 with ξ = ξ∗ and ξ = ζ(N) respectively.
Proof. For simplicity of notation, we denoteRN := R
(N)
YN ,MN
. By Bolzano-Weierstrass
theorem, there exists a subsequence {Ni} ⊂ {Nk} such that R0 := limi→∞RNi ∈
[0, D′(M0)] exists.
Since I and D′ are continuous, thus
lim
i→∞
D′
(
MNi − I
(
MNi , γRNi + YNiζ
(Ni)
))
= D′ (M0 − I (M0, γR0 + Y0ξ∗)) .
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Then, by the Dominated Convergence Theorem and Lemma 3.2.9 with ξ = ζ(N),
E [D′ (M0 − I (M0, γR0 + Y0ξ∗))]
= lim
i→∞
E
[
D′
(
MNi − I
(
MNi , γRNi + YNiζ
(Ni)
))]
= lim
i→∞
RNi = R0 (3.3.31)
Since Lemma 3.2.9 with ξ = ξ∗ is uniquely solved by R∗Y0,M0 , we have R0 =
R∗Y0,M0 . Since every subsequential limits of RNk agree with R
∗
Y0,M0
, we are done.
Lemma 3.3.4. Given a sequence {YN} ∈ (0,∞), assume there exists a subse-
quence {Nk} and Y0 ∈ (0,∞) such that Y0 = limk→∞ YNk , then limk→∞M (Nk)YNk =
M∗Y0 where M
∗
Y and M
(N)
Y are defined in Lemma 3.2.10 with ξ = ξ
∗ and ξ = ζ(N)
respectively.
Proof. For simplicity of notation, we denote MN := M
(N)
YN
and RN := R
(N)
YN ,MN
=
R
(N)
YN ,M
(N)
YN
. By Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem, there exists a subsequence {Ni} ⊂
{Nk} such that M0 := limi→∞MNi ∈ [0,∞] exists.
We first show that M0 ∈ (0,∞) by using following 4 steps:
Step 1: Prove if M0 = 0, then limi→∞ I
(
MNi , γRNi + YNiζ
(Ni)
)
> 0 almost
surely.
Step 2: Prove M0 > 0.
Step 3: Prove if M0 =∞, then limi→∞RNi =∞.
Step 4: Prove M0 <∞.
Step 1:
Given a sample ω ∈ Ω , assume a contrary that there exists a subsequence
{Nj} ⊂ {Ni} such that
lim
j→∞
I
(
MNj , γRNj + YNjζ
(Nj)(ω)
)
= 0.
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Then, we have limj→∞D′
(
MNj − I
(
MNj , γRNj + YNjζ
(Nj)(ω)
))
= D′(0)
and
limj→∞ U ′
(
I
(
MNj , γRNj + YNjζ
(Nj)(ω)
))
= ∞. But by (3.2.17) and the
fact that RNj = R
(Nj)
YNj ,MNj
≤ D′(MNj) from Lemma 3.2.9 with ξ = ζ(N), we
have:
∞ = lim
j→∞
U ′
(
I
(
MNj , γRNj + YNjζ
(Nj)(ω)
))
= ξ∗(ω)Y0 + γ lim
j→∞
(
RNj −D′
(
MNj − I
(
MNj , γRNj + YNjζ
(Nj)(ω)
)))
≤ ξ∗(ω)Y0
+γ lim
j→∞
(
D′(MNj)−D′
(
MNj − I
(
MNj , γRNj + YNjζ
(Nj)(ω)
)))
≤ ξ∗(ω)Y0 + γ (D′(0)−D′ (0)) <∞,
which leads to a contradiction. Hence, limi→∞ I
(
MNi , γRNi + YNiζ
(Ni)
)
> 0
almost surely.
Step 2: By Step 1, we have limi→∞ I
(
MNi , γRNi + YNiζ
(Ni)
)
> 0 almost surely.
By Fatou’s Lemma and Lemma 3.2.10 with ξ = ζ(N), we have
0 = lim inf
i→∞
MNi = lim inf
i→∞
E
[
I
(
MNi , γRNi + YNiζ
(Ni)
)]
≥ E
[
lim inf
i→∞
I
(
MNi , γRNi + YNiζ
(Ni)
)]
> 0.
We have a contradiction, hence M0 > 0.
Step 3: By (3.2.17), we first have
U ′
(
I
(
MNi , γRNi + YNiζ
(Ni)
))− YNiζ(Ni)
= γRNi − γD′
(
MNi − I
(
MNi , γRNi + YNiζ
(Ni)
))
(3.3.32)
If M0 = limi→∞MNi =∞, then either limi→∞RNi =∞ or
limi→∞ I
(
MNi , γRNi + YNiζ
(Ni)
)
= ∞ almost surely. We further assume a
contrary that there exist a subsequence {Nj} ⊂ {Ni} such that limj→∞RNj <
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∞, then limj→∞ I
(
MNj , γRNj + YNjζ
(Nj)
)
=∞, thus
lim
j→∞
(
U ′
(
I
(
MNj , γRNj + YNjζ
(Nj)
))− YNjζ(Nj)) = −Y0ξ∗ a.s. (3.3.33)
Since, for large enough j, by (3.3.32),
U ′
(
I
(
MNj , γRNj + YNjζ
(Nj)
))− YNjζ(Nj)
≤ U ′ (I (1, γRNj + YNjζ(Nj)))− YNjζ(Nj)
≤ γ
(
lim
j→∞
RNj + 1
)
− γD′
(
1− I
(
1,
γ
2
lim
j→∞
RNj
))
, (3.3.34)
then by Reverse Fatou’s lemma, (3.3.33), and Lemma 3.2.9 with ξ = ζ(N),
we have:
0 > −Y0E[ξ∗] = E
[
lim sup
j→∞
(
U ′
(
I
(
MNj , γRNj + YNjζ
(Nj)
))− YNjζ(Nj))]
≥ lim sup
j→∞
E
[
U ′
(
I
(
MNj , γRNj + YNjζ
(Nj)
))− YNjζ(Nj)]
= 0. (3.3.35)
We have a contradiction, therefore, limi→∞RNi =∞.
Step 4:
AssumeM0 =∞, we claim that limi→∞
(
MNi − I
(
MNi , γRNi + YNiζ
(Ni)
))
=
∞ almost surely. Given a sample ω ∈ Ω , assume a contrary that there exists
a subsequence {Nj} ⊂ {Ni} such that limj→∞
(
MNj − I
(
MNj , γRNj + YNjζ
(Nj)(ω)
))
<
∞, then
lim
j→∞
D′
(
MNj − I
(
MNj , γRNj + YNjζ
(Nj)(ω)
))
<∞.
Since limj→∞RNj =∞ by Step 3, we have
lim
j→∞
U ′
(
I
(
MNj , γRNj + YNjζ
(Nj)(ω)
))
=∞,
thus limj→∞ I
(
MNj , γRNj + YNjζ
(Nj)(ω)
)
= 0 and then it results in
lim
j→∞
(
MNj − I
(
MNj , γRNj + YNjζ
(Nj)(ω)
))
=∞, (3.3.36)
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which contradicts the assumption on its finiteness at the first place. Now,
we have limi→∞
(
MNi − I
(
MNi , γRNi + YNiζ
(Ni)
))
=∞ almost surely.
On {(Y,M)|Y ≥ U ′(M)}, we have D′ (M − I (M,Y )) = Y − U ′ (I (M,Y ))
is strictly increasing inM . Thus, becauseD′ is strictly increasing for positive
M−I (M,Y ), M−I (M,Y ) is strictly increasing inM on {(Y,M)|Y ≤ U ′(M)}.
On the other hand, on {(Y,M)|Y ≤ U ′(M)}, M−I (M,Y ) = M−(U ′)−1(Y )
is strictly increasing in M . Hence, M−I (M,Y ) increases in M for any fixed
Y , then we have
MNi − I
(
MNi , γRNi + YNiζ
(Ni)
) ≥ 1− I (1, γRNi + YNiζ(Ni)) ≥ −I(1, 1),
for large enough i, where the last inequality follows because limi→∞RNi =∞
by Step 3, and I (M,Y ) decreases in Y for any fixed M .
By Fatou’s Lemma, (3.3.36), and Lemma 3.2.10 with ξ = ζ(N), we have
contradiction:
0 = lim inf
i→∞
E
[
MNi − I
(
MNi , γRNi + YNiζ
(Ni)
)]
≥ E
[
lim inf
i→∞
(
MNi − I
(
MNi , γRNi + YNiζ
(Ni)
))]
=∞.
By Steps 2 and 4, we have M0 ∈ (0,∞). By Lemma 3.3.3, limi→∞RNi =
limi→∞R
(Ni)
YNi ,MNi
= R∗Y0,M0 , thus
lim
i→∞
I
(
MNi , γRNi + YNiζ
(Ni)
)
= I
(
M0, γR
∗
Y0,M0
+ Y0ξ
∗) .
By the Dominated Convergence Theorem and Lemma 3.2.10 with ξ = ζ(N),
E
[
I
(
M0, γR
∗
Y0,M0
+ Y0ξ
∗)] = lim
i→∞
E
[
I
(
MNi , γRNi + YNiζ
(Ni)
)]
= lim
i→∞
MNi = M0.
By the uniqueness of Lemma 3.2.10 with ξ = ξ∗, we have M0 = M∗Y0 .
Since every subsequential limits of {MNk} agree with M0 = limi→∞MNi =
M∗Y0 , we are done.
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Lemma 3.3.5. limN→∞ Y (N) = Y ∗.
Proof. By Bolzano-Weierstrass theorem, there exist a subsequence {Nk} such that
Y0 := limk→∞ Y (Nk) ∈ [0,∞] exists.
We will prove Y0 ∈ (0,∞) by using following 4 steps:
Step 1: Prove if Y0 = 0, P
[
limk→∞ I
(
M (Nk), γR(Nk) + Y (Nk)ζ(Nk)
)
=∞] > 0 .
Step 2: Prove Y0 > 0.
Step 3: Prove if Y0 = ∞, limk→∞ I
(
M (Nk), Y (Nk)ζ(Nk) + γR(Nk)
)
= 0 almost
surely.
Step 4: Prove Y0 <∞.
Step 1:
Assume the contrary that there exists an arbitrary a sample ω0 ∈ {ω ∈
Ω | ξ∗(ω) < ξ∗} and a sequence {Ni} ⊂ {Nk} such that
lim
i→∞
I
(
M (Ni), γR(Ni) + Y (Ni)ζ(Ni) (ω0)
)
<∞.
For any sample ω ∈ {ω ∈ Ω | ξ∗ (ω) > ξ∗ (ω0)} , we have ζ(Ni) (ω) > ζ(Ni) (ω0)
for large enough i, hence
U ′
(
I
(
M (Ni), γR(Ni) + Y (Ni)ζ(Ni) (ω)
))
> U ′
(
I
(
M (Ni), γR(Ni) + Y (Ni)ζ(Ni) (ω0)
))
.
Therefore, for any ω ∈ {ω ∈ Ω | ξ∗ (ω) > ξ∗ (ω0)},
lim inf
i→∞
U ′
(
I
(
M (Ni), γR(Ni) + Y (Ni)ζ(Ni) (ω)
))
≥ lim
i→∞
U ′
(
I
(
M (Ni), γR(Ni) + Y (Ni)ζ(Ni) (ω0)
))
> 0.
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The satisfaction of Condition (ii) in Theorem 3.2.8 implies that E[ζ(Ni)]
is uniformly bounded from above, then, by Fatou’s Lemma, (3.2.17), and
(3.3.28),
0 = lim inf
i→∞
Y (Ni)E[ζ(Ni)]
= lim inf
i→∞
E
[
U ′
(
I
(
M (Ni), γR(Ni) + Y (Ni)ζ(Ni)
))]
≥ E
[
lim inf
i→∞
U ′
(
I
(
M (Ni), γR(Ni) + Y (Ni)ζ(Ni)
))]
≥ lim
i→∞
U ′
(
I
(
M (Ni), γR(Ni) + Y (Ni)ζ(Ni) (ω0)
))
P [ξ∗ > ξ∗(ω0)] > 0.
We have contradiction, hence
lim
k→∞
I
(
M (Ni), γR(Ni) + Y (Ni)ζ(Ni) (ω0)
)
=∞
for all ω0 ∈ {ω ∈ Ω | ξ∗(ω) < ξ∗}.
Step 2: Assume a contrary that Y0 = 0, by Step 1, we further have
P
[
limk→∞
(
ζ(Nk)I
(
M (Nk), γR(Nk) + Y (Nk)ζ(Nk)
))
=∞] > 0. By Fatou’s Lemma
and (3.3.30), we have
x0 = lim inf
k→∞
E
[
ζ(Nk)I
(
M (Nk), γR(Nk) + Y (Nk)ζ(Nk)
)]
≥ E
[
lim inf
k→∞
ζ(Nk)I
(
M (Nk), γR(Nk) + Y (Nk)ζ(Nk)
)]
=∞.
We have contradiction, thus Y0 > 0.
Step 3: SinceMY is decreasing in Y as shown in Lemma 3.2.10, and limk→∞M
(Nk)
1 =
M∗1 by Lemma 3.3.4, we have
M (Nk) = M
(Nk)
Y (Nk)
≤M (Nk)1 ≤ 2M∗1 <∞ for large enough k (3.3.37)
. Then, since D′ is increasing, we have
lim sup
k→∞
D′
(
M (Nk)
) ≤ D′(2M∗1 ) <∞. (3.3.38)
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Assume a contrary that there exists a sample ω ∈ Ω and a sequence {Nj} ⊂
{Nk} with Y (Nj) →∞ such that
lim
j→∞
I
(
M (Nj), Y (Nj)ζ(Nj)(ω) + γR(Nj)
)
> 0. (3.3.39)
By (3.2.17), we have
Y (Nj)ζ(Nj)(ω)− U ′ (I (M (Nj), Y (Nj)ζ(Nj)(ω) + γR(Nj)))
= D′
(
M (Nj) − I (M (Nj), Y (Nj)ζ(Nj)(ω) + γR(Nj)))− γR(Nj)
≤ D′ (M (Nj))− γR(Nj), (3.3.40)
where the last inequality follows because I
(
M (Nj), Y (Nj)ζ(Nj)(ω) + γR(Nj)
)
is positive. Taking the limit superior with j → ∞ in the both sides of
(3.3.40), the limit in the left hand side tends to infinity because
limj→∞ U ′
(
I
(
M (Nj), Y (Nj)ζ(Nj)(ω) + γR(Nj)
))
< ∞ by (3.3.39), while the
limit in the right hand side is finite due to (3.3.38) and the non-negativity
of R(Nj), we have contradiction. Therefore, we have
lim
k→∞
I
(
M (Nk), Y (Nk)ζ(Nk) + γR(Nk)
)
= 0, a.s. (3.3.41)
Step 4:
Assume Y0 = ∞. By step 3, limk→∞ I
(
M (Nk), Y (Nk)ζ(Nk) + γR(Nk)
)
= 0
almost surely.
Since M (Nk) ≤ 2M∗1 for large enough k by (3.3.37) and R(Nk) ≥ 0 for all k,
we have
I
(
M (Nk), Y (Nk)ζ(Nk) + γR(Nk)
) ≤ I (2M∗1 , ζ(Nk))
≤ I (2M∗1 , U ′(2M∗1 )) + (U ′)−1(ζ(Nk)),
for large enough k.
By the satisfaction of Condition (iii) in Theorem 3.2.8,{
ζ(Nk)I
(
M (Nk), Y (Nk)ζ(Nk) + γR(Nk)
)}
k∈N is uniformly integrable. By the
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Dominated Convergence Theorem under uniform integrability assumption,
(3.3.30), and Step 3,
x0 = lim
k→∞
E
[
ζ(Nk)I
(
M (Nk), Y (Nk)ζ(Nk) + γR(Nk)
)]
= E
[
lim
k→∞
ζ(Nk)I
(
M (Nk), Y (Nk)ζ(Nk) + γR(Nk)
)]
= 0. (3.3.42)
We have a contradiction, so Y0 <∞.
By Steps 2 and 4, we have Y0 ∈ (0,∞). By Lemmas 3.3.3 and 3.3.4,
lim
k→∞
(
Y (Nk),M (Nk), R(Nk)
)
=
(
Y0, lim
k→∞
M
(Nk)
Y (Nk)
, lim
k→∞
R
(Nk)
Y (Nk),M
(Nk)
Y (Nk)
)
=
(
Y0,M
∗
Y0
, R∗Y0,M∗Y0
)
,
therefore, we have
lim
k→∞
ζ(Nk)I
(
M (Nk), γR(Nk) + Y (Nk)ζ(Nk)
)
= ξ∗I
(
M∗Y0 , γR
∗
Y0,M∗Y0
+ Y0ξ
∗
)
.
Since the satisfaction of Condition (ii) in Theorem 3.2.8 implies that
{
ζ(Nk)
}
k∈N
is uniformly integrable, by Dominated Convergence Theorem and (3.3.30),
x0 = lim
k→∞
E
[
ζ(Nk)I
(
M (Nk), γR(Nk) + Y (Nk)ζ(Nk)
)]
= E
[
ξ∗I
(
M∗Y0 , γR
∗
Y0,M∗Y0
+ Y0ξ
∗
)]
.
Together with the fact that R∗Y,M and M
∗
Y solve (3.2.18) and (3.2.20) with
ξ = ξ∗,
(
Y0,M
∗
Y0
, R∗Y0,M∗Y0
)
solves the system of equations (3.2.14)-(3.2.16) with
ξ = ξ∗. Since the solution of the system is unique, so we have
(
Y0,M
∗
Y0
, R∗Y0,M∗Y0
)
=
(Y ∗,M∗, R∗).
Since every subsequential limits of {Y (N)} agree with Y0 = limk→∞ Y (Nk) = Y ∗,
we have Y ∗ = limN→∞ Y (N).
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By Lemmas 3.3.3 and 3.3.4, we have
lim
N→∞
(
Y (N),M (N), R(N)
)
=
(
Y ∗, lim
N→∞
M
(N)
Y (N)
, lim
N→∞
R
(N)
Y (N),M
(N)
Y (N)
)
=
(
Y ∗,M∗Y ∗ , R
∗
Y ∗,M∗
Y ∗
)
= (Y ∗,M∗, R∗) . (3.3.43)
Hence, this proposition follows.
3.3.2 Convergence of Optimal Solution: Case of Strictly-
Convex Risk
We aim to show the similar convergence result as the case of downside risk. {Π(N)}
denotes a sequence of markets which satisfy Conditions 3.1.6 and 3.1.7, thus we
have a sequence of terminal pricing kernels {ξ(N)}. Similar argument applies to Xˆ∗
and Π∗. By Theorem 3.2.14, there exist optimal terminal payoffs of utility-strictly-
convex-risk problems Xˆ(N) and Xˆ∗ under the markets Π(N) and Π∗ respectively.
Theorem 3.3.6. Given that U and D satisfy Definitions 3.1.1 and 3.1.3 respec-
tively and all markets Π(N) and Π∗ satisfying Conditions 3.1.6 and 3.1.7 with
corresponding unique terminal pricing kernels ξN and ξ
∗ and optimal terminal
payoffs Xˆ(N) and Xˆ∗, as described in Theorem 3.2.14. Suppose that a sequence of
their terminal pricing kernels {ξ(N)} satisfy the following conditions:
(i) ξ(N) ∈ L2 converges weakly to ξ∗ ∈ L2 as N →∞.
(ii)
{
ξ(N)
}
N∈N is uniformly integrable.
Then the sequence {Xˆ(N)} converges weakly to Xˆ∗. Hence, Ψ
(
Xˆ(N)
)
→
Ψ
(
Xˆ∗
)
, i.e., the sequence of the optimal value functions of utility-risk problem
under Π(N) converges to the optimal value functions under Π∗.
Proof. The proof is similar to Theorem 3.3.1, the essential changes are the follows:
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• Lemma 3.3.3. To apply the Dominated Convergence Theorem in (3.3.31),
we need to first verify that R0 > −∞.
We assume the contrary that R0 = −∞ for strictly convex risk D, then
limi→∞ I
(
MNi , γRNi + YNiζ
(Ni)
)
=∞ almost surely by (3.2.23). Since U ′ is
continuous, by Inada condition, we have
lim
i→∞
YNiζ
(Ni) − U ′ (I (MNi , γRNi + YNiζ(Ni))) = Y0ξ∗ a.s. (3.3.44)
By (3.2.23), for all i such that RNi < 0,
YNiζ
(Ni) − U ′ (I (MNi , γRNi + YNiζ(Ni)))
≥ YNiζ(Ni) − U ′
(
I
(
MNi , YNiζ
(Ni)
))
= γD′
(
MNi − I
(
MNi , YNiζ
(Ni)
))
≥ γD′ (−I (M0 + 1, 0))
By Fatou’s lemma, (3.3.44), and Lemma 3.2.15 with ξ = ζ(N), we have
0 = lim
i→∞
E
[
D′
(
MNi − I
(
MNi , γRNi + YNiζ
(Ni)
))−RNi]
≥ lim inf
i→∞
E
[
1
γ
(
YNiζ
(Ni) − U ′ (I (MNi , γRNi + YNiζ(Ni))))]
≥ 1
γ
Y0E [ξ∗] > 0.
We have contradiction, therefore, R0 > −∞.
Then, we can show that D′
(
MNi − I
(
MNi , γRNi + YNiζ
(Ni)
))
is uniformly
bounded by D′
(
M0
2
− I (2M0, γ(R0 − 1))
)
and D′ (2M0) in large enough i,
so we can apply the Dominated Convergence Theorem in (3.3.31).
• Step 3 in Lemma 3.3.4. Since limj→∞R(Nj) may not be non-negative in the
case of strictly convex risk, we can prove the boundedness as (3.3.34) by
follows:
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for large enough j,
U ′
(
I
(
MNj , γRNj + YNjζ
(Nj)
))− YNjζ(Nj)
≤ U ′ (I (1, γRNj + YNjζ(Nj)))− YNjζ(Nj)
≤ γ
(
lim
j→∞
R(Nj) + 1
)
−D′
(
1− I
(
1, γ lim
j→∞
R(Nj) − 1
))
.
Then, we can apply reverse Fatou’s Lemma to have (3.3.35).
• Step 3 in Lemma 3.3.5. Since the non-negativity of R(Nk) does not hold in
the case of strictly convex risk, we have to verify that if Y0 =∞,
lim inf
k→∞
R(Nk) > −∞
in order to show the right hand size in (3.3.40) is finite as j →∞.
By Lemma 3.2.15 with ξ = ζ(Ni), R
(Ni)
Y,M is increasing in Y ,
lim inf
k→∞
R(Nk) = lim inf
k→∞
R
(Nk)
Y (Nk),M(Nk)
≥ lim inf
k→∞
R
(Nk)
K,M(Nk)
for all K > 0,
so we claim that lim infk→∞R
(Nk)
K,M(Nk)
> −∞ for all K > 0.
Assume the contrary that there exists K > 0 and a subsequence {Ni} ⊂
{Nk} such that limi→∞R(Ni)K,M(Ni) = −∞. Then,
lim
i→∞
(
ζ(Ni)K + γR
(Ni)
K,M(Ni)
)
= −∞.
Therefore, limi→∞ I
(
M (Ni), ζ(Ni)K + γR
(Ni)
K,M(Ni)
)
=∞. Then,
lim
i→∞
U ′
(
I
(
M (Ni), ζ(Ni)K + γR
(Ni)
K,M(Ni)
))
= 0. (3.3.45)
Since
U ′
(
I
(
M
(Ni)
Y (Ni)
, ζ(Ni)K + γR
(Ni)
K,M
(Ni)
Y (Ni)
))
≤ U ′ (I (0, ζ(Ni)K))
≤ ζ(Ni)K −D′ (−I (0, 0))
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for large enough i, L1 boundedness is preserved by the uniform integrability
of ξ′N . Then, applying reverse Fatou’s lemma with (3.3.45) and using the
fact that R
(Ni)
Y,M satisfies (3.2.25), we have:
0 = E
[
lim sup
i→∞
U ′
(
I
(
M (Ni), ζ(Ni)K + γR
(Ni)
K,M(Ni)
))]
≥ lim sup
i→∞
E
[
U ′
(
I
(
M (Ni), ζ(Ni)K + γR
(Ni)
K,M(Ni)
))]
= K lim sup
i→∞
E
[
ζ(Ni)
]
> 0.
We have a contradiction, thus
lim inf
k→∞
R
(Nk)
K,M(Nk)
> −∞ for any K ∈ (0,∞), (3.3.46)
and hence, by Lemma 3.3.45, we have
lim inf
k→∞
R(Nk) > −∞.
From here on, the rest of the proof of Step 3 in Lemma 3.3.5 is the same as
the case of downside risk.
• Step 4 in Lemma 3.3.5. By Lemma 3.2.15, for any K ∈ (0,∞), R(Nk) =
R
(Nk)
Y (Nk),M(Nk)
≥ R(Nk)
K,M(Nk)
for large enough k. Thus, lim infk→∞R(Nk) ≥
lim infk→∞R
(Nk)
K,M(Nk)
> −∞, where the last inequality has been verified in
(3.3.46). Since M (Nk) = M
(Nk)
Y (Nk)
≤ M (Nk)1 ≤ 2M∗1 by Lemmas 3.2.16 and
3.3.4, we have
I
(
M (Nk), Y (Nk)ζ(Nk) + γR(Nk)
) ≤ I (2M∗1 , γ lim inf
k→∞
R
(Nk)
K,M(Nk)
)
<∞.
By the uniform integrability of ζ(Nk), we can apply the Dominated Conver-
gence Theorem under uniform integrability assumption to obtain the same
contradiction in (3.3.42).
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3.3.3 Application: Approximation of Optimal Solution to
Continuous-Time Utility-Risk Problem
In this section, we will show that the sequence of the terminal pricing kernels
ξ(N) := ξ
(N)
N , where ξ
(N)
n defined in (3.1.6) satisfies the conditions stated in The-
orems 3.3.1 and 3.3.6 with ξ∗ := ξT , where ξt is defined in (3.1.4). Then, by
Theorems 3.3.1 and 3.3.6, the optimal terminal wealth of utility-risk problems
under continuous-time Black-Scholes model can be approximated by the optimal
solution in discrete-time binomial-tree model.
To show the terminal pricing kernels ξ(N) := ξ
(N)
N satisfying the conditions
stated in Theorem 3.3.1 for utility-downside-risk problem, the following assump-
tion stronger than Assumption 2.3.4, which is adopted in Remark 4.4 in Karatzas
and Shreve (1998), is required:
Assumption 3.3.7. There exist η ∈ (0, 1) and β > 1 such that U ′(ηy) ≤ βU ′(y)
for all y > 0.
Theorem 3.3.8. Given that Assumption 3.3.7 holds and U and D are given by
Definitions 3.1.1 and 3.1.2, the sequence of the terminal pricing kernels ξ(N) :=
ξ
(N)
N defined in (3.1.6) satisfies the conditions stated in Theorem 3.3.1 with ξ
∗ :=
ξT where ξt is defined in (3.1.4). Hence, the sequence of the optimal terminal
wealth for utility-downside-risk problem under binomial tree models converge to
the optimal terminal wealth under the Black-Scholes model described in Example
3.1.10.
Before we proceed to the proof, we first need the following two technical lem-
mas for verifying the conditions in Theorem 3.3.8.
Lemma 3.3.9. ξ(N) defined in (3.1.6) converges weakly to ξ∗ defined in (3.1.4).
Lemma 3.3.10. Given that ξ(N) is defined in (3.1.6), we have
(i) E
[
(ξ(N))3
]
< eKT , where K is a constant independent of N .
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(ii) For any fixed n ∈ N, there exist a constant Mn such that E
[
(ξ(N))−n
] ≤Mn
for all N ∈ N.
Remark 3.3.11. Since the pricing kernel can be expressed as a function of stock
price, the weak convergence of stock prices from the binomial-tree models to the
continuous-time Black-Scholes model is sufficient for Lemma 3.3.9. The conver-
gence of stock price has been studied in plenty of literature; such as Prigent (2003)
and Fo¨llmer and Schied (2004). Alternatively, we can show the convergence of
pricing kernels directly by the application of the Central Limit Theorem; the proof
is provided for the sake of convenience of reader.
Proof of Lemma 3.3.9.
To show the weak convergence of pricing kernels, we first need the following
alternative version of central limit theorem:
Theorem 3.3.12 (Theorem A.36 in Fo¨llmer and Schied (2004)). Suppose that for
each N ∈ N, we are given N independent random variables Y (N)1 , . . . , Y (N)N which
satisfy the following conditions:
(i) There are constants γN such that γN → 0 and |Y (N)k | ≤ γN a.s. for all k.
(ii)
∑N
k=1 E
[
Y
(N)
k
]
→ m
(iii)
∑N
k=1 V ar
[
Y
(N)
k
]
→ σ2
Then the distributions of
∑N
k=1 Y
(N)
k converge weakly to the normal distribution
with mean m and variance σ2.
By considering ξ
(N)
n defined in (3.1.6), we have ξ(N) = e−rT
∏N
k=1
(
1 +R
(N)
k
)
,
where
R
(N)
k := 2
e−λ∆t+σ
√
∆tZ
(N)
k − 1
e2σ
√
∆tZ
(N)
k − 1
− 1.
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Hence,
R
(N)
k =
αN := 2
e−λ∆t+σ
√
∆t−1
e2σ
√
∆t−1 − 1, if Z
(N)
k = 1;
βN := 2
e2σ
√
∆t−e−λ∆t+σ
√
∆t
e2σ
√
∆t−1 − 1, if Z
(N)
k = −1;
for all k = 1, 2, . . . , N.
Since
e−λ∆t+σ
√
∆t − 1
e2σ
√
∆t − 1 =
σ
√
∆t+O(∆t)
2σ
√
∆t+O(∆t)
=
1
2
+O(
√
∆t)
and similarly
e2σ
√
∆t − e−λ∆t+σ
√
∆t
e2σ
√
∆t − 1 =
(
σ
√
∆t+O(∆t)
)( 1
2σ
√
∆t
+O(1)
)
=
1
2
+O(
√
∆t),
we have αN = βN = O(
√
∆t)→ 0 as N →∞.
Then by Taylor expansion,
Y
(N)
k := ln
(
1 +R
(N)
k
)
= R
(N)
k −
1
2
(
R
(N)
k
)2
+O(∆t
3
2 ) a.s. (3.3.47)
Since R
(N)
k is bounded by γN := max{αN , βN} = O(
√
∆t),
|Y (N)k | = γN +
1
2
γ2N +O(∆t
3
2 )→ 0.
Hence, Condition (i) in Theorem 3.3.12 follows.
Next, to compute E
[
Y
(N)
k
]
, we consider E[R(N)k ] and E
[(
R
(N)
k
)2]
first. By a
standard computation, we have E[R(N)k ] = 0 for all k,N . Next,
E
[(
R
(N)
k
)2]
=
α2N + β
2
N
2
=
(
e2σ
√
∆t − 2e−λ∆t+σ
√
∆t + 1
e2σ
√
∆t − 1
)2
=
((
2α∆t+O(∆t
3
2 )
)( 1
2σ
√
∆t
+O(1)
))2
=
(α
σ
√
∆t+O(∆t)
)2
=
α2
σ2
∆t+O(∆t
3
2 ).
Then, by (3.3.47), we have
E
[
Y
(N)
k
]
= E
[
R
(N)
k
]
− 1
2
E
[(
R
(N)
k
)2]
+O(∆t
3
2 )
= − α
2
2σ2
∆t+O(∆t
3
2 ) (3.3.48)
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Hence,
N∑
k=1
E
[
Y
(N)
k
]
= − α
2
2σ2
T +O(∆t
1
2 )→ − α
2
2σ2
T as N →∞.
By (3.3.47) and the fact that R
(N)
k has an order of O(
√
∆t), we have
(
Y
(N)
k
)2
=(
R
(N)
k
)2
+O(∆t
3
2 ) almost surely. Then, by (3.3.48),
V ar
[
Y
(N)
k
]
= E
[(
Y
(N)
k
)2]
−
(
E
[
Y
(N)
k
])2
= E
[(
R
(N)
k
)2]
+O(∆t
3
2 )
=
α2
σ2
∆t+O(∆t
3
2 ).
Hence,
N∑
k=1
V ar
[
Y
(N)
k
]
=
α2
σ2
T +O(∆t
1
2 )→ α
2
σ2
T as N →∞.
By Theorem 3.3.12, we have
∑N
k=1 Y
(N)
k converge weakly to the normal distri-
bution with mean− α2
2σ2
T and variance α
2
σ2
T . Hence, ξ(N) = e−rT e
∑N
k=1 Y
(N)
k converge
weakly to log-normally distributed random variable with mean −rT − α2
2σ2
T and
variance α
2
σ2
T , which has the same distribution as ξT .
Proof of Lemma 3.3.10.
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By Taylor series expansion, we have
E
[(
1 +R
(N)
k
)3]
=
4
(
e6σ
√
∆t − 3e5σ
√
∆t−λ∆t + 3e4σ
√
∆t−2λ∆t − 3e2σ
√
∆t−2λ∆t + 3eσ
√
∆t−λ∆t − 1
)
(
e2σ
√
∆t − 1)3
≤ 1 + 3
(
eσ
√
∆t − 1
)2
+
3eσ
√
∆t−λ∆t (eλ∆t − 1) (e2σ√∆t − eσ√∆t−λ∆t(eλ∆t + 1) + 1)
σ2∆t
= 1 + 3
(
σ
√
∆t+O(∆t)
)2
+
3eσ
√
∆t−λ∆t (λ∆t+O(∆t2))
(
(2σ2 + λ)∆t+O(∆t
3
2 )
)
σ2∆t
= 1 +K∆t
for some constant K independent of N . Then,
E
[(
ξ(N)
)3]
= E
[
N∏
i=1
(
1 +R
(N)
k
)3]
≤ (1 +K∆t)N ≤ eKT for all N.
Therefore, (i) follows.
Given fixed n ∈ N, by standard computations with the application of Taylor
series expansions, we have:
E
[(
1 +R
(N)
k
)−n]
=
(
e2σ
√
∆t − 1
)n
2n+1
(
1(
e−λ∆t+σ
√
∆t − 1)n + 1(e2σ√∆t − e−λ∆t+σ√∆t)n
)
= 1 +
(n+ 1)n
2σ2
(
1
2
σ2 + λ
)2
∆t+O(∆t
3
2 ).
Then, there exist a constant Kn independent of N such that
E
[(
ξ(N)
)−n]
= E
[
N∏
i=1
(
1 +R
(N)
k
)−n]
=
(
1 +
(n+ 1)n
2σ2
(
1
2
σ2 + λ
)2
∆t+O(∆t
3
2 )
)N
≤ eKnT .
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Proof of Theorem 3.3.8.
By Lemma 3.3.9, Condition (i) in Theorem 3.3.1 follows.
By Assumption 3.3.7, its inverse function (U ′)−1 satisfy the property: (U ′)−1(ηx) ≤
β(U ′)−1(x) for all x > 0. Thus, (U ′)−1(ηyx) ≤ βy+1(U ′)−1(x) for all x, y > 0 and
further we have (U ′)−1(ηyx) ≤ βy+1(U ′)−1(x) + (U ′)−1(x) for all y ∈ R, x > 0.
Hence,
(U ′)−1(z) ≤ βz ln βln η (U ′)−1(1) + (U ′)−1(1) for any z > 0.
Then, by Minkowski inequality, we have(
E
[(
(U ′)−1
(
ξ(N)
))3]) 13 ≤ (U ′)−1(1)(β3E [(ξ(N))3 ln βln η ]+ 1) 13 .
In turn, by Lemma 3.3.10(ii), we have E
[(
(U ′)−1
(
ξ(N)
))3]
<∞.
Consider that
E
[(
ξ(N)
(
(U ′)−1
(
ξ(N)
)
+M
)) 3
2
]
≤ E
[(
1
2
((
ξ(N)
)2
+ 2
(
(U ′)−1
(
ξ(N)
))2
+ 2M2
)) 32]
,
then, by Minkowski inequality and Lemma 3.3.10(i), we can show that
E
[(
ξ(N)
(
(U ′)−1
(
ξ(N)
)
+M
)) 3
2
]
<∞.
Hence, Condition (ii) in Theorem 3.3.1 follows by 13.3(a) in Williams (1991).
By Theorem 3.3.1, the desired convergence result of the optimal terminal
wealth follows.
Similarly, we can show that the terminal pricing kernels ξ(N) := ξ
(N)
N satisfies
the conditions stated in Theorem 3.3.1 for utility-strictly-convex-risk problem.
Theorem 3.3.13. Let U and D are given by Definitions 3.1.1 and 3.1.3. The
sequence of the terminal pricing kernels ξ(N) := ξ
(N)
N defined in (3.1.6) satisfies
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the conditions stated in Theorem 3.3.6 with ξ∗ := ξT where ξt is defined in (3.1.4).
Hence, the sequence of the optimal terminal wealth for utility-strictly-convex-risk
problem under binomial tree models converge to the optimal terminal wealth under
the Black-Scholes model described in Example 3.1.10.
Proof. Condition (i) in Theorem 3.3.6 follows in Lemma 3.3.9.
By Lemma 3.3.10(i), E
[
(ξ(N))3
]
< eKT , where K is a constant independent of
N . Hence, Condition (ii) in Theorem 3.3.6 follows by 13.3(a) in Williams (1991).
By Theorem 3.3.6, we have the desired convergence result of the optimal ter-
minal wealth.
Furthermore, similar approximation of optimal value function can be done:
Corollary 3.3.14. (i) Given that Assumption 3.3.7 holds, the optimal value
function for utility-downside-risk problem under discrete binomial tree model
as in Example 3.1.11 converges to the optimal value function under continuous-
time Black-Scholes model as in Example 3.1.10 as time interval decreases
(i.e. N →∞).
(ii) The optimal value function for utility-strictly-convex-risk problem under dis-
crete binomial tree model as in Example 3.1.11 converges to the optimal value
function under continuous-time Black-Scholes model as in Example 3.1.10
as time interval decreases (i.e. N →∞).
Remark 3.3.15. Chapter 2 provided a comprehensive study of utility-risk port-
folio selection under the continuous-time Black-Scholes framework. By Remark
3.2.6, the optimal terminal wealth obtained in Chapter 2 is in the analytical form
of I(M,Y ξ+γR) where I is an implicit function satisfying (3.2.13) and Y,M and
R are constants satisfying the nonlinear moment constraints in (3.2.14)-(3.2.16).
However, it is difficult to numerically compute the solution in Chapter 2 even we
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have an explicit form of I. It is because ξ is a continuous random variable with a
support of the positive half real line. Hence, the expectations in (3.2.14)-(3.2.16)
become improper integrals in which the integrand is a nonlinear function of un-
known parameters Y,M and R. Thus, it is difficult to compute the improper
integrals numerically and so do the nonlinear programming problem for Y,M and
R under the continuous-time Black-Scholes framework.
Under the binomial-tree model, ξ has finite possibilities, so the expectations
in (3.2.14)-(3.2.16) become finite sums. Therefore, it is easier to solve the system
of equations in (3.2.14)-(3.2.16) numerically. With Theorems 3.3.8 and 3.3.13, we
can approximate the optimal terminal wealth in continuous-time Black-Scholes
model by the optimal terminal wealth in discrete binomial tree model, which is
more easier to compute.
3.4 Numerical Simulation
In this subsection, we compute the numerical solution for utility risk problem
under binomial tree model as described in Example 3.1.11. Without any specific
instruction, we set the parameters to be: r = 0.03, α = 0.07, σ = 0.2, T = 1, x0 =
1. We consider utility function to be a power function: U(x) = 2x
1
2 , then U ′(x) =
x−
1
2 , we consider risk function to be either variance (D(x) = x
2
2
) or semivariance
(D(x) =
x2+
2
).
3.4.1 Convergence by Decreasing Time Interval
In this subsection, we will illustrate numerically Corollary 3.3.14 that the optimal
terminal wealth and value function will converges when the number of period N
increases so that ∆ = T
N
decreases, then by Theorems 3.3.8 and 3.3.13. We will
verify this result numerically. We fix γ = 0.1. We shall compute the solution
of the nonlinear system in (3.2.14)-(3.2.16) (Y, M, R), optimal control at t = 0
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Table 3.1: The Convergence of Optimal Solutions of Utility-Variance Problems as
Decreasing Time Interval
N Y M R pi∗(0) Utility Variance J∗ % Change
25 1.2041 2.9321 0 1.8851 3.1548 1.8665 2.9682 -0.0563%
50 1.2055 2.9243 0 1.8727 3.1517 1.8519 2.9665 -0.0279%
100 1.2061 2.9205 0 1.8667 3.1502 1.8448 2.9657 -0.0139%
200 1.2065 2.9186 0 1.8636 3.1494 1.8412 2.9653 -0.0069%
400 1.2066 2.9176 0 1.8621 3.1490 1.8394 2.9651 -0.0035%
800 1.2067 2.9171 0 1.8613 3.1488 1.8385 2.9650
(pi∗(0)), optimal expected utility, optimal variance, optimal objective value (J∗),
and the relative change of optimal objective value if the number of period is further
doubled for different number of period (N).
From the numerical result in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, we see that whenever we
double the number of period N , the change in value function is approximately
halved. Under this trend, the results in N = 50 is a good approximation to
the optimal solution for utility risk problem under continuous time Black-Scholes
model as in Example 3.1.10 with the error less than 0.1% in terms of the optimal
objective value.
3.4.2 Utility-Risk Efficient Frontiers
In this subsection, we plot the utility-variance and utility-semivariance efficient
frontiers for different volatility (σ = 0.1, 0.2, and 0.4). Smaller γ lead more risky
investment, which increases both utility and risk, then we can obtain an efficient
frontier by varying γ.
In Figure 3.1, we observe that given same value of risk, smaller σ will give
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Table 3.2: The Convergence of Optimal Solutions to Utility-Semivariance Prob-
lems as Decreasing Time Interval
N Y M R pi∗(0) Utility Semivariance J∗ % Change
25 1.2551 3.8750 1.5450 2.2335 3.3928 2.2067 3.1721 -0.0752%
50 1.2563 3.8656 1.5397 2.2172 3.3888 2.1908 3.1698 -0.0384%
100 1.2571 3.8587 1.5399 2.2091 3.3867 2.1813 3.1685 -0.0193%
200 1.2573 3.8567 1.5379 2.2050 3.3857 2.1777 3.1679 -0.0095%
400 1.2575 3.8553 1.5376 2.2030 3.3852 2.1756 3.1676 -0.0050%
800 1.2575 3.8547 1.5372 2.2020 3.3849 2.1746 3.1675
greater utility. It is because, when σ is doubled, the investor has to bear more risk
in order to have additional expected return or expected utility through increasing
risky investment.
In Figure 3.2, we observe that smaller volatility of the risky asset encourages
investor to have more risky investment because, under the smaller volatility, risky
investment induces comparatively smaller deviation risk, hence the risky invest-
ment becomes comparatively more profitable.
Now, we fix σ = 0.2, we examine extreme value of γ. If γ = 0, our utility
risk problem will reduce to a canonical utility maximization, this topic will be
discussed in the next subsection. If γ → ∞, then we put all of the focus on the
deviation risk, so the solution will tend to riskless investment. Hence, in Table
3.3, we observe that the utility will tend to U(erTx0) = 2e
rT
2 , which is the utility
of terminal payoff under riskless strategy. Meanwhile, the deviation risk and the
optimal control will tend to 0.
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Table 3.3: The Convergence of Optimal Solution for Utility-Risk Problems to
Riskless Solution
The Case of Utility-Variance
γ pi∗(0) Utility Variance
100 3.145× 10−2 2.2677 6.341× 10−5
10000 3.174× 10−4 2.2551 6.458× 10−9
1000000 3.174× 10−6 2.2550 6.459× 10−13
∞ (riskless) 0 2.2550 0
The Case of Utility-Semivariance
γ pi∗(0) Utility Semivariance
100 3.376× 10−2 2.2737 9.186× 10−5
10000 3.305× 10−4 2.2552 1.007× 10−8
1000000 3.243× 10−6 2.2550 1.026× 10−12
∞ (riskless) 0 2.2550 0
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Table 3.4: The Convergence of Optimal Solution from Utility-Variance Problem
to Solely Utility Maximization
γ pi∗(0) Utility Utility loss Variance Risk reduced
0 3.5119 3.6829 1681.1068
0.0001 3.3407 3.6692 0.37% 219.8164 86.92%
0.001 3.0599 3.6181 1.76% 62.9261 96.26%
0.01 2.5704 3.4663 5.88% 12.9751 99.23%
0.1 1.8667 3.1502 14.47% 1.8448 99.89%
3.4.3 Comparison between Utility-Risk Optimization and
Solely Utility Maximization
When γ = 0, our utility risk problem will reduce to a canonical solely util-
ity maximization. The optimal terminal wealth of the utility maximization is
X = 1
E[ 1ξ ]ξ2
. Furthermore, under the continuous-time Black-Scholes model, X =
erT+
α2
σ2
T+2α
σ
WT , then the corresponding expected utility and variance in diffusion
model will become 2e
r
2
T+ α
2
2σ2
T and 1
2
e2rT+4
α2
σ2
T
(
e4
α2
σ2
T − 1
)
respectively.
As γ → 0, the expected utility in utility-risk problem will converge to the
expected utility in solely utility maximization (we set N = 100) in Tables 3.4 and
3.5.
From Tables 4a and 4b, we observe that adding a risk term to utility maxi-
mization problem can help to reduce the variance risk and semivariance risk. For
example, in Table 4a, adding variance with γ = 0.01 can reduce 99% of variance in
simple utility maximization with less than 6% utility loss as expense. In Table 4b,
the additional semivariance term can reduce more 90% of semivariance in simple
utility maximization with less than 10% utility loss as expense.
We also notice that there are limit points in the efficient frontiers when σ = 0.4
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Table 3.5: The Convergence of Optimal Solution from Utility-Semivariance Prob-
lem to Solely Utility Maximization
The Case of Utility-Semivariance
γ pi∗(0) Utility Utility loss Semivariance Risk reduced
0 3.5119 3.6829 23.6906
0.0001 3.5011 3.6829 0.0007% 23.1534 2.27%
0.001 3.4203 3.6811 0.05% 19.6849 16.91%
0.01 3.0437 3.6403 1.16% 9.8944 58.23%
0.1 2.2091 3.3867 8.04% 2.1813 90.79%
in Figure 3.1, it is because the efficient frontiers reach the points representing
canonical utility maximizations. In contrast to mean-variance case that the ef-
ficient frontier will go to infinity when we set γ → 0, the expected utility in
utility-risk problem is bounded above by the expected utility in simple utility
maximization, thus there is always a limit point in the utility-risk efficient frontier,
where the limit point represents the case of γ = 0, i.e. solely utility maximization.
In the case in Figure 3.1(a), it becomes (3.443, 2.548).
3.4.4 Comparison between Variance and Semivariance
In this subsection, we compare the ratio of downside semivariance to upside semi-
variance (
E[(E[X]−X)2+]
E[(E[X]−X)2−]) and the corresponding trading strategy given a fixed utility
target between utility-variance and utility-semivariance investors.
In Figures 3.3 (a), utility-semivariance investor has smaller the ratio of down-
side semivariance to upside semivariance than utility-variance investor because the
former investor specially focus on reducing downside semivariance. Two curves
converge as the utility target increase, since risk aversion toward the deviation
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risks decrease and will tend to zero when the utility target reaches the optimal
utility value for solely utility maximization. In Figure 3.3 (b), utility-semivariance
investor has more conservative investment than utility-variance investor under the
same utility target.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we considered dynamic utility-deviation-risk portfolio selection
under a generalized model setting where the dynamics of asset prices can be
unspecified. Our generalized model can cover the discrete binomial tree model,
the continuous-time Black-Scholes model and stochastic interest rate model.
Under the complete market assumption in Assumption 3.1.7, we first converted
our dynamic optimization problem into an equivalent static problem by Theorem
3.1.9. We further derived Nonlinear Moment Problem, which includes a equation
involving terminal pricing kernel described in Assumption 3.1.6 and three equality
constraints on nonlinear moments, to characterize the optimal terminal wealth for
utility-risk problem. The corresponding necessary and sufficient optimality theo-
rems related to the Nonlinear Moment Problem were given in Theorems 3.2.3 and
3.2.5 respectively. Under the satisfaction of the Inada Conditions, we established
the existence of optimal solutions for utility-downside-risk problems, and utility-
strictly-convex-risk problems in Theorems 3.2.8 and 3.2.14 respectively under our
generalized framework. The existence and uniqueness of the optimal solution for
utility-risk problem have been resolved.
In Theorems 3.3.1 and 3.3.6, we established the continuity of optimal termi-
nal payoff in terminal pricing kernel in the sense that the sequence of optimal
terminal payoffs converges weakly as the terminal pricing kernels. The limit of
such sequence of payoffs is the terminal payoff under a market with the limit of
terminal pricing kernel. These convergence results were then applied to establish
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the weak convergence of optimal terminal payoffs from the discrete binomial tree
model to the continuous-time Black-Scholes model in Theorems 3.3.8 and 3.3.13.
As the result, we have a numerical algorithm to compute the optimal solution for
the continuous-time utility-risk problem numerically. In numerical examples in
Section 3.4, we observe that, after adding a risk management term such variance
or semivariance of the terminal payoff, the deviation risk incurred in the case of
solely utility maximization can be reduced by more than 90% with less than 10%
loss in utility as a trade-off.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 3.1: Utility-Risk Efficient Frontiers. (a) The comparison of utility-variance
efficient frontiers between different σ, (b) The comparison of utility-semivariance
efficient frontiers between different σ. Horizontal-axis represents variance in (a)
and semivariance in (b). Vertical-axis represents utility. Solid lines represent
σ = 0.1, dotted line represents σ = 0.2, and dashed lines represent σ = 0.4.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 3.2: Optimal Utility-Risk Portfolio. (a) The comparison of optimal control
at t = 0, pi∗(0), for utility-variance problem against risk aversion, γ, between
different σ. (b) The comparison of optimal control at t = 0 for utility-semivariance
problem against γ between different σ. Horizontal-axis represents γ. Vertical-axis
represents pi∗(0). Solid lines represent σ = 0.1, dotted lines represent σ = 0.2,
and dashed lines represent σ = 0.4.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 3.3: (a) The comparison of the ratio of downside semivariance to upside
semivariance,
E[(E[X]−X)2+]
E[(E[X]−X)2−] , against a given utility target, 2E[X
1/2] , between dif-
ferent deviation risk functions. (b) The comparison of optimal control at t = 0,
pi∗(0), against a given utility target, 2E[X1/2], between different risk functions.
Horizontal-axis represents 2E[X1/2]. Vertical-axis represents
E[(E[X]−X)2+]
E[(E[X]−X)2−] in (a)
and pi∗(0) in (b). Solid lines represent the case of variance and dashed lines rep-
resent the case of semivariance.
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Chapter 4
A Paradox in Time Consistency
in Mean-Variance Problem?
In Section 4.1.1, we shall introduce the market framework and the investors’ pref-
erence. The three solution approaches to tackle time inconsistent problems are
described and compared using the classical mean-variance problem in Section
4.1.2. In Section 4.1.3, we shall provide an overview of the theoretical results of
time-consistent mean-variance optimization under state-dependent risk-aversion
in Bensoussan et al. (2014) and Bjo¨rk et al. (2014) and the non-intuitive numer-
ical results in Bensoussan et al. (2014). In Section 4.2, we shall first list out the
sufficient conditions together with their economic implications, under which the
mentioned obscure phenomena will appear as shown in the main theorems stated
at the end of the section; namely, one can start off his/her constrained equilibrium
strategy at a certain time to beat the unconstrained counterpart (Theorem 4.2.4),
even more, the pure strategy of solely investing in bond can sometimes simul-
taneously dominate both constrained and unconstrained equilibrium strategies
(Theorems 4.2.5 and 4.2.6). In Section 4.3, we shall establish the main results.
Further numerical illustrations will be provided in Section 4.4; and we observe
that the constrained time-consistent strategy dominates the unconstrained one
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for over 90% of the whole time horizon. We finally conclude in Section 4.5.
4.1 Model Setting and Time Consistency
4.1.1 Market Model and Investors’ Preference
In this chapter, we adopt the continuous time framework as in Section 5 of Ben-
soussan et al. (2014). We fix a finite terminal time T > 0. Given the probability
space (Ω,F ,P), E denotes the expectation with respect to P, and Wt denotes
the standard one-dimensional P-Brownian motion which then generates a natural
filtration Ft := σ(Wt : s ≤ t) ∨N0 on F , where N0 is P-null set. We assume that
there are one bond and a single stock in the market. The dynamics of bond and
stock are given by:
dBt = rtBtdt, B0 = b0;
dSt = µtStdt+ σtStdWt, S0 = s0,
where rt is the riskless return rate, µt and σt are the appreciation and the volatility
rates of the stock respectively. Also assume that αt := µt − rt > 0. All market
parameters rt, αt and σt are time dependent, deterministic, differentiable, and
uniformly bounded on R, i.e. 0 < r ≤ rt ≤ r < ∞, 0 < α ≤ αt ≤ α < ∞, and
0 < σ ≤ αt ≤ σ <∞ for all t ∈ R. Let ut (the admissible control) be the amount
of money invested in the stock at time t. The dynamics of the controlled wealth
process is:
dXut = (rtX
u
t + αtut)dt+ σtutdWt, X
u
0 = x0. (4.1.1)
We now consider two different investors: unconstrained and constrained in-
vestors. The former one can shortsell both bond and stock; while the latter one
cannot. Their common objective function at the commencement t ∈ R with the
current wealth x > 0 is:
J(t, x;u) := Et,x[XuT ]−
γt
2x
V art,x[X
u
T ], (4.1.2)
122
4.1. Model Setting and Time Consistency
where Et,x and V art,x denote the conditional expectation and conditional variance
on the event {Xut = x}, and the risk aversion coefficient γt is assumed to be
positive, increasing, and differentiable in t ∈ R. Note that it is reasonable to
assume an increasing γt since people usually look for a more stable income when
they are getting elder, so they become more risk-averse, relative to the current
wealth, on their own terminal payoffs.
Furthermore, in this chapter, the admissible controls are confined to be Marko-
vian: ut = u(t,Xt), i.e. the admissible control is a function, which is a feedback
one, in both the current time t and the current wealth Xt only. The sole differ-
ence in the setting between unconstrained and constrained investors is the set of
admissible controls: the risky investment strategy of the unconstrained investor,
u(U)(t, x), can be chosen on R; while that of the constrained investor, u(C), is con-
fined by the shortselling prohibition, so that 0 ≤ u(C)(t, x) ≤ x. More precisely,
the collection of the admissible controls of the unconstrained and constrained
investors, A(U) and A(C), are defined respectively as follows:
A(U) :=
{
u(U) : R× R+ → R
∣∣∣u(U)(t, x) ∈ R} ;
A(C) :=
{
u(C) : R× R+ → R
∣∣∣0 ≤ u(C)(t, x) ≤ x} .
In summary, an unconstrained investor looks for an admissible strategy ut ∈
A(U) to maximize the objective function (4.1.2), where the portfolio wealth is
generated by dynamics (4.1.1). A constrained investor concerned a similar port-
folio management problem as the unconstrained investor except that the class of
admissible strategies is instead restricted to A(C).
The optimization problems of unconstrained and constrained investors are
both time-inconsistent (which will be elaborated in Section 4.1.2), and we seek
for time-consistent solutions for these optimization problems in Problems 4.1.7
and 4.1.9 in Section 4.1.3 respectively.
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4.1.2 Time Consistency and Mean-Variance Problems
In this section, we shall describe three solution approaches for time inconsistent
problems, namely: (i) precommitment; (ii) spendthrift; and (iii) game-theoretic.
And as an illustration on their usefulness, we shall compare them through the
celebrated classical mean-variance model.
(i) Precommitment Approach
For the precommitment approach, we fix an initial state and then find a max-
imizer for the objective function at that initial state; the maximizer is called
precommitment solution. Under this approach, the maximizer may depend on
initial states, then it may not be optimal for the objective function at any fu-
ture state. Hence, the solution obtained through precommitment approach is still
time-inconsistent.
Definition 4.1.1. Given a continuous-time Markovian control problem with an
objective function J(t, x;u) and an admissible control set A, ut0,x0 ∈ A is said to
be a precommitment strategy at (t0, x0) if
ut0,x0 := arg max
u∈A
J(t0, x0;u).
Example 4.1.2 (Time-Inconsistent Mean-Variance Problem, Li and Zhou (2000)).
Consider the following maximization problem:
max
u∈A(U)
J0(t0, x0;u), where J0(t, x;u) := Et,x[XuT ]− γV art,x[XuT ], (4.1.3)
subject to (4.1.1).
The precommitment solution, that maximize J0(t0, x0;u),
ut0,x0(t, x) = −αt
σ2t
(
x− e
∫ t
t0
rsds
[
x0 +
1
2γ
e
− ∫ Tt0
(
rs−α
2
s
σ2s
)
ds
])
. (4.1.4)
Since the maximizer ut0,x0 for mean-variance problem in Example 4.1.2 de-
pends on the initial state (t0, x0), so this problem is time-inconsistent. To be
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frank, The optimality of the precommitment solution only makes sense at only
one moment - the initial time. For instance, we know that ut0,x0 is optimal for
J(t0, x0;u), but u
t0,x0 may not be optimal for J
(
t1, X
ut0,x0
t1
;u
)
whenever t1 > t0,
which should be maximized by ut1,X
ut0,x0
t1 instead.
(ii) Spendthrift Approach
At (t1, x1), if an individual re-evaluate his plan and he has no commitment on
the plan, it should be rational for him to give up ut0,x0 and adopt ut1,x1 . If the plan
is re-evaluated continuously, any single plan ut0,x0 chosen can only have validity at
t0, and his actual strategy becomes u˜(t, x) := u
t,x(t, x) for (t, x) ∈ R2. In this case,
the agent keeps changing his strategy to the currently optimal one for every time
point, Strotz (1955) termed this behavior spendthrift and Pedersen and Peskir
(2015) termed the corresponding strategy dynamically optimal strategy:
Definition 4.1.3. Given a continuous-time Markovian control problem with an
objective function J(t, x;u) and an admissible control set A, u˜ ∈ A is said to be
a dynamically optimal strategy if
u˜(t, x) := ut,x(t, x) for (t, x) ∈ R2,
where
ut,x := arg max
u∈A
J(t, x;u), for each (t, x) ∈ R2
Under the spendthrift approach, the individual can apparently maintain his
objective value to be the maximum one, J(t, x;ut,x), over the whole time hori-
zon; however, it can actually never be the case. Indeed, the maximized objective
function value can only be achieved by the investor who commits to adopt the cor-
responding maximizing strategy without revising it at all future time points.
Hence, the investor who keeps changing his strategy to the currently optimal one
can never achieve the maximum objective value as specified at an earlier time.
For instance, J(t0, x0;u
t0,x0) is attained by the investor who adopts ut0,x0(t, x) for
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all t ∈ [t0, T ] and x ∈ R, but can never be attained by the investor who adopts
u˜(t, x) for t ∈ [t0, T ] and x ∈ R.
Nevertheless, the solution from the spendthrift approach is meaningful in some
aspects. First, as mentioned in Strotz (1955), this spendthrift strategy is adopted
by any individual who cannot be aware of the time-inconsistency matter or has
no intention on resolving this inconsistency issue. Thus, this myopic individual
always revises his strategy to satisfy his contemporary desire. Indeed, u˜ is inde-
pendent of the initial states, so it is time-consistent. In particular, Pedersen
and Peskir (2015) treated u˜ as a time-consistent strategy:
Example 4.1.4 (Time-Consistent Mean-Variance Problem (Spendthrift), Peder-
sen and Peskir (2015)). Consider the following portfolio selection problem:
max
u∈A(U)
J0(t0, x0;u), where J0(t, x;u) is defined in (4.1.3), subject to (4.1.1),
the dynamically optimal solution (under Definition 4.1.3 with objective function
J0 and admissible set A(U)) is:
u˜(t, x) =
αt
2γσ2t
e
− ∫ Tt (rs−α2sσ2s
)
ds
. (4.1.5)
The solution under the spendthrift notion u˜ can be obtained from the pre-
commitment solution ut0,x0 by replacing the initial states (t0, x0) by the current
states (t, x). Therefore, the solutions under precommitment and spendthrift can
be obtained by the same mathematical arguments. The difference between the
two notions is how to implement the mathematical solution: whether or not the
investor will revise his strategy during the re-evaluation in some future time points.
As the mathematical context for spendthrift strategy is essentially the same
as the precommitment strategy, the spendthrift strategy is mostly considered as
the strategy adopted by the investor who cannot be aware the time inconsistency
issues, the spendthrift strategy is perceived to be inferior and its effect on actual
behavior in market trading is usually overlooked which is only partially covered in
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the literature. The spendthrift strategy was mainly studied in order to compare
with other strategies, such as precommitment and equilibrium strategies, under
various time inconsistent problems: Pollak (1968) for Ramsey’s consumption and
saving problem, Mar´ın-Solano and Navas (2010) for Merton’s consumption and
investment problem, and Pedersen and Peskir (2015) for Mean-variance problem.
(iii) Game-theoretic Approach
Alternatively, game-theoretic approach is more widely used to recommend a
time-consistent solution. This approach purposely seeks for a solution that one
will consistently follow but it is not the ultimate maximizer. Under this approach,
the portfolio selection problem is converted into a non-cooperative intertemporal
game, in which every time point in the time horizon is represented by the corre-
sponding time player. The time player chooses his strategy, which becomes the
portfolio allocation at the time point he representing, to maximize the objective
function at this time point. The strategies by all time players form a solution path
for the original dynamic optimization problem. After formulating the game, the
Nash equilibrium of the intertemporal game is then obtained and utilized to be
a time-consistent solution, called equilibrium solution, for the portfolio selection
problem (see Table 4.1). At the equilibrium point, all the time players have no
incentive to choose the strategy other than uˆ given that all later time players have
chosen their own equilibrium ones. Hence, the equilibrium control is a solution
that we will consistently follow over time and thus time-consistent.
The following definition of equilibrium control is provided by Ekeland and
Pirvu (2008) as a time-consistent solution for continuous-time control problem:
Definition 4.1.5 (Ekeland and Pirvu (2008)). Given a continuous-time Marko-
vian control problem with an objective function J(t, x;u) and an admissible con-
trol set A, a Markovian control uˆ ∈ A is said to be an equilibrium control if for
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Non-cooperative game Dynamic optimization
Time player t Time point t
Objective function of Player t Objective function at t, J(t, x;u)
Strategy by Player t Portfolio at t, ut ∈ R
Strategies by all players Solution path over time horizon, u : [0, T ]× R+ → R
Nash equilibrium Time-consistent solution
Table 4.1: The Construction of Non-cooperative Game Problem under Game-
theoretic Approach
every admissible u ∈ A,
lim inf
h→0+
J(t, x; uˆ)− J(t, x;uh)
h
≥ 0, for any t < T and x ∈ R, (4.1.6)
where uh is given by
uh(s, x) :=
u(s, x), for t ≤ s < t+ h, x > 0;uˆ(s, x), for t+ h ≤ s ≤ T, x > 0.
With the equilibrium control, we can further define the equilibrium value function,
V (t, x) := J(t, x; uˆ), attained at uˆ.
To solve a dynamic optimization problem using game-theoretic approach, we
look for an admissible solution satisfying Definition 4.1.5. This precise definition
allows us to find a time-consistent solution for dynamic decision problems through
modeling the equivalent stochastic control problems. To elaborate Definition 4.1.5
using the language of game theory, we consider our dynamic optimization problem
as a non-cooperative game problem with a continuum of players: For each t ∈
[0, T ], there is a time player, player t, who chooses a strategy u(t) (only at t;
the state variable is omitted) to maximize his objective function J(t;u) which
depends not only on u(t), the strategy chosen by player t, but also on all u(s)
with s ≥ t, the strategies chosen by player s. Following the notion of equilibrium
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control in Definition 4.1.5, provided that all players s > t have already chosen uˆ, it
is optimal for the player t to also choose uˆ. Based on this game with a continuum
of players, the time-consistent strategy of the original dynamic optimization can
be defined using the concept of a “subgame perfect Nash equilibrium point”. For
further motivations of Definition 4.1.5, one can consult the works by Peleg and
Yaari (1973), Ekeland and Pirvu (2008), and Bjo¨rk and Murgoci (2010).
For the application of time-consistent solution approach to mean-variance set-
ting, Basak and Chabakauri (2010) and Bjo¨rk and Murgoci (2010) are the first to
obtain the equilibrium solution:
Example 4.1.6 (Time-Consistent Mean-Variance Problem (Equilibrium Solu-
tion), Basak and Chabakauri (2010) and Bjo¨rk and Murgoci (2010)). Consider
the following portfolio selection problem:
max
u∈A(U)
J0(t0, x0;u), where J0(t, x;u) is defined in (4.1.3), subject to (4.1.1),
the equilibrium solution (under Definition 4.1.5 with objective function J0 and
admissible set A(U)) is:
uˆ(t, x) =
αt
2γσ2t
e−
∫ T
t rsds. (4.1.7)
Although the solutions obtained from both spendthrift and game theoretic
approaches are time-consistent, they are completely different. The value functions
of dynamically optimal and equilibrium strategies are established respectively in
Pedersen and Peskir (2015) and Bjo¨rk and Murgoci (2010) as follows:
V˜ (t, x) := J(t, x; u˜) = e
∫ T
t rsdsx+
1
2γ
(
e
∫ T
t
α2s
σ2s
ds − 1
4
e
2
∫ T
t
α2s
σ2s
ds − 3
4
)
,
Vˆ (t, x) := J(t, x; uˆ) = e
∫ T
t rsdsx+
1
4γ
∫ T
t
α2s
σ2s
ds,
where u˜ and uˆ are given in (4.1.5) and (4.1.7) respectively.
By an immediate application of the mean-value theorem, the value function
evaluated at the equilibrium strategy is actually greater than that at dynamically
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Figure 4.1: The value functions of dynamically optimal solution, V˜ (t, 1) (solid
line) and equilibrium solution, Vˆ (t, 1) (dashed line), against the current time t.
optimal strategy:
Vˆ (t, x)− V˜ (t, x) = 1
2γ
(
1
2
∫ T
t
α2s
σ2s
ds− e
∫ T
t
α2s
σ2s
ds
+
1
4
e
2
∫ T
t
α2s
σ2s
ds
+
3
4
)
=
1
2γ
(∫ T
t
α2s
σ2s
ds
)(
1
2
− eη + 1
2
e2η
)
> 0,
for some η ∈
(
0,
∫ T
t
α2s
σ2s
ds
)
. A numerical illustration is shown in Figure 4.1 with
rt = 0.03, µt = 0.1, and σt = 0.2 for all t ∈ [0, 10] and γ = 1, x = 1, and T =
10, where the value functions of dynamically optimal and equilibrium solutions,
V˜ (t, x) and Vˆ (t, x), are shown. The dynamically optimal solution has a greater
expected value, as this spendthrift solution actually always suggests to invest more
in risky asset than that using the equilibrium solution. However, in the meanwhile,
this more aggressive strategy will also give a greater variance in magnitude than
that under the equilibrium strategy. In sum, the value function of the dynamically
optimal solution, which the investor concerns, will be smaller than that using
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equilibrium solution.
To the best of our knowledge, the comparative study on the performance
between equilibrium and dynamically optimal strategies has been up to specific
time-inconsistent problems. We here illustrate that difference in performance
through the classical mean-variance models; nevertheless, we still look forward to
the further similar analysis over the general time-inconsistent settings, and up to
this point, we cannot completely claim on which one could be uniformly better
than another. From our viewpoint, the importance of spendthrift approach is
not to provide a strategy which gives out a better objective value, but to mimic
the actual behavior in the market. Most practitioners are not aware about the
time inconsistency issues, so they usually behave as spendthrift strategy. The
inferior performance of the spendthrift strategy may explain why the managers in
the market perform weaker than widely expected, because they are incapable of
refraining from their deeply rooted inconsistent and spendthrift habit. Therefore,
the study on spendthrift strategy is subtle. It may explain the actual behavioral
bias of practitioners and helps us to look for superior strategy that transcends
against the “market”.
In this chapter, we shall concern on the equilibrium solution from the game-
theoretic approach only and treat it as the time-consistent solution. In the next
subsection, we shall introduce the motivation behind our observed paradoxical
results that appear in (time-consistent) equilibrium approach.
4.1.3 Motivation: Time-Consistent Mean-Variance Opti-
mization with Wealth-Dependent Risk Aversion
Note that, when the risk aversion stays constant over the whole time horizon, the
equilibrium solution for the classical mean-variance problem as shown in Example
4.1.6 is state-independent. Later, Bjo¨rk et al. (2014) discovered that, under a
more realistic mean-variance framework under which the risk aversion is inversely
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proportional to the current wealth, the equilibrium solution varies linearly with
the current wealth, and hence the solution is state-dependent which seems more
economically sounding. More precisely, Bjo¨rk et al. (2014) studied the following
time-consistent optimization problem:
Problem 4.1.7 (Unconstrained investor’s problem, Bjo¨rk et al. (2014)). Find an
equilibrium control uˆ(U) ∈ A(U) according to Definition 4.1.5, where the objective
function J is given by (4.1.2), and the portfolio wealth is generated by dynamics
(4.1.1), and the admissible class is given by A(U).
Bjo¨rk et al. (2014) characterized the equilibrium solution by the extended HJB
equations systems, and then, by using a suitable Ansatz, a semi-explicit form of
the equilibrium solution could be obtained:
Theorem 4.1.8 (Theorem 4.6 in Bjo¨rk et al. (2014)). The equilibrium solution
to Problem 4.1.7 is given by uˆ(U)(t, x) = c
(U)
t x, where c
(U)
t satisfies the following
integral equation:
c
(U)
t =
αt
σ2t
d
(U)
t ;
d
(U)
t =
1
γt
e
− ∫ Tt (rs+αsc(U)s +σ2s(c(U)s )2)ds + e− ∫ Tt σ2s
(
c
(U)
s
)2
ds − 1,
(4.1.8)
The equilibrium value function is given by
V (U)(t, x) = e
∫ T
t (rs+αsc
(U)
s )dsx− γt
2
(
e
∫ T
t 2(rs+αsc
(U)
s )+σ
2
s
(
c
(U)
s
)2
ds − e
∫ T
t 2(rs+αsc
(U)
s )ds
)
x.
(4.1.9)
Since there is no shortselling restrictions in Problem 4.1.7, the equilibrium
control uˆ(C) in Theorem 4.1.8 can take value outside the range of [0, x], i.e. the
investor can shortsell when he implements the equilibrium strategy. However,
the shortselling in discrete framework as in Bjo¨rk and Murgoci (2014) can cause
the wealth in the next period to take a non-positive value, making the mean-
variance maximization problem with wealth-dependent risk version ill-posed, and
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this observation was explained in detail in Bensoussan et al. (2014). Therefore, in
Bensoussan et al. (2014), we looked for an equilibrium solution for mean-variance
problem with wealth-dependent risk aversion subject to the shortselling prohibi-
tion on both stock and bond as recall as below again:
Problem 4.1.9 (Constrained investor’s problem, Bensoussan et al. (2014)). Find
an equilibrium control uˆ(C) ∈ A(C) according to Definition 4.1.5, where the ob-
jective function J is given by (4.1.2), where the portfolio wealth is generated by
dynamics (4.1.1), and the admissible class is given by A(C).
Remark 4.1.10. The objective functions in Problems 4.1.7 and 4.1.9 are the
same, their only difference is the admissible set. With different admissible set, the
equilibrium solution obtained are different. As we are not seeking for the ultimate
maximizer, it is not necessary that the equilibrium solution with larger admissible
set can achieve a greater objective value.
By solving the extended HJB system for the constrained Problem 4.1.9, Ben-
soussan et al. (2014) obtained an equilibrium solution:
Theorem 4.1.11 (Theorem 6.1 in Bensoussan et al. (2014)). The equilibrium
solution to Problem 4.1.7 is given by uˆ(C)(t, x) = c
(C)
t x, where c
(C)
t satisfies the
following integral equation:
c
(C)
t = G
(
αt
σ2t
d
(C)
t
)
;
d
(C)
t =
1
γt
e
− ∫ Tt (rs+αsc(C)s +σ2s(c(C)s )2)ds + e− ∫ Tt σ2s
(
c
(C)
s
)2
ds − 1,
(4.1.10)
where G is a layer function defined as:
G(x) :=

1 if x > 1,
x if x ∈ [0, 1],
0 if x < 0.
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Equilibrium objective value for different investors
in different T with t = 0, x = 1.
Investor Unconstrained Constrained
T=1 1.2839 1.2069
T=10 2.4730 4.1623
T=20 5.3994 9.0910
T=50 78.8514 128.2294
Table 4.2: The Counter-intuitive Numerical Observation in Bensoussan et al.
(2014).
The equilibrium value function is given by
V (C)(t, x) = e
∫ T
t (rs+αsc
(C)
s )dsx− γt
2
(
e
∫ T
t 2(rs+αsc
(C)
s )+σ
2
s
(
c
(C)
s
)2
ds − e
∫ T
t 2(rs+αsc
(C)
s )ds
)
x.
(4.1.11)
In the numerical studies in Bensoussan et al. (2014), we further compare the
performances of equilibrium strategies adopted by unconstrained and constrained
investors; their semi-explicit forms are those stated in Theorems 4.1.8 and 4.1.11.
In Bensoussan et al. (2014), we fixed r = 0.05, µ = 0.2, σ = 0.2, and
γ(t;T ) :=
1
1 + e−0.1(t−T )
,
we observed that the constrained investor can acquire a greater mean-variance
objective value than that of the unconstrained investor as quoted in Table 4.2.
These numerical observation is surprising because whatever the constrained
investor can do, it is supposed that the unconstrained investor can do the same.
Therefore, we expect that the unconstrained investor should perform better than
his constrained counterpart.
Motivated by our counter-intuitive numerical observation, in this chapter, we
shall provide an analytical support to these non-intuitive numerical observations.
134
4.2. Main Results
We investigate the economically meaningful conditions under which the same
non-typical phenomenon reappear: the constrained investor dominates the un-
constrained investor. An analytical comparison on the equilibrium mean-variance
value functions for unconstrained and constrained investors will be demonstrated.
Furthermore, we shall compare the performance of equilibrium strategies (for both
constrained and unconstrained investors) with the pure strategy of solely investing
in bond.
4.2 Main Results
We set the following conditions for our paradoxical main results :
Condition 4.2.1.
αT
σ2T
> γT .
Condition 4.2.2. There exists δ0 > 0 such that
r − γ
′
t
γt
+
min
{(
αt
σ2t
)′
, 0
}
αt
σ2t
> δ0 for all t ∈ R.
We further set a more relaxing condition replacing Condition 4.2.2:
Condition 4.2.3. There exists δ1 > 0 such that
r − γ
′
t
γt
> δ1 for all t ∈ R.
Obviously, for taking δ1 ≥ δ0 > 0, Condition 4.2.2 implies Condition 4.2.3,
and Condition 4.2.3 implies that γT e
−(r−δ1)(T−t) ≤ γt ≤ γT for all t ≤ T .
Assume that the riskfree rate rt, the appreciation rate µt and the volatility
σt of the stock is constant over t. In Shiryaev et al. (2008) (also see Du Toit
and Peskir, 2009), the ratio α
σ2
is described as the “goodness index” of the stock,
which justifies a particular stock on whether it should be sold-at-once or bought-
and-hold. In particular, they showed that if the ratio α
σ2
≥ 1
2
, the investor should
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hold the stock until the expiry of the predetermined time horizon; otherwise, he
should sell the stock at once (i.e. to invest solely in bond). The strategy based on
such “goodness index” can maximize the expected ratio of the discounted stock
selling price to the ultimate maximum over the planned time horizon. Hence,
the ratio α
σ2
can indicate the favorable performance or not of the stock over the
bond. Our Condition 4.2.1 can be interpreted as comparing whether the terminal
performance of the stock is beyond the investor’s own risk aversion γT at the
expiry. Loosely speaking, it is expected that the validity of Condition 4.2.1 would
normally encourage the investor to buy more stock as the outperformance of the
stock may compensate his fear towards risk.
Condition 4.2.2 can be interpreted as comparing whether the sum of the rela-
tive decrease in “goodness index” and the relative increase in risk aversion coeffi-
cient is bounded above by the riskfree rate. When the market is going well, most
investors have an optimistic anticipation on the continuing market appreciation,
their risk aversion of the investor should expect to enjoy a more gentle progres-
sive growth over time, while the “goodness index” of the stock against the bond
should show a better performance in the future. In reality, in order to avoid any
irrational exuberance in the security market during the rapid economic boom, it
is common to set the riskfree rate high enough to slow down any over-investment.
In this case, Condition 4.2.2 is likely to be satisfied.
In contrast, in a lull market, investors’ pessimistic view on the market growth
guides them to have a substantial increase in risk aversion over time while the stock
may probably possess a sharp decline in its own “goodness index”; to remedy the
economic downturn, reducing borrowing interest rate can help to boost up the
investment environment. Hence, Condition 4.2.2 is less likely to be satisfied in a
weak market.
In the financial world, it is commonly observed that under a growing mar-
ket, such that Conditions 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 could be naturally satisfied as discussed
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above, would prefer investors to hold a relatively larger proportion in stock, while
any restriction on shortselling will set extra hurdle for investors on leveraging to
a more decent profit. However, our mathematical result demonstrates a paradox-
ical claim that any time-consistent investor should sometimes prefer the confined
strategy even when the market goes very well: under Conditions 4.2.1 and 4.2.2,
the constrained strategy dominates the unconstrained one.
Theorem 4.2.4. Under Conditions 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, there exists some t < T such
that V (C)(t, x) > V (U)(t, x) for all x > 0.
Its proof will be given in Section 4.3.2. Note that the expression of the equilib-
rium mean-variance value functions for unconstrained and constrained investors,
denoted by V (U) and V (C) respectively, are given in Theorems 4.1.8 and 4.1.11.
As a relatively less restrictive version of Condition 4.2.2, Condition 4.2.3 can be
interpreted as comparing whether the relative increase in risk aversion coefficient is
bounded above by the riskfree rate. Again, the latter condition is likely to appear
when the market is performing well, which can be argued as above for Condition
4.2.2. Similarly, in the prevailing understanding of the market behavior, investors
should allocate at least a noticeable portion in stock, especially in a very good
economy. However, the following two main theorems provide another paradoxical,
yet mathematically precise, assertion that the time-consistent strategy, no matter
confined or unconfined one, is sometimes beaten by the pure strategy of solely
investing in bond even in a well-performed market:
Theorem 4.2.5. Under Condition 4.2.3, there exists a t∗ < T such that V (Rf)(t, x) >
V (U)(t, x) for all x > 0 and t < t∗, where V (Rf) is value function of the pure strat-
egy of solely investing in bond given by
V (Rf)(t, x) := e
∫ T
t rsdsx. (4.2.12)
Theorem 4.2.6. Under Condition 4.2.3, there exists a t† < T such that V (Rf)(t, x) >
V (C)(t, x) for all x > 0 and t < t†, where V (Rf) is given in (4.2.12)
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Their proofs of above theorems will be given in Sections 4.3.3 and 4.3.4 re-
spectively.
4.3 Proof of Main Results
Note that the ratios of investment to wealth of equilibrium strategy for uncon-
strained and constrained investors, denoted by c(U) and c(C) respectively, are given
by (4.1.8) in Theorem 4.1.8 and (4.1.10) in Theorem 4.1.11; the corresponding
equilibrium mean-variance value functions for unconstrained and constrained in-
vestors, denoted by V (U) and V (C) respectively, are given by (4.1.9) and (4.1.11).
4.3.1 Preliminary Lemmas for Main Theorems
Before we proceed to the proof of the main theorems, we first establish some
preliminary lemmas.
4.3.1.1 Unconstrained case
We first establish that under Conditions 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, the ratio of investment
to wealth, c
(U)
t , is increasing in t whenever one is holding some of the stock at t;
similar results for d
(U)
t hold under Condition 4.2.3:
Lemma 4.3.1. (i) Suppose that Conditions 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 hold. For any t ≤ T ,
whenever c
(U)
t > 0, we have
(
c
(U)
t
)′
> 0, i.e. c
(U)
t is increasing corresponding
to those t’s. Hence,
c
(U)
t ≤ c(U) :=
α
γTσ2
, for all ∞ < t ≤ T (4.3.13)
(ii) Suppose that Condition 4.2.3 holds. For any t ≤ T , whenever d(U)t > −σ
2
t
α2t
δ1,
we have
(
d
(U)
t
)′
> 0.
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Proof. (
c
(U)
t
)′
=
(
αt
σ2t
){
1
γt
(
rt + αtc
(U)
t + σ
2
t
(
c
(U)
t
)2
− γ
′
t
γt
)
e
− ∫ Tt (rs+αsc(U)s +σ2s(c(U)s )2)ds
+σ2t
(
c
(U)
t
)2
e
− ∫ Tt σ2s(c(U)s )2ds}+ (αt
σ2t
)′
d
(U)
t
>
αt
σ2t
(rt + αtc(U)t − γ′tγt
)
+
min
{(
αt
σ2t
)′
, 0
}
αt
σ2t

×
(
1
γt
e
− ∫ Tt (rs+αsc(U)s +σ2s(c(U)s )2)ds)
> 0. (4.3.14)
The first inequality follows because d
(U)
t is positively proportional to c
(U)
t by (4.1.8)
and so d
(U)
t > 0, and e
− ∫ Tt σ2s(c(U)s )2ds − 1 < 0. The last inequality follows after
Condition 4.2.2. By (4.3.14), we have c
(U)
t ≤ c(U)T = αTγT σ2T ≤
α
γT σ2
= c(U), so the
second assertion in (i) follows. The case in (ii) can also be proven similarly.
For any k ∈ (0, 1
γT
), define
τ
(U)
k := sup
{
t < T
∣∣d(U)t = k} ∈ [−∞, T ). (4.3.15)
Note that Lemma 4.3.1 (ii) implies that d
(U)
t > k if and only if t > τ
(U)
k . We shall
then establish some finite upper and lower bounds for τ
(U)
k as follows.
Lemma 4.3.2. Suppose that Condition 4.2.3 holds. For any k ∈
(
0, 1
γT
)
, τ
(U)
k ≤
τ
(U)
k ≤ τ (U)k , where τ (U)k is given by (4.3.15),
T − τ (U)k := min
{
1
δ1
ln
[
1
γTk
]
,
σ2
k2α2
ln
[
1 + 1
γT
1 + k
]}
,
T − τ (U)k :=
1
r + αc(U) + σ2
(
c(U)
)2 ln
[
1 + 1
γT
1 + k
]
,
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and c(U) is defined in (4.3.13).
Proof. Since d(U) is increasing by Lemma 4.3.1 (ii), we have c
(U)
t =
αt
σ2t
d
(U)
t ≤
α
σ2
d
(U)
T ≤ c(U). By considering (4.1.8), for any t such that d(U)t > 0, we have
e
−
(
r+αc(U)+σ2
(
c(U)
)2)
(T−t)
(
1 +
1
γT
)
− 1
≤ d(U)t ≤ min
{
e−
α2
σ2
k2(T−max{t,τ (U)k })
(
1 +
1
γT
)
− 1, e
−δ1(T−t)
γT
}
.(4.3.16)
By taking t = τ
(U)
k in the last-handed inequality in (4.3.16), we have
d
(U)
τ
(U)
k
≥ e−
(
r+αc(U)+σ2
(
c(U)
)2)(
T−τ (U)k
)(
1 +
1
γT
)
− 1 = k,
then τ
(U)
k ≤ τ (U)k follows by recalling that d(U) is increasing in accordance with
Lemma 4.3.1 (ii).
To show that τ
(U)
k ≤ τ (U)k , we consider two cases: (i) T − τ (U)k = 1δ1 ln
[
1
kγT
]
;
(ii) T − τ (U)k = σ
2
k2α2
ln
[
1+ 1
γT
1+k
]
.
(i) By taking t = τ
(U)
k in the right-handed inequality in (4.3.16), we have
d
(U)
τ
(U)
k
≤ e
−δ1
(
T−τ (U)k
)
γT
= k,
then τ
(U)
k ≥ τ (U)k follows by recalling that d(U) is increasing in light of Lemma
4.3.1 (ii).
(ii) Assume the contrary that τ
(U)
k < τ
(U)
k . Since d
(U) is strictly increasing
according to Lemma 4.3.1 (ii), d
(U)
τ
(U)
k
> d
(U)
τ
(U)
k
= k, where the last equality
is due to the definition of τ
(U)
k in (4.3.15). On the other hand, by taking
t = τ
(U)
k in the right-handed inequality in (4.3.16) and using the assumption
that τ
(U)
k < τ
(U)
k , we have
d
(U)
τ
(U)
k
≤ e−
α2
σ2
k2
(
T−max
{
τ
(U)
k ,τ
(U)
k
})(
1 +
1
γT
)
− 1
= e
−α2
σ2
k2
(
T−τ (U)k
)(
1 +
1
γT
)
− 1 = k,
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which leads to a contradiction.
Hence, both cases can result in τ
(U)
k ≥ τ (U)k .
By Lemma 4.3.2, for t ≤ τ (U)k , we have
1− e−
∫ T
t σ
2
s
(
c
(U)
s
)2
ds
> 1− e−α
2
σ2
k2(T−τ (U)k ) ≥ 1− e−
α2
σ2
k2
(
T−τ (U)k
)
=: pk,
(4.3.17)
and so pk = 1−
(
1+k
1+ 1
γT
) α2k2
σ2
(
r+αc(U)+σ2(c(U))
2
)
.
Define k∗ such that pk∗ = maxk∈
(
0, 1
γT
) pk. Next, we shall show that d(U)t will have
a negative upper bound for large enough T − t. Define
−L∗ := max
{
−δ1σ
2
2α2
,−pk∗
2
}
< 0 and τ ∗ := sup
{
t < T
∣∣d(U)t = −L∗} ∈ [−∞, T ),
(4.3.18)
Lemma 4.3.3. Suppose that Condition 4.2.3 holds. T − τ ∗ ≤ T − τ ∗, where
T − τ ∗ := max
{
2
δ1
ln
[
2
γT pk∗
]
, T − τ (U)k∗
}
and, τ ∗ and τ (U)k are defined in (4.3.18)
and (4.3.15) respectively.
Proof. Assume the contrary that τ ∗ < τ ∗, by the fact that d(U)t > L
∗ for all
t ∈ [τ ∗, T ) in accordance with Lemma 4.3.1 (ii), we have c(U)t > −αtσ2t L
∗. On the
other hand, we have
1
γτ∗
e
− ∫ Tτ∗ (rs+αsc(U)s +σ2s(c(U)s )2)ds < 1
γT
e
−
(
δ1−α2
σ2
L∗
)
(T−τ∗) ≤ 1
γT
e−
1
2
δ1(T−τ∗) ≤ pk∗
2
;
indeed, the first inequality follows from Condition 4.2.3 and the fact that c
(U)
t >
−αt
σ2t
L∗ for all t ∈ [τ ∗, T ); while the second and third inequalities follow from the
definitions of L∗ and τ ∗ respectively.
Since τ ∗ ≤ τ (U)k∗ , then by (4.3.17), we have
d
(U)
τ∗ =
1
γτ∗
e
− ∫ Tτ∗ (rs+αsc(U)s +σ2s(c(U)s )2)ds + e− ∫ Tτ∗ σ2s
(
c
(U)
s
)2
ds − 1 < −pk∗
2
≤ −L∗,
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Figure 4.2: The graphical illustration for τ ∗, τ ∗, τ (U)k , τ
(U)
k and τ
(U)
k . The black line
represents d
(U)
t . τ
(U)
k , τ
(U)
k and τ
(U)
k are defined in Lemma 4.3.2. L
∗, τ ∗ and τ ∗ are
defined in 4.3.4.
which contradicts that τ ∗ < τ ∗.
Lemma 4.3.4. Suppose that Condition 4.2.3 holds. d
(U)
t ≤ −L∗ for all t < τ ∗,
where L∗ and τ ∗ are defined in (4.3.18).
Proof. Since −L∗ > − δ1σ2t
α2t
and
(
d
(U)
t
)′
> 0 whenever d
(U)
t > − δ1σ
2
t
α2t
by Lemma
4.3.1 (ii), so d
(U)
t ≤ −L∗ for all t ≤ τ ∗, hence our claim follows.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the relative magnitude between τ ∗, τ ∗, τ (U)k , τ
(U)
k and τ
(U)
k .
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4.3.1.2 Constrained case
The results established in the previous subsection are also valid for the constrained
setting. The following lemma can be proven using the same argument as Lemma
4.3.1.
Lemma 4.3.5. (i) Suppose that Conditions 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 hold. For any t ≤
T , whenever c
(C)
t ∈ (0, 1), we have
(
c
(C)
t
)′
> 0, i.e. c
(C)
t is increasing
corresponding to those t’s.
(ii) Suppose that Condition 4.2.3 holds. For any t ≤ T , whenever d(C)t > −σ
2
t
α2t
δ1,
we have
(
d
(C)
t
)′
> 0.
For any k ∈
(
0,min
{
1
γT
, σ
2
α
})
, define
τ
(C)
k := sup
{
t < T
∣∣d(C)t = k} ∈ [−∞, T ), (4.3.19)
we shall then establish some finite upper and lower bounds for τ
(C)
k as follows
using the same argument as Lemma 4.3.2.
Lemma 4.3.6. Suppose that Condition 4.2.3 holds. For any k ∈
(
0,min
{
1
γT
, σ
2
α
})
,
τ
(C)
k ≤ τ (C)k ≤ τ (C)k , where τ (C)k is defined in (4.3.19),
T − τ (C)k := T − τ (U)k = min
{
1
δ1
ln
[
1
γTk
]
,
σ2
k2α2
ln
[
1 + 1
γT
1 + k
]}
,
T − τ (C)k :=
1
r + α + σ2
ln
[
1 + 1
γT
1 + k
]
.
By Lemma 4.3.6, for t < τ
(C)
k , we have
1− e−
∫ T
t σ
2
s
(
c
(C)
s
)2
ds
> 1− e−
α2
σ2
k2
(
T−τ (C)k
)
=: qk, (4.3.20)
and so qk = 1−
(
1+k
1+ 1
γT
) α2k2
σ2(r+α+σ2)
. Define k† such that qk† = maxk∈
(
0,min
{
1
γT
,σ
2
α
}) qk.
Similar to the unconstrained case, we shall show that c
(C)
t will be zero for large
enough T − t.
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Figure 4.3: The graphical illustration for τ †, τ †, τ (C)k , τ
(C)
k and τ
(C)
k . The black
line represents d
(C)
t . τ
(C)
k , τ
(C)
k and τ
(C)
k are defined in Lemma 4.3.6. τ
† :=
sup
{
t < T
∣∣d(C)t = 0} and τ † are defined in Lemma 4.3.7.
Lemma 4.3.7. Suppose that Condition 4.2.3 holds. c
(C)
t = 0 for all t < τ
†, where
T − τ † := max
{
1
δ1
ln
[
1
γT qk†
]
, T − τ (C)
k†
}
, and τ
(C)
k is defined in (4.3.19).
Proof. By (4.3.20), for any t < τ † ≤ τ (C)
k† ,
d
(C)
t =
1
γt
e
− ∫ Tt (rs+αsc(C)s +σ2s(c(C)s )2)ds + e− ∫ Tt σ2s
(
c
(C)
s
)2
ds− 1 < 1
γT
e−δ1(T−τ
†)− qk† ≤ 0,
where the second last term being less than zero is followed by the fact that T−τ † ≥
1
δ1
ln
[
1
γT qk†
]
.
Figure 4.3 illustrates the relative magnitude between τ †, τ †, τ (C)k , τ
(C)
k and τ
(C)
k ,
where τ † := sup
{
t < T
∣∣d(C)t = 0} ∈ [−∞, T ).
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4.3.2 Proof of Theorem 4.2.4
Define
t0 := sup
{
t < T
∣∣ ∫ T
t
αs
(
c(U)s − c(C)s
)
ds = 0
}
∈ [−∞, T ), (4.3.21)
in particular, t0 = −∞ means
∫ T
t
αs
(
c
(U)
s − c(C)s
)
ds > 0 for all t < T . Under
Condition 4.2.1, it is obvious that 1 = c
(C)
T < c
(U)
T =
αT
γT σ
2
T
(i.e. the unconstrained
investor will shortsell bond to buy more stock at T ), thus by the continuity of c’s,∫ T
t
αs
(
c(U)s − c(C)s
)
ds > 0 when t is close enough to T. (4.3.22)
We now establish that the constrained solution can outperform the uncon-
strained one when the investor commences the strategies at t0; for the justification
of the existence of a finite t0, it will be shown in Proposition 4.3.10.
Proposition 4.3.8. Given that Conditions 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 hold. With such a
finite t0 < T defined in (4.3.21), we have that V
(C)(t0, x) > V
(U)(t0, x) for all
x > 0.
Define
t1 := sup
{
t < T
∣∣c(U)t = c(C)t } ∈ [−∞, T ). (4.3.23)
Before we proceed on its proof, we first establish the following useful lemma:
Lemma 4.3.9. Under Conditions 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, the followings hold:
(i) t1 ∈ (t0, T ); (ii) c(C)t = 1 for all t ∈ [t1, T ]; (iii) There exists  > 0 such
that c
(U)
t < c
(C)
t for all t ∈ (t1 − , t1); (iv) c(U)t < c(C)t for all t ∈ (t0, t1).
Proof. (i) Assume the contrary that t1 ≤ t0, c(C)t < c(U)t for all t ∈ (t0, T ), then∫ T
t0
αs
(
c
(U)
s − c(C)s
)
ds > 0, which contradicts to the definition of t0.
(ii) Since c
(C)
t < c
(U)
t for all t ∈ (t1, T ), by (4.1.8) and (4.1.10), we have αtσ2t d
(C)
t >
αt
σ2t
d
(U)
t = c
(U)
t ≥ c(C)t for all t ∈ (t1, T ), which implies that G takes its
maximum value 1 and so c
(C)
t = 1 for all t ∈ (t1, T ).
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(iii) By the proof of (ii),
αt1
σ2t1
d
(C)
t1 > 1. The continuity of d ensures that there
exists 1 > 0 such that c
(C)
t = 1 for all t ∈ (t1 − 1, t1). By Lemma 4.3.1(i),(
c
(U)
t1
)′
> 0 implies that there exists 2 > 0 such that c
(U)
t < 1 = c
(C)
t for all
t ∈ (t1 − 2, t1). The result follows by choosing  := min {1, 2}.
(iv) By Lemma 4.3.5 (ii) and (4.1.10),
(
σ2t
αt
c
(C)
t
)′
≥ 0 for all t ∈ (−∞, T ] almost
everywhere (except t = τ † or t = inf
{
t
∣∣c(C)t = 1}). Assume the contrary,
so as there exists t2 := sup
{
t < t1
∣∣c(U)t = c(C)t } ∈ (t0, t1). By (iii), we have
that c
(U)
t > c
(C)
t for all t ∈ (t1, T ) and c(U)t < c(C)t for all t ∈ (t2, t1). Then∫ T
t2
σ2s
((
c(U)s
)2 − (c(C)s )2) ds
= 2
∫ T
t2
(
σ2s
αs
c(C)s
)
αs
(
c(U)s − c(C)s
)
ds+
∫ T
t2
σ2s
(
c(U)s − c(C)s
)2
ds
> 2
(
σ2t1
αt1
c
(C)
t1
)∫ T
t2
αs
(
c(U)s − c(C)s
)
ds, (4.3.24)
where the last inequality follows by the fact that
(
σ2t
αt
c
(C)
t
)′
≥ 0 for all t.
By considering the definition of t0 in (4.3.21), t0 < t2, and the fact of (4.3.22),∫ T
t2
αs
(
c
(U)
s − c(C)s
)
ds > 0, and hence
∫ T
t2
σ2s
((
c
(U)
s
)2
−
(
c
(C)
s
)2)
ds > 0.
Then, d
(U)
t2 < d
(C)
t2 by comparing (4.1.8) and (4.1.10). Due to (iii) and c
(U)
t is
increasing whenever c
(U)
t > 0 in accordance with Lemma 4.3.1 (i), we have
c
(U)
t2 < 1. However, because d
(U)
t2 < d
(C)
t2 , it is impossible that c
(U)
t2 = c
(C)
t2 ,
which contradicts to the definition of t2.
Proof of Proposition 4.3.8. Following the same computation as in (4.3.24), we
have ∫ T
t0
σ2s
((
c(U)s
)2 − (c(C)s )2) ds > 2(σ2t1αt1 c(C)t1
)∫ T
t0
αs
(
c(U)s − c(C)s
)
ds = 0.
Our claim follows by comparing (4.1.9) and (4.1.11).
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We finally establish the existence of t0 (i.e. t0 > −∞) by constructing a finite
lower bound.
Proposition 4.3.10. Given that Conditions 4.2.1 and 4.2.2 hold. There exists
t0 ∈ [t0, T ) defined in (4.3.21), where t0 := τ ∗−
ασ2
(
c
(U)
T −1
)(
T−τ (U)θ
)
α2L∗ > −∞, θ := σ
2
α
,
τ (U) and τ ∗ are defined in Lemmas 4.3.2 and 4.3.3, and L∗ is given in (4.3.18).
Hence, t0 > −∞.
Proof. Assume the contrary that t0 < t0. Since t0 < τ
∗ < τ ∗ (by Lemma 4.3.3),
then c
(U)
t0 < 0 (by Lemma 4.3.4). By continuity of c
(U) and c(C), c
(U)
T > 1 and
c(C) ∈ [0, 1], the Intermediate Value Theorem ensures that t1 > t0. By Lemma
4.3.9(ii), we have c
(U)
t1 = c
(C)
t1 = 1. By Lemma 4.3.1 and the definition of t1 in
(4.3.23), we have c
(U)
T > c
(U)
t > c
(C)
t = 1 for all t ∈ (t1, T ). By Lemma 4.3.9(iv)
and the assumption that t0 < t0, c
(U)
t < c
(C)
t for all t ∈ (t0, t1). By definition of
τ
(U)
θ in (4.3.15) and definition of θ, d
(U)
τ
(U)
θ
= σ
2
α
, then c
(U)
τ
(U)
θ
≤ 1 = c(U)t1 . By Lemma
4.3.1(i) and Lemma 4.3.2, we have t1 ≥ τ (U)θ ≥ τ (U)θ .
With the above results, we have∫ T
t0
αs
(
c(U)s − c(C)s
)
ds
≤ α
∫ T
t1
(
c(U)s − c(C)s
)
ds+ α
∫ t1
t0
(
c(U)s − c(C)s
)
ds
< α
∫ T
t1
(
c
(U)
T − 1
)
ds+ α
∫ τ∗
t0
αs
σ2s
d(U)s ds
< α
(
c
(U)
T − 1
)
(T − τ (U)θ )−
α2
σ2
L∗
(
τ ∗ − t0
)
= 0, (4.3.25)
where the second inequality follows from c
(C)
t = 1 for all t ∈ (t1, T ) and c(U)t < c(C)t
for all t ∈ (τ ∗, t1); the third inequality follows from t1 ≥ τ (U)θ and Lemmas 4.3.3
and 4.3.4; and the last equality follows from the definition of t0. Note that (4.3.25)
contradicts to the assumption that t0 < t0.
Since the finiteness of t0, defined in (4.3.21), is warranted by Proposition 4.3.10,
Theorem 4.2.4 follows from Proposition 4.3.8.
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Figure 4.4: The graphical illustration to showing how equilibrium strategy changes
with commencement time. The solid line and the dashed line represent the equi-
librium investment to the wealth ratio of unconstrained and constrained investor
respectively. L∗, τ ∗ and τ † are defined in Lemmas 4.3.4 and 4.3.7. t1 is defined in
Lemma 4.3.9.
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Remark 4.3.11. The idea of the proof of Theorem 4.2.4 is to seek for a t0 such
that
∫ T
t0
αs
(
c
(U)
s − c(C)s
)
ds = 0 subject to the sufficient condition assumed in
Proposition 4.3.8. Assume that the market parameters r, α and σ are constant.
In Figure 4.4,
∫ T
t
(
c
(U)
s − c(C)s
)
ds represents the difference of the area of the yellow
region from the area of the orange one between t and T , so t0 will be taken to
be the first t < T such that this difference vanishes. To obtain such t0, we
can argue as follows. By Lemma 4.3.9, we know that there is exactly one finite
time t1 such that c
(U) and c(C) intercept with each other after t0. Hence, as
c(U) is bounded from above, there exists a M > 0 so that, for any t ∈ (t0, t1),∫ T
t
max
{
c
(U)
s − c(C)s , 0
}
ds =
∫ T
t1
(
c
(U)
s − c(C)s
)
ds ≤M , i.e. the area of the orange
region in Figure 4.4 is bounded. By Lemma 4.3.4, we know that before τ ∗, c(U) <
− α
σ2
L∗, thus c(U) − c(C) < − α
σ2
L∗, so we can find a large enough T − t such that∫ T
t
max
{
−
(
c
(U)
s − c(C)s
)
, 0
}
ds > M (In Figure 4.4, when t < τ ∗ moves to the
left, the area of the yellow region increases at a rate = |c(U) − c(C)| > α
σ2
L∗, so we
can choose an earlier enough t such that the area of the yellow region from t to T
is greater than M), hence t0 can be identified.
4.3.3 Proof of Theorem 4.2.5
By Lemmas 4.3.3 and 4.3.4, for t < τ ∗ ≤ τ ∗, c(U)t ≤ − ασ2L∗, where L∗ is given in
(4.3.18). Define t∗ := τ ∗ − ασ2c(U)(T−τ∗)
α2L∗ , where c
(U) and τ ∗ are defined in (4.3.13)
and Lemma 4.3.3 respectively. For all t < t∗, we have∫ T
t
αsc
(U)
s ds =
∫ T
τ∗
αsc
(U)
s ds+
∫ τ∗
t
αsc
(U)
s ds
≤ αc(U)(T − τ ∗)− α
2
σ2
L∗(τ ∗ − t) < 0.
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Recall the expression of V (U) in (4.1.9), for any t < t∗,
V (U)(t, x)
= e
∫ T
t (rs+αsc
(U)
s )dsx− γt
(
e
∫ T
t 2(rs+αsc
(U)
s )+σ
2
s
(
c
(U)
s
)2
ds − e
∫ T
t 2(rs+αsc
(U)
s )ds
)
x
< e
∫ T
t (rs+αsc
(U)
s )dsx < e
∫ T
t rsdsx = V (Rf)(t, x).
Remark 4.3.12. By Theorem 4.2.5, the value function of riskless strategy is
greater than that of unconstrained strategy whenever the commencing time t < t∗.
Considering the expected terminal wealth with the ratio c of investment to wealth,
i.e. Et,x[XT ] = e
∫ T
t (rs+αscs)dsx, any holding of stock in an amount of c > 0 can
boost up this expectation through a factor of e
∫ T
t αscsds. By Lemma 4.3.4, we
know that the unconstrained investor will shortsell stock to invest more in bond
for any time before τ ∗ with c less than a negative constant, so that
∫ T
t
αscsds
is increasing in t before τ ∗. Therefore, there exists a earlier enough t so that∫ T
t
αscsds < 0 making the factor e
∫ T
t αscsds < 1. As a result, the unconstrained
strategy at such commencement time t < t∗ will be beaten by the riskless strategy
of solely investing in bond.
4.3.4 Proof of Theorem 4.2.6
By Lemma 4.3.7, we know for t < τ †, c(C)t = 0. Define t
† such that
T − t† := max
 1δ1 ln
2
(
1− e−α(T−τ†)
)
γT qk†
 , T − τ †
 ,
where τ † is defined in Lemma 4.3.7.
For any t < t†, we have t < t† ≤ τ † ≤ τ (C)
k† , so
1− γt
2
e
∫ T
t
(
rs+αsc
(C)
s
)
ds
(
e
∫ T
t σ
2
s
(
c
(C)
s
)2
ds − 1
)
< 1− γT qk†
2
eδ1(T−t) < e−α(T−τ
†)
≤ e−
∫ T
t αsc
(C)
s ds,
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where the first inequality follows from (4.3.20), the second inequality follows from
the definition of t†, and the last inequality is a consequence of the facts that
c
(C)
s ≤ 1 for all s and c(C)s = 0 for s < τ †.
Recall the expression of V (C) in (4.1.11), for any t < t†,
V (C)(t, x)
= e
∫ T
t (rs+αsc
(C)
s )dsx− γt
2
(
e
∫ T
t 2(rs+αsc
(C)
s )+σ
2
s
(
c
(C)
s
)2
ds − e
∫ T
t 2(rs+αsc
(C)
s )ds
)
x
= e
∫ T
t (rs+αsc
(C)
s )dsx
(
1− γt
2
e
∫ T
t
(
rs+αsc
(C)
s
)
ds
(
e
∫ T
t σ
2
s
(
c
(C)
s
)2
ds − 1
))
< e
∫ T
t rsdsx = V (Rf)(t, x).
Remark 4.3.13. Similar to Remark 4.3.12, by Lemma 4.3.7, we know that the
constrained investor will adopt riskfree strategy for any time before τ †, thus by
(4.1.11), whenever t < τ †,
∂
∂t
(
V (C)(t, x)
e
∫ T
t rsdsx
)
=
γt
2
rt
(
e
∫ T
t (rs+2αsc
(C)
s )+2σ
2
s
(
c
(C)
s
)2
ds − e
∫ T
t (rs+2αsc
(C)
s )ds
)
≥ rγT
2
(
e
∫ T
τ† 2σ
2
s
(
c
(C)
s
)2
ds − 1
)
> 0
Therefore, there exists a small enough t such that V
(C)(t,x)
e
∫T
t rsdsx
< 1. Again, the
constrained strategy at such commencement time t < τ † will be beaten by the
riskless strategy, as claimed in Theorem 4.2.6.
4.4 Numerical Illustration
In this section, for different value of risk aversion γt, we provide a graphical illus-
tration between the ratios of equilibrium investment to wealth, c
(U)
t and c
(C)
t , and
the equilibrium value functions, V (U)(t, x) and V (C)(t, x), for unconstrained and
constrained investors. Their expressions are shown in Theorems 4.1.8 and 4.1.11.
In each plot, the respective ratios and the value functions of both unconstrained
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Table 4.3: The Parameters Used in γt for Figures
γT = 0.2 γT = 1 γT = 3
k=0.025 Figure 4.5 Figure 4.7 Figure 4.9
k=0 Figure 4.6 Figure 4.8 Figure 4.10
and constrained investor against the commencement time are shown. The perfor-
mance of the investor who takes the pure strategy by simply putting all his wealth
in bank is considered and compared with that of unconstrained and constrained
investors, for illustrating the implication of Theorems 4.2.5 and 4.2.6.
We set risk aversion γt to be time-varying such that an investor behaves more
risk averse over time. For illustration, we propose to model γt by the following
logistic function with some known parameters γT and k:
γt :=
2γT
1 + e−k(t−T )
.
Larger value of k will result more considerable increase in risk aversion as time
goes on; so the risk aversion of an investor with long time to the expiry will
be smaller for larger value of k. We consider 6 different functions of γ(t) with
γT ∈ {0.2, 1, 3} and k ∈ {0.025, 0} (see Table 4.3). Note that the risk aversion
coefficient keeps constant if k = 0. For γT = 0.2, 1, Condition 4.2.1 is clearly
satisfied; while for γT = 3, Condition 4.2.1 is not satisfied, through the example,
we show that the claim in Theorem 4.2.4 also very likely fails to hold, while suggest
that our proposed Condition 4.2.1 could be “optimal” in form. Besides, we fix
r = 0.03, µ = 0.1, σ = 0.2, and T = 40.
Furthermore, we illustrate Theorems 4.2.4, 4.2.5 and 4.2.6 by computing the
following constants:
• t∗ := sup{t < T |V (U)(t, x) ≤ V (Rf)(t, x)};
• t† := sup{t < T |V (C)(t, x) ≤ V (Rf)(t, x)};
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• t0 := sup
{
t < T |V (U)(t, x) ≤ V (C)(t, x)};
• t0 := sup
{
t < T
∣∣ ∫ T
t
αs
(
c
(U)
s − c(C)s
)
ds = 0
}
as defined in (4.3.21);
• ∆V (t0, 1) := V (U)(t, 1)− V (C)(t, 1);
where V (Rf) is given in (4.2.12).
All 6 figures show that the ratios of investment to wealth of both unconstrained
and constrained investors increase in commencement time as in Lemma 4.3.1 (i).
Furthermore, c
(U)
t becomes negative and c
(C)
t stays at zero for all earlier enough t,
which is consistent with Lemmas 4.3.4 and 4.3.7.
Theorem 4.2.4 says that there exists some commencement time such that from
that time on, the constrained equilibrium strategy performs better than the un-
constrained one. In Table 4.4, the feasible set of such commencement times occupy
more than 90% of the whole time horizon. This means that there is more than
90% of the time that the constrained equilibrium strategy performs better than
the unconstrained one. Furthermore, we have shown that the outperformance of
the constrained strategy against the unconstrained one if both commence at t0 as
defined in (4.3.21) in Proposition 4.3.8, this explains that ∆V (t0, 1) is negative in
Table 4.4.
t∗ and t† in Table 4.5 indicate the respective time points where the riskfree in-
vestor performs better than unconstrained and constrained investors before which,
as established in Theorems 4.2.5 and 4.2.6 respectively. It is reasonable to describe
a strategy, which underperforms than the riskless one, to be inferior, and so the
unconstrained equilibrium strategy and constrained equilibrium strategy are both
less favorable if one starts to invest before t∗ and t† respectively. Note that when
the terminal risk aversion coefficient γT decreases, t∗ would get closer to the expiry.
Hence, the time portion over which the unconstrained strategy remains more fa-
vorable than the riskless one reduces, as γT decreases. In contrast, as γT decreases,
t† gets departed from t∗. The shortselling constraints enlarges the time portion
153
4.4. Numerical Illustration
Table 4.4: When the Constrained Investor Dominates the Unconstrained Investor
for Different γt
γT k t0 % of t which V
(C) > V (U) t0 ∆V (t0, 1)
0.2 0.025 36.9271 92.32% 29.3924 -0.8408
0.2 0 37.1294 92.82% 30.0075 -0.8328
1 0.025 38.5363 96.34% 31.7436 -0.0580
1 0 38.6208 96.55% 31.8949 -0.0605
Table 4.5: When the Riskless Strategy Dominate the Equilibrium Strategies for
Different γt
γT k t∗ t† k t∗ t†
0.2 0.025 15.6295 -26.9883 0 25.6088 4.3168
0.5 0.025 12.3127 -9.2159 0 23.5456 12.6319
1 0.025 7.6871 1.7609 0 21.0064 17.7313
1.75 0.025 2.1902 2.1902 0 18.3645 18.3645
3 0.025 -4.7595 -4.7595 0 15.5073 15.5073
of the equilibrium strategy being more favorable than the riskless one. So one
can interpret that the shortselling constraints are more useful for time-consistent
investor when he becomes less risk averse. This observation can be interpreted as
the less risk averse attitude misleading to make over-investment, while shortselling
constraints can save the investor from running into dangerous investment which
may actually be unfavorable in term of the other objective functions.
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4.5 Discussion
Our result suggests some reasonable economic conditions, that could often happen
in the reality, under which, the constrained equilibrium strategy can dominate the
unconstrained one at a certain commencement time (Theorem 4.2.4); furthermore
both of these strategies can be beaten by the pure one of solely investing in bond
for early enough commencement time (Theorems 4.2.5 and 4.2.6). The numerical
study also illustrate that the unconstrained strategy is dominated by another
time-consistent one in the most of the time over the time horizon.
Theorem 4.2.4 shows that the equilibrium solution for the unconstrained in-
vestor is not a maximizer because it cannot beat that of the constrained coun-
terpart which is still time-consistent, and commonly accessible and admissible to
the unconstrained investor. Even worse, both the unconstrained and constrained
equilibrium strategies are beaten by the riskless strategy in Theorems 4.2.5 and
4.2.6. Hence, game theoretic approach may not provide an alternative maximizer
even among all time-consistent strategies, even though our objective is apparent
to looking for a “maximizer” (actually just an equilibrium solution).
There is no mathematical paradox for the present time-consistent solution.
The equilibrium strategies of both unconstrained and constrained investors do
satisfy the Nash equilibrium nature under game theoretic approach. From this
idea of game theoretic approach, any such equilibrium strategy is a time-consistent
strategy which has a portion being optimal at the commencement time close to
the expiry time T ; this also explains why we observe that the unconstrained
strategy has the best possible performance against that of the constrained and
riskless strategies in Figures 4.5-4.10 when t close to T . In the meanwhile, the
later time players set a routine to which the optimal control of the earlier time
players refers, so the preference of the earlier time players will be overlooked. On
the one hand, the appearance of the paradox suggests that the strategy of the
later time players in the unconstrained optimization can be more unfavorable for
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the earlier time players than those in the constrained case. While on the other
hand, the game theoretic approach assigns a “precommitment” strategy to the
later time players. In principle, if this time-consistent approach is appropriate,
a sophisticated investor should not care that his unconstrained strategy being
beaten by another (constrained) time-consistent strategy, and even by a riskless
strategy, at the earlier time point. However, based on our results obtained, it is
too tempting to make a change, isn’t it?
The rationale behind the present acclaimed paradox should be rooted in the
economic interpretation of game theoretic approach. Strotz (1955) first suggested
to use game theoretic approach as a “time-consistent plan”, and said that it should
be “the best plan among those that he (would) actually follow”. However, we have
established that the equilibrium strategy of unconstrained investor obtained by
game theoretic approach, which is described as the “best time-consistent strat-
egy” in Strotz (1955), is essentially beaten by another admissible time-consistent
strategy (the strategy adopted by constrained investor). Even worse, in the nu-
merical examples in Table 4.4, the constrained strategy outperforms against the
unconstrained one for more than 90% of the whole time horizon, which is just like
an unconstrained equilibrium investor giving up the victory over his constrained
counterpart for more than 18 years in order to attain a triumph only at the final
year. Of course, there is no correct answer whether it is worthwhile to achieve
a perfect ending. Nevertheless, before becoming the premier, the unconstrained
investor needs to bear the stress from the inferior performance of unconstrained
equilibrium strategy, especially even an investor who puts all his wealth into the
bank account can gain more satisfaction than adopting the unconstrained strategy
by Table 4.5 and Theorem 4.2.5. Actually, sometimes the unconstrained investor
can also acquire the performance under the constrained strategy by confining his
admissible set, it seems too tempting for him to give up the unconstrained strategy
and pursue his “best plan among consistent plans”.
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On the other hand, for open-loop controls in light of the definition of equilib-
rium control in Hu et al. (2012), whether the equilibrium control over a smaller
admissible set can out-perform the one over a larger set is an open problem. Also,
it is an interesting study to compare the performance of the respective equilibrium
control among the class of open-loop ones and the class of Markovian ones.
Game theoretic approach can help us to find a time-consistent solution, but
whether it is a good solution for an investor is a question that we have to think
about carefully. The inconsistency and paradox raised in this Chapter show that
the solution concept of equilibrium control is subtle, so an intensive study on
underlying economic interpretation behind the time-consistent solution should be
encouraged. It is interesting to have a more comprehensive empirical study on the
connection between the mathematical solution and investors’ behavior for equi-
librium strategy, and we should reconsider carefully whether the solution via the
simple non-cooperative game theoretic approach is justifiable as an ideal strategy
used by a time-consistent investor. As pointed out by Schweizer (2010), to find
a time-consistent formulation in general is an open problem, which means that
there could be other ideal formats of time-consistent strategy. Since time incon-
sistent problems can be intricate, different problems should be tackled by their
own tailor-made “time consistent” approach in accordance with their respective
economic considerations. We hope that our present work can motivate more sub-
stantial research on time consistency that can cunningly link mathematics and
economics in a proper manner.
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(a)
(b)
Figure 4.5: Fix γT = 0.2, k = 0.025: (a) The ratio of investment to wealth, ct,
and (b) the equilibrium value function, V (t, 1), against the commencement time
t, for unconstrained (solid line), constrained (dashed line) and riskless investors
(dotted line).
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(a)
(b)
Figure 4.6: Fix γT = 0.2, k = 0: (a) The ratio of investment to wealth, ct, and
(b) the equilibrium value function, V (t, 1), against the commencement time t, for
unconstrained (solid line), constrained (dashed line) and riskless investors (dotted
line).
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(a)
(b)
Figure 4.7: Fix γT = 1, k = 0.025: (a) The ratio of investment to wealth, ct, and
(b) the equilibrium value function, V (t, 1), against the commencement time t, for
unconstrained (solid line), constrained (dashed line) and riskless investors (dotted
line).
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(a)
(b)
Figure 4.8: Fix γT = 1, k = 0: (a) The ratio of investment to wealth, ct, and
(b) the equilibrium value function, V (t, 1), against the commencement time t, for
unconstrained (solid line), constrained (dashed line) and riskless investors (dotted
line).
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(a)
(b)
Figure 4.9: Fix γT = 3, k = 0.025: (a) The ratio of investment to wealth, ct, and
(b) the equilibrium value function, V (t, 1), against the commencement time t, for
unconstrained (solid line), constrained (dashed line) and riskless investors (dotted
line).
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(a)
(b)
Figure 4.10: Fix γT = 3, k = 0: (a) The ratio of investment to wealth, ct, and
(b) the equilibrium value function, V (t, 1), against the commencement time t, for
unconstrained (solid line), constrained (dashed line) and riskless investors (dotted
line).
163
Bibliography
Ainslie, G. (1992). Picoeconomics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Bajeux-Besnainou, I., J. V. Jordan, and R. Portait (2003). Dynamic asset alloca-
tion for stocks, bonds and cash. Journal of Business 76 (2), 263–287.
Barro, R. J. (1999). Ramsey meets Laibson in the neoclassical growth model.
Quarterly Journal of Economics 114 (4), 1125–1152.
Basak, S. and G. Chabakauri (2010). Dynamic mean-variance asset allocation.
Review of Financial Studies 23 (8), 2970–3016.
Basak, S. and G. Chabakauri (2012). Dynamic hedging in incomplete markets: a
simple solution. Review of Financial Studies 25 (6), 1845–1896.
Basak, S. and A. Shapiro (2001). Value-at-risk-based risk management: optimal
policies and asset prices. Review of Financial Studies 14 (2), 371–405.
Bellman, R. E. (1957). Dynamic Programming (1 ed.). Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
Bensoussan, A., K. C. Wong, and S. C. P. Yam (2014). Mean-variance precommit-
ment policies revisited via a mean-field technique. In A. Takahashi, Y. Muro-
machi, and T. Shibata (Eds.), Recent Advances in Financial Engineering 2012,
Singapore, pp. 177–198. World Scientific.
164
Bibliography
Bensoussan, A., K. C. Wong, and S. C. P. Yam (2016). A paradox in time
consistency in mean-variance problem? Submitted.
Bensoussan, A., K. C. Wong, S. C. P. Yam, and S. P. Yung (2014). Time-consistent
portfolio selection under short-selling prohibition: from discrete to continuous
setting. SIAM Journal on Financial Mathematics 5 (1), 153–190.
Bielecki, T. R., H. Jin, S. R. Pliska, and X. Y. Zhou (2005). Continuous-time
mean-variance portfolio selection with bankruptcy prohibition. Mathematical
Finance 15 (2), 213–244.
Bjo¨rk, T. and A. Murgoci (2010). A general theory of Markovian time inconsistent
stochastic control problems. Working Paper, Stockholm School of Economics.
Bjo¨rk, T. and A. Murgoci (2014). A theory of Markovian time inconsistent stochas-
tic control in discrete time. Finance and Stochastics 18 (3), 545–592.
Bjo¨rk, T., A. Murgoci, and X. Y. Zhou (2014). Mean-variance portfolio optimiza-
tion with state-dependent risk aversion. Mathematical Finance 24 (1), 1–24.
Brennan, M. J., R. Lagnado, and E. S. Schwartz (1997). Strategic asset allocation.
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 21 (8–9), 1377–1403.
Campbell, J. Y. and L. M. Viceira (1999). Consumption and portfolio deci-
sions when expected returns are time varying. Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 114 (2), 433–495.
Cao, X., J. Gao, D. Li, and K. Zhou (2014). Dynamic mean-LPM and
mean-CVaR portfolio optimization in continuous-time. Working Paper.
http://arxiv.org/abs/1402.3464.
Chen, P. and H. Yang (2011). Markowitz’s mean-variance asset-liability man-
agement with regime switching: a multi-period model. Applied Mathematical
Finance 18 (1), 29–50.
165
Bibliography
Chen, P., H. Yang, and G. Yin (2008). Markowitz’s mean-variance asset-liability
management with regime switching: a continuous-time model. Insurance:
Mathematics and Economics 43 (3), 456–465.
Cox, J. C. and C. Huang (1989). Optimal consumption and portfolio policies when
asset prices follow a diffusion process. Journal of Economic Theory 49 (1), 33–
83.
Cui, X., D. Li, and X. Li (2015). Mean-variance policy for discrete-time cone-
constrained markets: time consistency in efficiency and the minimum-variance
signed supermartingale measure. Mathematical Finance. to appear.
Cuoco, D., H. He, and S. Isaenko (2008). Optimal dynamic trading strategies
with risk limits. Operations Research 56 (2), 358–368.
Cvitanic´, J., L. Goukasian, and F. Zapatero (2003). Monte Carlo computation
of optimal portfolios in complete markets. Journal of Economic Dynamics and
Control 27 (6), 971–986.
Czichowsky, C. (2013). Time-consistent mean-variance portfolio selection in dis-
crete and continuous time. Finance and Stochastics 17 (2), 227–271.
Deelstra, G., H. Pham, and N. Touzi (2001). Dual formulation of the utility maxi-
mization problem under transaction costs. Annals of Applied Probability 11 (4),
1353–1383.
Detemple, J. B., R. Garcia, and M. Rindisbacher (2003). A Monte Carlo Method
for Optimal Portfolios. Journal of Finance 58 (1), 401–446.
Du Toit, J. and G. Peskir (2009). Selling a stock at the ultimate maximum. Annals
of Applied Probability 19 (3), 983–1014.
Ekeland, I. and A. Lazrak (2010). The golden rule when preferences are time-
inconsistent. Mathematics and Financial Economics 4 (1), 29–55.
166
Bibliography
Ekeland, I., O. Mbodj, and T. A. Pirvu (2012). Time-consistent portfolio man-
agement. SIAM Journal of Financial Mathematics 3 (1), 1–32.
Ekeland, I. and T. A. Pirvu (2008). Investment and consumption without com-
mitment. Mathematics and Financial Economics 2 (1), 57–86.
Fitzpatrick, B. G. and W. H. Fleming (1991). Numerical methods for optimal
investment-consumption models. Mathematics of Operations Research 16 (4),
823–841.
Fleming, W. H. and H. M. Soner (2006). Controlled Markov Processes and Vis-
cosity Solutions. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Fo¨llmer, H. and A. Schied (2004). Stochastic Finance: An Introduction in Discrete
Time (2nd edition ed.). Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
Forsyth, P. A. and J. Wang (2010). Numerical solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman formulation for continuous time mean variance asset allocation. Jour-
nal of Economic Dynamics and Control 34 (2), 207–230.
Forsyth, P. A. and J. Wang (2011). Continuous time mean variance asset al-
location: a time-consistent strategy. European Journal of Operational Re-
search 209 (2), 184–201.
Goldman, S. M. (1980). Consistent plans. Review of Economic Studies 47 (3),
533–537.
Gu, A., D. Li, and Y. Zeng (2016). Robust equilibrium reinsurance-investment
strategy for a mean-variance insurer in a model with jumps. Insurance: Math-
ematics and Economics 66, 138–152.
Harris, C. and D. Laibson (2001). Dynamic choices of hyperbolic consumers.
Econometrica 69 (4), 935–957.
167
Bibliography
Harris, C. and D. Laibson (2013). Instantaneous gratification. Quarterly Journal
of Economics 128 (1), 205–248.
He, H. (1991). Optimal consumption-portfolio policies: a convergence from dis-
crete to continuous time models. Journal of Economic Theory 55 (2), 340–363.
He, X. D., H. Jin, and X. Y. Zhou (2015). Dynamic portfolio choice when risk is
measured by weighted VaR. Mathematics of Operations Research 40 (3), 773–
796.
Hogan, W. W. and J. M. Warren (1972). Computation of the efficient boundary
in the E-S Portfolio Selection Model. Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis 7 (4), 1881–1896.
Hu, Y., H. Jin, and X. Y. Zhou (2012). Time-inconsistent stochastic linear-
quadratic control. SIAM Journal on Control and Optimization 50 (3), 1548–
1572.
Jin, H., H. M. Markowitz, and X. Y. Zhou (2006). A note on semivariance.
Mathematical Finance 16 (1), 53–61.
Jin, H., J. Yan, and X. Y. Zhou (2005). Continuous-time mean-risk portfolio selec-
tion. Annales de l’Institut Henri Poincare (B) Probability and Statistics 41 (3),
559–580.
Karatzas, I., J. P. Lehoczky, and S. E. Shreve (1987). Optimal portfolio and
consumption decisions for a “small investor” on a finite horizon. SIAM Journal
on Control and Optimization 25 (6), 1557–1586.
Karatzas, I., J. P. Lehoczky, S. E. Shreve, and G. Xu (1991). Martingale and du-
ality methods for utility maximization in an incomplete market. SIAM Journal
on Control and Optimization 29 (3), 702–730.
168
Bibliography
Karatzas, I. and S. E. Shreve (1998). Methods of Mathematical Finance. New
York: Springer-Verlag.
Karp, L. (2007). Non-constant discounting in continuous time. Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory 132 (1), 557–568.
Kroll, Y., H. Levy, and H. M. Markowitz (1984). Mean-variance versus direct
utility maximization. Journal of Finance 39 (1), 47–61.
Kronborg, M. T. and M. Steffensen (2015). Inconsistent investment and consump-
tion problems. Applied Mathematics and Optimization 71 (3), 473–515.
Krusell, P. and A. A. J. Smith (2003). Consumption-savings decisions with quasi-
geometric discounting. Econometrica 71 (1), 365–375.
Laibson, D. (1997). Golden eggs and hyperbolic discounting. Quarterly Journal
of Economics 112 (2), 443–478.
Larsen, K. and G. Zˇitkovic´ (2007). Stability of utility-maximization in incomplete
market. Stochastic Processes and their Applications 117 (11), 1642–1662.
Leippold, M., F. Trojani, and P. Vanini (2006). Equilibrium impact of value-at-
risk regulation. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 30 (8), 1277–1313.
Levy, H. and H. M. Markowitz (1979). Approximating expected utility by a
function of mean and variance. American Economic Review 69 (3), 308–317.
Li, D. and W. L. Ng (2000). Optimal dynamic portfolio selection: multiperiod
mean-variance formulation. Mathematical Finance 10 (3), 387–406.
Li, D. and X. Y. Zhou (2000). Continuous-time mean-variance portfolio selection:
a stochastic LQ framework. Applied Mathematics and Optimization 42 (1), 19–
33.
169
Bibliography
Lim, A. E. B. and X. Y. Zhou (2002). Mean-variance portfolio selection with
random coefficients in a complete market. Mathematics of Operations Re-
search 27 (1), 101–120.
Loewenstein, G. and D. Prelec (1992). Anomalies in intertemporal choice: evi-
dence and an interpretation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 107 (2), 573–597.
Mar´ın-Solano, J. and J. Navas (2010). Consumption and portfolio rules for time-
inconsistent investors. European Journal of Operational Research 201 (3), 860–
872.
Markowitz, H. M. (1952). Portfolio selection. Journal of Finance 7 (1), 77–91.
Markowitz, H. M. (1956). The optimization of a quadratic function subject to
linear constraints. Naval Research Logistics 3 (1-2), 111–133.
Markowitz, H. M. (1959). Portfolio Selection: Efficient Diversification of Invest-
ments. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
Markowitz, H. M. (1990). Foundations of portfolio theory. Journal of Fi-
nance 46 (2), 469–477.
Markowitz, H. M. (2010). Portfolio theory: as i still see it. Annual Review of
Financial Economics 2, 1–23.
Merton, R. C. (1971). Optimum consumption and portfolio rules in a continuous-
time model. Journal of Economic Theory 3 (4), 373–413.
Merton, R. C. (1972). An analytical derivation of the efficient portfolio frontier.
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 7 (4), 1851–1872.
Nantell, T. J. and B. Price (1979). An analytical comparison of variance and
semivariance capital market theories. Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis 14 (2), 221–242.
170
Bibliography
Nawrocki, D. (1999). A brief history of downside risk measures. Journal of
Investing 8 (3), 9–25.
Pedersen, J. L. and G. Peskir (2015). Optimal mean-variance portfolio selec-
tion. Working Paper. http://www.maths.manchester.ac.uk/ goran/research-
reports/psrr14-2013.pdf.
Peleg, B. and M. E. Yaari (1973). On the existence of a consistent course of action
when tastes are changing. Review of Economic Studies 40 (3), 391–401.
Phelps, E. S. and R. A. Pollak (1968). On second-best national saving and game-
equilibrium growth. Review of Economic Studies 35 (2), 185–199.
Pliska, S. R. (1982). A discrete time stochastic decision model. In W. H. Flem-
ing and L. G. Gorostiza (Eds.), Advances in Filtering and Optimal Stochastic
Control, Volume 42 of Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences, pp.
290–304. Berlin-Heidelberg-New York: Springer-Verlag.
Pliska, S. R. (1986). A stochastic calculus model of continuous trading: optimal
portfolios. Mathematics of Operations Research 11 (2), 371–382.
Pollak, R. A. (1968). Consistent planning. Review of Economic Studies 35 (2),
201–208.
Prigent, J. (2003). Weak Convergence of Financial Markets. Berlin: Springer-
Verlag.
Pulley, L. B. (1981). A general mean-variance approximation to expected utility
for short holding periods. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 16 (3),
361–373.
Samuelson, P. A. (1969). Lifetime portfolio selection by dynamic stochastic pro-
gramming. Review of Economics and Statistics 51 (3), 239–246.
171
Bibliography
Schweizer, M. (2010). Mean-variance hedging. In R. Cont (Ed.), Encyclopedia of
Quantitative Finance, pp. 1177–1181. Willey.
Shiryaev, A. N., Z. Xu, and X. Y. Zhou (2008). Thou shalt buy and hold. Quan-
titative Finance 8 (8), 765–776.
Steinbach, M. C. (2001). Markowitz revisited: mean-variance models in financial
portfolio analysis. SIAM Review 43 (1), 31–85.
Strotz, R. H. (1955). Myopia and inconsistency in dynamic utility maximization.
Review of Economic Studies 23 (3), 165–180.
Thaler, R. (1981). Some empirical evidence on dynamic inconsistency. Economics
Letters 8 (3), 201–207.
Touzi, N. (2002). Stochastic control problems, viscosity solutions, and application
to finance. Lecture Note.
Touzi, N. (2013). Optimal Stochastic Control, Stochastic Target Problems, and
Backward SDE. New York: Springer-Verlag.
Wei, J., K. C. Wong, S. C. P. Yam, and S. P. Yung (2013). Markowitz’s mean-
variance asset-liability management with regime switching: A time-consistent
approach. Insurance: Mathematics and Economics 53 (1), 281–291.
Williams, D. (1991). Probability with Martingales. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
Wong, K. C., S. C. P. Yam, H. Yang, and H. Zheng (2016). Numerical valuation
of optimal utility-risk portfolio. Working Paper.
Wong, K. C., S. C. P. Yam, and H. Zheng (2015). Utility-risk portfolio selection.
Submitted.
172
Bibliography
Yiu, K. F. C. (2004). Optimal portfolios under a value-at-risk constraint. Journal
of Economic Dynamics and Control 28 (7), 1317–1334.
Yong, J. (2012). Time-inconsistent optimal control problems and the equilibrium
HJB equation. Working Paper. http://arxiv.org/abs/1204.0568.
Zheng, H. (2009). Efficient frontier of utility and conditional VaR. Mathematical
Methods of Operations Research 70 (1), 129–148.
173
